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The research programme challenge was to establish optimum reliability for the Royal Bank of 
Scotland’s data centres electrical networks, given such mission critical buildings are vital to business 
operations, and loss of data centre services in terms of critical equipment outage is likely to negatively 
affect the UK economy.  The Royal Bank of Scotland’s data centres are listed with the Committee for 
Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), and although despite being of national importance the 
current industry practice is to design and construct electrical infrastructures in-line with the Uptime 
Institutes Tier Classification table, which provides a design only approach for equipment topologies 
and expected annual downtime of critical systems. This approach is based on Inherent Availability 
(Ai) which utilises manufacturers design metrics and does not consider the complexities or issues 
encountered in an actual mesh connected electrical network i.e., those of an operational state. 
 
Therefore, in this investigation Operational Availability (Ao) of the actual data centre electrical 
network was established through a series of power system model simulations, which included load 
flow, short circuit analysis, protection device co-ordination and grading, arc flash and load point 
reliability. Power system models were constructed from the actual installed equipment, site load 
values and considered all possible operational scenarios and failure modes, with power system 
simulations being undertaken for every operational scenario that had been outlined in the original 
design specifications, including symmetrical fault current simulations undertaken at every critical 
busbar.  
 
The findings from each of the power system studies were analysed against the original system 
benchmarks, with gap analysis undertaken leading to the formation of a new and improved 
generalised approach for maximising Operational Availability (Ao).  Electrical network issues were 
encountered across a range of power system studies with the more prominent areas including high 
voltage protection device arrangements and arc flash incidents located on the low voltage switchgear. 
In fact, over 30% of the electrical equipment investigated did not provide an optimal solution, with 
each one of these issues being simulated individually and critiqued with power system engineering 
theories and best practices, allowing subsequent improvements to be achieved. The improved 
solutions were again simulated for system failure rates thus provided a tangible metric comparison, 
with estimated outage times being reduced by as much as 45 hours per year.  
 
This new approach was formulated into a flowchart, a Generalised Approach to Improving Data 
Centre Operational Availability which is an advancement to the current Uptime Institutes Tier 
Classifications methodology, the approach was validated in this electrical network and reduced 
estimated outage times by over 45 hours per year. This is a substantial improvement in operational 
iii 
 
reliability metrics and the flowchart can be utilised by any other data centre owner i.e., for simulation 
and improvement of their electrical network with core focus on achieving an actual improvement in 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction, research aims and objectives  
1.0 Introduction  
This chapter provides an explanation into the background of mission critical buildings, detailing the 
key points as to why such buildings are pivotal to the successful operation of the UK economy. Also, 
highlighting the vast scale of construction and power consumption of such critical infrastructures, 
providing an insight into the current challenges and what investigations have taken place for 
understanding the links between electrical engineering and the operation of these buildings, with a 
given focus on data centre operations and an explanation of the associated differences between 
inherent and operational availability, and why this is important. Also, detailing the aims and 
objectives for the research, explaining how they will achieve a contribution of knowledge, and an 
overview of thesis layout including descriptor of each chapter contents.  
1.1 Background 
Mission critical buildings are an essential part of business operations, technology is utilised daily in 
business sectors such as banking and finance, travel and hospitality, hospitals and healthcare services, 
emergency services, security and intelligence, military, and social media -which all depend on the 
successful uptime of data centre equipment. Therefore, a data centres existence is to support critical 
technology equipment allowing successful business operations and delivery of services to customers. 
Such business services can be critical to the UK economy, with ramification following service outage 
or equipment failure being catastrophic in terms of significant financial and reputational damages.  
 
This therefore leads onto the designs for mission critical buildings, with a requirement for twenty-four 
by seven operation which demands a complex range of electrical equipment to support the connected 
loads and withstand any possible infrastructure emergency or fault scenario. Scenarios such as grid 
outages, power surges, failure of electromechanical equipment, switching surges, lightning strikes, 
protection operations and human errors amongst others. The current design approach is utilisation of 
the Uptime Institutes Tier Classifications table which is a theory based on utilising high Inherent 
Availabilities (Ai) of equipment provided by the manufactures and does not take into consideration 
the actual site topologies and operational settings. Through application of power system modelling 
and simulation this research will investigate such operational scenarios of an actual Tier 3 data centre 






1.2 Problem Statement  
Currently data centres are designed and constructed in-line with the Uptime Institutes Tier 
Classifications guidelines, analysis of these guidelines has proven that data centres operate correctly 
but do not maximise their operational performance. This is because the approach is fundamental based 
on utilising a high redundant capacity and inherent availability metrics provided by each equipment 
manufacture and does not consider the operational factors, or issues encountered with operational 
electrical systems. The aim of this project, through system modelling and simulation, is to investigate 
the operational factors of an actual Tier 3 data centre and establish an approach which will achieve an 
enhancement on system reliability.  
 
From the literature search in this area know body has yet tried to utilise the investigation of 
Operational Availability (Ao) to supplement or replace the current Uptime Tier Classifications 
approach, by applying a series of robust power system models and simulations to an actual Tier 3 data 
centre system with establishment of reliability metrics at each critical busbar i.e., improving or 
correcting the system imbalances that could be experienced with the Uptime Tier Classifications 
approach. 
1.3 Aims  
The aim of this research is to develop a new generalised approach methodology for achieving the 
optimal electrical power system configuration for data centres, which can be utilised for maximising 
the uptime reliability metrics for operational equipment and topologies.  
 
The output of this new generalised approach methodology will aim to provide higher reliability 
metrics in comparison to the current approach, which is utilisation of the Uptime Institutes Tier 
Classifications table. The Uptime’s approach is based on utilising high Inherent Availability (Ai) for 
specified equipment, however no Operational Investigation (Ao) or inclusion of operational factors are 
included within this approach, hence the research aim is based on this gap.  
 
The aim of a new generalised approach methodology will be achieved via creating a suite of power 
system models which represent an actual Tier 3 data centre electrical network, with an aim of 
subjecting these models to a series of simulations to establish the optimal operational configurations 
and achievement of reliability metrics. Simulation results with be critiqued with power system theory 
and best practices to produce a final robust flowchart outlining the new and improved generalised 






1.4 Objectives  
 
i. Literature review. 
The literature review will define what types of electrical equipment are installed within data 
centres, what the typical network configurations and design topologies are, what international 
standards are available and how they are applied in their design and construction. An analysis 
of how reliability metrics are measured in data centre electrical networks along with how 
power system analysis of electrical equipment is undertaken. Alongside these specific data 
centre aspects, the literature covering theories of power system analysis will be reviewed, 
including theoretical calculations, modelling, and simulation, with a bias to such equipment 
located within data centre buildings.  
 
ii. Audit the data centre system. 
A review of all site documentation available for the RBS data centre electrical network will 
be undertaken, with an objective to obtain detailed information for its current structure, 
network configurations and topologies, equipment installed, equipment settings, and possible 
fault scenarios. This will include reviewing the original design documentation, previous 
history of electrical studies, manufacturers data, test certification, and historic recording of 
operational settings. In addition to the review of literature a physical site based deep dive 
audit will be undertaken, to ensure all operational settings and equipment ratings are as 
recorded in the documentation. This will include inspecting equipment such as main DNO 
feeders, synchronous generators, power transformers, UPS, switchgear, circuit breakers, 
protection relays and interconnecting cabling. The data extracted from all site equipment will 
be stored in several settings tables for use in subsequent ETAP modelling and simulations as 
part of this research program. Settings tables are shown in Appendix  II and Appendix III. 
 
iii. Construct and validate singular power system model components.  
Creating a suite of singular power system model components to represent the actual data 
centre equipment found at the audit stages, including grid feeder, synchronous generator, 
UPS, power transformers, switchgear, protection relays, and distribution cables. Utilising 
theoretical calculations as proof of concept for each of the data centre components, i.e. 
proving accuracy of the model equipment in singular format, with a triangulation of data 
between theoretical calculation, simulation, and manufacturers specifications before 
proceeding to build a complete system model. The standardised ETAP model blocks will be 






iv. Construct a complete data centre power system model. 
Utilising the individual model components to construct a complete data centre electrical 
network in-line with the site documentation and single line diagrams. This will include every 
electrical pathway and equipment from incoming sources to end load points in the live 
system. A validation check of system components, connections and measurements will be 
undertaken with a comparison to installed site metering data.  
 
v. Benchmarking the original system reliability. 
Requires the creation of a series of load point reliability studies in simulation software to 
establish the current system performance (overall reliability benchmarking), before subjecting 
the system to any further power system analysis and investigation. Reliability metrics are to 
be expressed as an hours per year expected outage for every system load point i.e., main 
switchgear components and data hall power distribution units etc. 
 
vi. Power system analysis.  
Compiling a detailed and robust approach to simulation methodology, undertaking a range of 
ETAP simulations for nominal, design, and emergency operational scenarios, as defined in 
the data centre audit documentation and original design specification for a Tier 3 and Tier 4 
system. Applying a methodical approach with completing the power system studies - load 
flow, short circuit analysis, protection device grading, and arc flash assessment.   
 
vii. Analysis of simulation results.  
Analyse results in terms of deviation from international standards IEC60909, IEC 61363, 
IEEE1584-2018, NFPA 70E 2018, ANSI C84, BS7671, and against power system theories; 
adaptive Newton Raphson, voltage security index, system voltage drops, symmetrical 
component analysis, protection grading aspects for Time Current Curve (TCC) and Non-Time 
Current Curve (NTCC) functions. Also, validating compliance with operational manuals and 
tolerances outlined by the original equipment manufacturers.  
 
viii. Outline system improvements and re-simulate.  
Providing a suite of recommended improvements for operational topologies, equipment 
settings, and electrical protection grading systems. Update the electrical simulation models 
accordingly then re-simulate all operational and failure scenarios as per the original study, 
including undertaking load point reliability analysis at each load point allowing a pre- and 





ix. Benchmark the improved system reliability. 
Requires creating a series of load point reliability studies to establish the improved system 
performance (overall reliability benchmarking), i.e., after subjecting it to extensive power 
system analysis and investigation and undertaking the recommended system improvements. 
Reliability metrics are to be expressed as an hours per year expected outage of each system 
load point i.e., main switchgear components and data hall power distribution units etc. The 
hours per year outage metric will provide a pre- and post-analysis of reliability performance 
and substantiate validity of recommendations given.   
 
x. Create a new and improved generalised approach methodology.  
This objective will require construction of a detailed sequential flowchart of actions, and 
recommended results for each of the data centre power system studies. The generalised 
approach methodology will ensure an improvement of Operational Availability (Ao) is 
achieved in comparison to the current Uptime Institutes Tier Classification approach and can 
be applied to any data centre electrical network and ensuring it can be utilsied in parallel to 
the current model. The flowchart will include all technical power system aspects such as load 
flow, short circuits, protection device grading, arc flash mitigation and load point reliability 
analysis. 
 
These objectives are timely and important given the demand and growth of data centre buildings is 
exceeding many other operations, with complex electrical engineering systems underpinning the 
success of these buildings. Despite being an area with limited research publications available the 
current findings have expressed a concern over operational reliability. Given the current design 
approach is to utilise the Uptime Tier Classification table which has been proven to work well but 
does not apply focus on maximising the reliability of an operational system. Failure of these data 
centre systems will have significant financial, political, customer and reputational impacts therefore 
providing an approach to improve operational reliability and reduced the predicted failure rates and 












1.5 The Research Challenge and PhD Contribution  
To understand the current scope of research available for this chosen field, with specific focus on the 
use and application of electrical equipment and protection schemes, and how they can affect 
Operational Availability (Ao) of data centres. Including the establishment and application of an 
appropriate power system modelling software which is effective with carrying out simulations for 
load flow, short circuits, protection device grading, arc flash mitigation and load point reliability 
analysis.  
 
This research programme is to include a comprehensive audit and literature review of an actual Tier 3 
data centre, obtaining all operational topologies, equipment details and operational settings. With this 
information obtained the challenge will be to build a unique set of singular model components, 
validate each of them for accuracy against theoretical calculation and the original equipment 
manufacturers data, which will provide an accurate assessment of the original network and establish 
its current availability metrics i.e., benchmark the complete original system.  
 
With initial benchmarking completed the next challenge is subjecting the electrical network to a series 
of complex power system simulations inclusive of load flow, short circuits, protection device grading, 
arc flash mitigation and load point reliability analysis. This simulation approach will include 
investigation of all operational configurations, and failure scenarios, with results and parameters 
critiqued against international standards and more importantly their direct effects on system load point 
reliability.  Results following simulations will allow recommendation for system improvements, 
which will then be undertaken on the original model components and re-simulated under the same 
operational and failure scenarios to ensure an improvement of operational availability is obtained i.e., 
a new reliability metric will be established. 
 
The unique contribution of knowledge is construction of an approach methodology which can be 
applied to any other data centre electrical network for improvement of Operational Availability (Ao), 
The author will achieve this by utilising the research outcomes to create a new generalised approach 
flowchart which will have been proven to increase system reliability and achieve an enhancement on 
the Uptimes Tier Classifications approach. The flowchart will provide optimal guidance and 
benchmark parameters for each of the power system studies and follow a sequential step by step 
approach to achieve maximum operational reliability. This approach challenges the current research 
gap in terms of providing additional operational benefits above the current design approach of 






1.6 Thesis Organisation  
The thesis is organised as follows.  
 
Chapter 1 
An explanation into the background of mission critical buildings, detailing the key points as to why 
such buildings are important and what challenges are present within the industry. Also lists the aims 
and objectives, PhD contribution,  and an overview of thesis layout including all chapter contents. 
 
Chapter 2  
A detailed overview of the data centre industry in terms of electrical networks, review of industry 
equipment, applications, and engineering sciences. Provides further discussion on the six areas of 
electrical infrastructures which can affect data centre reliability and merging technologies utilised in 
these buildings. Highlight’s limitations of the current approach.  
 
Chapter 3  
A detailed overview of the RBS data centre infrastructure in terms of general layout and equipment 
installed. Provides a proof-of-concept ETAP simulation for singular equipment before progressing 
with full model construction and simulation.   
 
Chapter 4  
Detailing the specification of ETAP electrical model simulations for load flow, fault current analysis, 
protection grading and arc flash assessment. Also detailing the engineering theories and mathematical 
equations, international standards and theories utilised in all model simulations.  
 
Chapter 5  
Provides ETAP software simulation results and descriptions for; load flow, short circuit analysis, 
protection grading, arc flash and load point reliability studies, respectively.  Including full HV 
network results and separate section for LV UPS systems.  
 
Chapter 6 
Consists of the implications associated with the application of electrical protection in data centres, 
details several options for obtaining improved Time Current Curves (TCC), ensuring effective 
operation of circuit devices & mitigating outages of the infrastructure – both HV & LV equipment. 
Ultimately increasing the potential Operational Availability (Ao) of the critical electrical equipment. 




protection settings. Chapter 6.3 providing a generalised approach flowchart with set of optimal 
conditions for achieving improved data centre Operational Availability (Ao). 
 
Chapter 7  
Provides research programme conclusions, re-capping on what has been researched, nature of the 
arguments and key points of how the elements were undertaken. Also details the overall benefits 
gained with creating a generalised approach methodology for improving operational reliability of data 































Chapter 2 – Literature review 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter is a detailed overview of data centre electrical networks, operational configuration of 
equipment and topologies for a complete low voltage and high voltage electrical system. This includes 
an in-depth review of the wider field, providing details on the size, complexity and associated 
international standards, along with an understanding of the challenges faced by the data centre 
owners, particularly in terms of achieving the most reliable configuration of electrical equipment and 
how pivotal this is with respect to achieving maximum uptime of critical services.  A review of the 
most critical equipment found in these buildings was undertaken, which included investigations of 
high voltage power transformers, synchronous generators, uninterruptible power supplies, power 
distribution units, switchgear, circuit breakers, protection relays, interconnecting cabling, and busbar, 
and more importantly how these equipment are utilised and configured in this type of infrastructure.  
 
This chapter also provides further discussion on the reliability metrics currently utilised within this 
field, along with an explanation of the British Standard (BSEN 50600-1) and Uptime Institutes Tier 
Classifications table. Essentially, outlining how these infrastructures are nominally operated and 
predicted reliability metrics are obtained. These metrics were also reviewed for scientific content and 
equations for obtaining both Operational Availability (Ao) and Inherent Availability (Ai) metrics, 
including establishing Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) - given 
















2.1 Background  
Mission critical infrastructures are vital to the economy [46], at present data centres consume large 
amounts of electrical energy and publications have predicted such facilities will consume 100 billion 
KWh at an annual cost of £5.36 billion [53]. This aggressive increase in electrical power is likely to 
continue into the distant future as technology applications continue to grow and improve [49]. Each 
year there will be more than 1.2 trillion gigabytes of data created and utilised by: banking facilities, 
stock exchange, hospital services, and airport traffic control stations [15]. Highlighted in Table 2.1.1 
is the scale of such mission critical facilities in terms of gross MW power capacity required to 
facilitate critical systems [23]. 
 
Table 2.1.1  Example Data Centre Power Capacities [23] 
DATA CENTRE LOCATION CAPACITY (MW) 
Google 
Council Bluffs, IA 105 
Pryor, OK 49 
Hamina, Finland 19 
Apple 
Maiden NC 19 
Newark CA 15 
Facebook 
Lulea, Sweden 70 
Altoona, IA 70 
Microsoft San Antonio, TX 27 
Yahoo Lockport, NY 23 
 
Such growing dependency on these businesses brings an added focus on the consequence of 
downtime, quite often the Information Technology (IT) operations are crucial to the business 
continuity and if systems become unavailable the operation may be impaired, or even stop completely 
[49]. The term ‘downtime’ is largely used to describe a loss of critical IT applications which have 
occurred due to a failure in the facilities infrastructure. Such failures could include the loss of an 
electrical substation or malfunction of a circuit protection device etc.   
 
System failures need to be mitigated with standby systems and resilient design; this topic will form a 
pivotal part of this research investigation. Interestingly [15] and [23] indicates data centres on average 
obtain 2.5 outages a year which equates to 2.84 million hours of global data centre downtime at an 
estimated financial loss of £200,000 per hour. Mission critical electrical infrastructures such as those 
utilised in data centres and this research investigation are designed to achieve high reliability and 




2.2 Electrical Equipment for Data Centres 
The below sections provide an insight and overview of the key equipment located within data centre 
electrical networks.  
2.2.1 High Voltage (HV) Switchboards 
High voltage switchboards are commonly located at the source of the data centre electrical 
distribution system. Such electrical switchgear will interconnect grid feeders, standby generators, and 
power distribution transformers. Schneider Electrics IEC installation guide identified availability of 
such high voltage equipment needs to be high [8], thus service factors are an important consideration 
of design. Other such research details typical architectures for HV data centre networks including 
single fed, ring main systems, dual feeders, and duplicate busbar topologies. Such configurations of 
the HV network will affect the system impedance and fault current thus poses a challenge for the 
electrical protection system, whilst under varied operational and fault scenarios [23] and [26].  
2.2.2 Power Transformers 
Power transformers are static devices which transform electrical energy, copper windings wound onto 
an iron core creates a mutual inductance to induce an EMF between windings. Primarily research 
identified that the distribution transformer is utilised to convert voltages levels in the electrical supply 
system with minimal loss [27], [28], [29]. Dionise and Cooper also indicate transformers in mission 
critical systems are often operated in a parallel connection feeding a common busbar, or in a duty & 
standby arrangement as an ‘N+X’ configuration. However, this connection type may lead to technical 
complication with magnetising inrush since operation of the transformer circuit breaker whilst on load 
can lead to high value of residual flux, which can remain within the core until re energisation thus 
high inrush currents can be obtained in the data centre network [20]. This circumstance poses a 
challenge for the electrical protection devices i.e., to achieve maximum operational availability during 
such energising operations. This research programme investigates electrical protection devices of such 
power transformers during both single and parallel operations.  
2.2.3 Busbar and Cabling 
Research highlights electrical busbar and cablings are essential component parts of the electrical 
system, their protection is required to allow for all normal and abnormal operating conditions [8] and 
[20]. The cabling or busbar design must nominally satisfy full load currents, short circuit currents, 
overcurrent’s, mitigate voltage drop and form part of the indirect protection system. In mission critical 
facilities failure of such busbar or cabling can lead to downtime of critical plant, with an indication 
through assessment of facility audits that a significant quantity of installed cabling in data centres not 





2.2.4 Standby Generators 
Standby generators are vital to a mission critical infrastructure. Most often the generator system will 
provide alternative power redundancy and resiliency to critical busbar loads during loss or instability 
of main grid feeders [48], without such equipment the Ao of these infrastructures would be 
significantly reduced. Generator construction is generally a combination of a mechanical prime 
mover, alternator, governor, fuel tank, electric starter, earthing resistor, and connection to a 
distribution network via switchgear. Research identifies such standby generators will need to operate 
as standalone machines and in parallel with main grid feeders, therefore electrical protection can 
become complex to cover all operations [6], [7], [8].  Application of generator electrical protection is 
therefore investigated during this research, which included insulation failure, stator protection, L-G 
faults, rotor protection, overcurrent, loss of prime mover, loss of field, over voltage, differential, and 
parallel operation with G59 compliance. 
2.2.5 Uninterruptable Power Supplies 
An Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) in simplistic terms is a device which provides short term 
battery standby power to IT equipment should utility power supply fail or become unstable. UPS 
provide power in such a way that the transition from utility supplies to battery power is seamless and 
uninterrupted [25] and [47]. It is identified in [2] and [25] that often in large data centre facilities the 
double conversion on-line UPS modules are utilised, with designs of such units being considered as a 








Figure 1.2.5.1  Piller UPS Schematic Diagram [14] 
 
Where components are: 
1 Commutation choke 10 Pony motor 
2 Phase-shift transformers 11 Synchronous machines (converter) 
3 6-pulse three-phase bridge rectifier 12 Exciter 
4 Battery 13 Overload and short-circuit protection 
5 DC link circuit chokes 14 Voltage regulators 
6 Battery chokes 15 Input switches  
7 Thyristor converters (inverter) 16 Bypass 
8 Mains choke 17 Thyristor switch contactors 
9 Thyristor switches   
 
 
The double conversion UPS converts AC to DC power with application of a rectifier, also DC to AC 
with the unit’s inverter. Should mains input supply fail to the rectifier batteries are an alternative 
source of power for the inverter, thus critical load power is maintained. Manufacturers state the 
uniblock motor generator (Piller) UPS construction ensures effective fault clearing capacity with 
inherent low sub transient reactance, although the infrastructures electrical protection will need to be 
effective in both auto & manual bypass modes of operation. Both modes of operation were modelled 






Research indicates there are many other types of UPS which are currently available on the market and 
choosing one can often be a confusing endeavor with a potential significant impact on the electrical 
network [3] and [47]. For example, it is generally considered that there are only two types of UPS 
(standby and on-line). There is in-fact five different UPS designs as noted below. 
 
i. Standby  
ii. Line Interactive  
iii. Standby-Ferro  
iv. Double Conversion On-Line  
v. Delta Conversion On-Line  
 
Specifically relating to this research programme, the UPS units investigated are double conversion on-
line rotary type, see Figure 2.2.5.1, which are often common within larger commercial applications 
providing high reliability and a nearly perfect sinewave output. The design configuration is similar to 
the standby UPS except that the primary route for power flow is via the inverter instead of an AC 
main input. In normal operation power is supplied via the mains choke circuit comprising of a 
thyristor switch and inductor. The synchronous machine operates directly from AC line input (mains 
1) and because of the sinusoidal current there are practically no system harmonics generated. Since 
the mains voltage is identical to the motor voltage, a power factor of 0.95 to 1 is typically obtained. 
The static switch is normally wired to mains 1 but can also be wired to mains 2. The thyristor switch 
is controlled so that active power flows only in the direction of the motor, although reactive power 
flows in both directions [3]. In the event of mains 1 failure, the unit prevents power from flowing into 
loads connected in parallel to the same AC system, or into a system short-circuit. The choke limits the 
reactive current, even when there is a large difference between the motor and mains voltage. If 
deviation of the primary supply system widely varies from the permissible tolerance range, the 
thyristor switch is electronically disabled, and the machine is supplied via the rectifier/inverter path. 
On return of a permissible tolerance range, the thyristor switch is connected automatically during in-
phase conditions. 
 
During a mains failure when the set is operating in the battery mode, power contactors are open. This 
prevents parasitic power voltages at the machine reaching the primary network – which may be 
isolated – if faults occur in the semiconductors of the rectifier or thyristor switch. The requirements of 
DIN VDE 0105, whereby semiconductor switches are not permitted for isolating power installations, 
are therefore fully met. This also applies to the bypass path, which likewise contains either power 





Due to redundant paths formed by the rectifier/inverter or battery/inverter or thyristor switch 
combinations, the manufacturers suggest the entire system achieves an MTTF of over 600,000 hours. 
Depending on the availability of the input line higher values are obtained when the bypass path is 
taken into consideration [47]. Apart from increasing the reliability, providing the supply via the 
thyristor switch has further advantages. Firstly, operating the UPS set directly from the mains results 
in a sinusoidal input current for any distorted load current. Secondly, because of the elimination of 
double energy conversion from three-phase current to direct current and vice versa, the efficiency of 
the set is further increased.  Both modes of operation need to be considered in terms of system short 
circuit analysis which can be complicated due to the number of parallel units within the electrical 
network and additional mains synchronous bypass operations. During this research programme the 
below modes of operation were assessed in terms of short circuit contributions at the relevant 
connected busbar.  
 
UPS modes of operation 
i. 3, 4 or 5 units in parallel, bypass and batteries disconnected. 
ii. 3, 4 or 5 units in parallel connected with mains grid for no break transfer. 
iii. 5 units connected to batteries in standby mode and disconnected from the grid. 
iv. Bypass mode. 
2.2.6 Power Distribution Units  
Power Distribution Units (PDU’s) are nominally supplied from a 415Va.c. distribution panel by 
means of cabling or busbar conductors [49]. Such PDU’s locate branch circuits which connect the 
critical load to final overcurrent protection devices. These final circuit overcurrent protection devices 
must effectively grade with upstream protection to minimise loss of critical loads under a genuine 
circuit fault [7], [8]. The final circuits will be connected to power distribution rails within the IT racks 
as shown below in Figure 2.2.6.1, this is a common installation method involving branch wiring from 
multiple protection devices or a central busbar system with ‘tap off’ points for each enclosure. 
 
 




2.3 Redundancy and Tier Classifications  
Electrical designs for mission critical infrastructures are most often categorised on a metric referred to 
as a ‘Tier rating’ or ‘N+X redundancy’ systems [15], [23], [14]. This Tier rating philosophy provides 
a classification index which highlights availability and reliability of a given infrastructure and 
associated equipment. The Uptime Institute identified higher Tier classifications will lead to an 
inherent robust design for end users critical load, thus led to a more available electrical system with 
minimised downtime [15]. The ‘N+X redundancy’ topology explains further that ‘N’ is defined as the 
total required amount of equipment to achieve an operational system, therefore increasing N to 2N 
would double the amount of equipment nominally utilised for operational demand thus increase 













The N+X configuration may be further increased, in terms of N, to allow for planned outages and 
system maintenance, for any N+X system reliability can be expressed mathematically as Reliability 
R(t), which can be found as [44]. 
 
𝑅(𝑡) =  
𝑛!
𝑥! (𝑛 − 𝑥)!
  𝑒   1 − 𝑒   
(1) 
Where; 
x  represents the required components of a given distribution system, based on load demand. 
n  represents the total number of components installed within the distribution system. 
n!  represents the factorial of n, i.e., if n = 6 n! = 6x5x4x3x2x1. 
x!  represents the factorial of x. 
𝜆 represents the probability of failure. 
2.4 Tier Classifications 
Current Tier classifications index provided by the Uptime Institute (Table 2.4.1), details the typical 
mission critical electrical infrastructures and associated Tier philosophy. Tier 1 is generally classified 
as a basic infrastructure with a single distribution path and no system redundancy, therefore all 
planned and unplanned works in a Tier 1 distribution system would result in downtime of critical 
load. A Tier 2 also has a single distribution path although several redundant components installed, this 
system allows certain elements of equipment outages but again distribution paths remain a point of 
failure. A Tier 3 system is concurrent maintainability with multiple equipment and distribution paths 
from source to load, in this system typically one path serves the load with another path acting as a 
standby supply allowing system and equipment maintenance without downtime, this is described as a 
2N system [49]. The metric indicated for the most reliable system is therefore categorised as a Tier 4 
system which has a clear and distinct different criterion than the other listed Tier ratings. This type of 
system must be ‘fault tolerant’ and mitigate any negative operational impact, furthermore the onsite 
generation is to be considered as primary power source with main grid feeders acting as an economic 
alternative [24] and [52]. 
 
In practice achieving Tier 4 criteria is difficult to obtain due to the complexity of equipment and the 
issues of mechanical components always having a given failure rate, often the practical element of 
increased cost may also outweigh the appetite for increased capital spends - for the given tangible 





Table 2.4.1 Uptime Institute Tier Classifications [24]  
Uptime Classifications Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 
Number of Pathways 1 1 1 Active / 1 Passive 2 Active 
Redundancy N N+1 N+1 2N 
Compartmentalisation No No No Yes 
Concurrently Maintainable No No Yes Yes 
Fault Tolerant No No No Yes 
Expected Total Downtime Per Year (hrs/yr.) 4 2 0.8 0.8 
Mean Time To Repair MTTR (hrs/yr.)  28 22 1.6 0.4 
Where;  
N  represents the number of electrical supply paths and equipment from feeder source to load. 
N+1 represents a ‘plus one’ (+1) spare capacity or machine for a given load. 
2N represents a dual capacity separated supply system. 
2.5 Merging Technologies 
An overview of the emerging technologies utilised within the electrical networks of data centres. 
Often requiring standby generator systems operating for an income revenue source to offset capital 
spend and cost of ownership [50], not necessarily inline or compliant to the Uptime Tier 
Classifications.  
2.5.1 Frequency Response Systems 
Frequency Control by Demand Management (FCDM), Firm Frequency Response (FFR), Smart 
Frequency Control (SFC), all of which enable the operation of facilities standby generators when gird 
frequency decreases below a desired set point [50]. This is controlled by the National Grid.  
2.5.2 Short-Term Operating Reserve (STOR) 
This is a system which reduces grid demands or increasing on-site private generation with around ten 
minutes notice from the National Grid and sustaining this operation for approximately one to two 
hours. Businesses are being paid for being ready to respond to a STOR events, and are again receiving 
further incentives for delivered energy utilisation. 
2.5.3 Triad Management 
The triad management system is essentially how the National Grid charges businesses for the cost of 
the transmission network. By reducing load and increasing generation when National Grid demand is 





In summary, understanding the above power management technologies it could be suggested current 
economic targets [50], and an opportunity for reduction of energy with a desire to minimise 
operational costs of the data centre will continue to provide a substantial challenge to the philosophy 
provided by Uptime Institute Tier 4 classification [15] i.e., generators acting as primary power source 
for critical load only.  Thus, operational improvement of other Tier classifications in terms of 
reliability may be desirable in future infrastructure. Therefore, effective electrical protection of critical 
systems such as generators and UPS supplies will allow data centres to benefit from maximum 
operational availability whilst considering financial implications and reducing costs.  One interesting 
point to note is the given Tier 4 criteria of ‘fault tolerant’ can have a significant variation & 
magnitude of meanings for which no tangible evidence is currently available in the current approach. 
2.6 Defining Fault Tolerance & Availability Metrics 
Research has identified the terms’ reliability and availability have specialised technical meanings. 
Reliability can be described as a systems ability to perform a certain function over a period of 
specified time, whereas availability is the readiness of a system to perform a function at a specific 
time [51] and [52]. With these definitions in mind, it becomes apparent that mission critical 
infrastructures must be both reliable and available to maintain supply for uptime of critical electrical 
loads in the system. Research identified that availability of an engineering system can be categorised 
into two specific areas, these are Inherent Availability (Ai) and Operational Availability (Ao) [1].  
 
Ai is correlated with known manufactures failure rates Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), and 
Mean Time To Recovery (MTTR). With the IEEE standards currently identified in Table 2.6.1 which 
indicates typical failure probabilities for electrical equipment [1], [20], [21].  
 
Table 2.6.1 IEEE Electrical Equipment MTBF Rates  
Equipment Type Minutes Per Year Outage Times  
HV mains (11, 33 KV) 450 
LV mains 90 
Diesel Generator Set 360 
Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) 150 
 
It would therefore be logical to consider the lower a failure rate, and time to repair the more Inherent 
Availability (Ai) would be increased. This statement is supported with a mathematical expression 













MTBF  represents Mean Time Between Failure of equipment.  
MTTR  represents Mean Time To Recovery.  
 
An analogy would be to suggest if an electrical system never failed MTBF would be infinity, likewise 
if repairs of failures took zero minutes it would also lead to 100% inherent availability. In practice this 
is not achievable but currently defines a firm metric for comparison of mission critical infrastructure 
equipment [22]. However, Ai does not consider the importance and practical relevance of Operational 
Availability (Ao). Where, Ao explores further technical factors other than those considered with Ai 
which includes investigation of distribution topology, operational layout of substations, cable feeders, 
relay protection safety grading margins, fault levels, arc flash safety, power quality, load 
characteristics and maximum demand. 
 
Given the equipment can be uniquely connected, operated, and evaluated individually Ai may become 
less significant whilst investigating the complete system availability, it is often the operational 
assessment and correlated constraints of electrical infrastructures that can have numerous adverse 
effects on its reliability [51] and [52], or more specifically operational availability. In short inherent 
availability  may not be the sole success in achieving limited downtime or indeed the best approach.  
2.6.1 Six Areas Effecting Data Centre Availability  
Research identified there are six main areas which compromise reliability of critical infrastructures, 
evidence of this claim was based on numerous electrical infrastructure audits in data centre 
infrastructures [20]. The six indicated areas listed are system electrical protection, system monitoring, 
surge protection, wiring, grounding, system design and operational availability. Ao being mutually 
exclusive and affected by all other five indicated areas [20]. These issues multiplied by consequences 
equal system risk [51]. 
 
Discussing further the area of system electrical protection, such protection equipment forms part of 
the complete electrical distribution system. Primarily its role is to provide rapid disconnection of 
faulty equipment to prevent damage to equipment or users [7] and [8]. Such protection operations 
should have minimal negative effect on the remaining electrical network, ensuring resilience & 




lost during malfunction or mis-coordination of a protection relay. Protection device types utilised in 
mission critical facilities are detailed below.  
Current Relays 
The current relay is one of the most common forms of electrical protection for high voltage networks. 
Research [6-7] and [9-10] indicate types of current relays which include plain overcurrent and or L-G 
settings with either Inverse Definite Minimum Time (IDMT) or Definite Time characteristics (DT). 
Supplementary to the nominal overcurrent relays there are options for directional elements if voltage 
connections are also available along with the Current Transformers (CT). Other current relay settings 
include Instantaneous (INST) or High Sinusoidal Overcurrent (HSOC) along with Sensitive Earth 
Fault (SEF) and Restricted Earth Fault (REF). All protection types are investigated in this research 
programme, in terms of achieving optimal settings for mission critical equipment, Figure 2.6.1.1 
shows a typical high voltage protection relay.  
 
Figure 2.6.1.1 Schneider Electric Digital Protection Relay [6] 
 
Historically IDMT current relays were produced as an electromagnetic device which relied on a 
pivoted metal disc which rotated with torque produced from fluxes and eddy currents, hence disc 
movement was a function of current. The pivoted disc speed is proportional to the torque, and 
operating time is inversely proportional to the speed, hence - Inverse Definite Minimum Time 
relationship exists. Although today’s IDMT relays are constructed with digital electronic components 
the fundamental relationship is unchanged, the below equation displays the theoretical calculation as 








         
(3) 
Where; 
I  represents the value of applied current. 
Is  represents the base value of current setting. 
TMS  represents the Time Multiplier Setting. 
𝑘 and α are the constants for given current curve characteristic.   
 
It is interesting to note both K and α are defined constants in the relay which allows for characteristic 
operating curves to be applied. Such as Very Inverse (VI), Extremely Inverse (EI), Standard Inverse 
(SI) and numerous other options depending on manufacturing preferences. Research identified the 
large quantity of characteristic curves are to allow effective time grading between distribution 









Fuses and Miniature Circuit Breakers 
Fuses are proven reliable devices which rupture under overload or short circuit fault conditions to 
isolate faulty equipment from electrical supply, after such faults fuse devices must be manually 
replaced before any circuits can be put back into operation, thus provides a challenge in terms of 
Operational Availability (Ao) and necessity for critical spares to limit potential downtime following 
fuse operations.  
 
Research identified fuses are often categorised into the following three groups [10].  
i. High Voltage Fuses > 1000 Va.c. and 40 KA. 
ii. Low Voltage Fuses < 1000 Va.c. and 80 KA. 
iii. Miniature Fuses (with low current breaking capacity typically < 2 KA).  
 
A common fuse type utilised in both LV and HV distribution applications is the desirable High 
Rupturing Capacity (HRC) type. Research identified this type of fuse has excellent current and energy 
limiting characteristics with specified manufacturer ratings of 80KA at 400V and 40KA at 11KV [6]. 
During short circuit conditions HRC fuses will operate very quickly, usually in the first quarter of a 
cycle. However, under overcurrent conditions the fuse element melts uniformly and much slower 
which may lead to enough deterioration of the fuse element effecting future operating characteristics 
[7]. For this reason, it has often found that HRC fuses are commonly replaced with Air Circuit 
Breakers (ACB) in most commercial applications [10], since enhanced current limiting characteristics 
of ACB’s are now available by numerous manufacturers. Research identified improved contact layouts 
and arc chutes provide opening times of 5ms and a total fault clearance time of approx. 25ms for 
faults currents in order of 150KA [9] and [10]. Therefore, appropriate selection of ACB’s can offer 
robust short circuit protection in-line with HRC fuses. Circuit breakers are generally categorised into 
the following groups [7].  
 
i. Miniature Circuit Breakers (MCB).  
ii. Moulded Case Circuit Breakers (MCCB). 
iii. Air Circuit Breakers (ACB). 
 
Both MCB & MCCB nominally provide thermal and magnetic elements for overload and short circuit 
protection respectively, other larger devices such as ACB’s also provide earth leakage protection, 






Electrical audits identified a large quantity of ACB protection devices are incorrectly set which may 
lead to malfunction of circuit breakers under network faults, thus negatively effective operational 
availability Ao of electrical systems [20]. It is clear how important effective electrical protection is 
with respect to achieving a Tier 4 rated ‘fault tolerant’ system, or an improved Operational 
Availability (Ao) for any other Tier classification, and the challenges posed with protection grading 
for such a significant type and variety of available electrical protection equipment. 
 
Research indicates critical facilities audited by consultant engineers, found owners were unaware of 
any coordination study of installed protective devices or were unclear on the original system design 
[20]. It was reported during such technical audits sample protection settings were analysed and found 
to provide mismatched protection, and poor selectivity in terms of clearing faults - thus reduced 
system reliability. With further identification that the performance of electrical systems should be 
systematically and periodically audited for conformance of standards and regulations [31] and [32], 
highlighting that companies who perform such technical audits obtain fewer incidents and achieved 
improved facilities. Key drivers for audits involve the examination, observation, and investigation of 
electrical systems with a view to identify required remedial action for continuous improved systems. 
 
It is interesting to note architectures of electrical distribution networks within mission critical 
infrastructures can vary significantly depending on the power requirements, security of supply, and 
characteristics of the equipment present. All of which can pose challenging effects on both system 
fault levels, relay settings, protection device types and successful co-ordination of grading schemes. 
One challenge for mission critical infrastructures is to obtain optimal protection relay settings 
avoiding malfunction of a relay during any possible network fault type, or operational configuration. 
This will ensure no critical busbar loads are lost and high Operational Availability (Ao) is obtained.  
 
Empirical research also suggests numerous data centre electrical systems have encountered issues 
with ground fault coordination [20]. Typically, such ground fault protection is applied to main feeders 
and downstream devices although this was not apparent in audit results. Again, this condition effects 
primary power reliability. Merlin Gerin [6-7] and [10] identified that predicting performance of an 
electrical protection scheme with reference to ground faults is essential to obtain the potential network 
fault levels. To determine such fault levels knowledge of equipment impedances and network 
configuration is required, consideration must be given to both nominal and short duration 
arrangements to enable the most advanced application and settings of protective devices within the 




2.6.2 Defining Fault Levels 
Grainger and Stevenson describe fault levels can essentially be calculated at every part of the 
electrical network [11] or more specifically as a fault tree analysis of all equipment within the data 
centre [51]. However, an important point to note is system fault studies for three phase electrical 
systems need to consider both symmetrical and unsymmetrical situations. A symmetrical three phase 
power system is nominally constructed of three phase conductors with each phase having an identical 
voltage amplitude and frequency relating to a common reference, and phase difference of 1200. The 
common reference being a neutral conductor connected to a common ground.  However, it was 
identified that three phase systems can become unbalanced during faults scenarios which requires 
further analysis [8], and application of symmetrical components introduced as C.L Fortescue’s 
theorem. With research [12], [18] & [19] stating three unbalanced phasors of a three-phase system can 
be resolved into three balanced systems phasors. Where the balanced sets components are: 
 
i. Positive sequence components consisting of three phasors which are displaced by 120 degrees 
from each other, having identical phase sequence as the original phasor. 
ii. Negative sequence components of three phasors which are displaced by 120 degrees from 
each other, having a phase sequence that is opposite to the original phasor. 
iii. Zero sequence components of three phasors which are equal in magnitude with zero phase 
displacement from each other.  
 
Application of this theory for resolution of an unbalanced vector is defined in [3], [5], & [6], and 









Equations for Phase Voltages Va Vb Vc are: 
 
Va = V1 + V2 +V0 
Vb = a2 V1 + a V2 +V0 
Vc = a V1 + a2 V2 +V0 
(4) 
Where; 
a is a complex number known as operator,  a =  1   1200 
V0, V1, V2  represent the zero, positive, and negative phase voltage sequence components. 
 
Such sequence components relate to the equipment characteristics and research identified it will affect 
system fault levels under varied fault types [12] i.e., L-L-L, L-L, L-L-G, L-G. With IEC 60909 [12] 
short circuit current formulas shown in equations (5), (6), (7), (8).  
 
Three Phases Fault (L-L-L):  





Two Phases Fault (L-L):  
𝐼 =  
𝑉
(2 𝑥 𝑍 )
 
(6) 
Two Phases to Earth Fault (L-L-G):  
𝐼 =  
√3 ∗ 𝑉
(𝑍 + 2𝑍 )
 
(7) 
Phase to Earth Fault (L-G):  
𝐼 =  
√3 ∗ 𝑉




𝑍 =  𝑍  
𝐼   represents short circuit current. 
V  represents  L-L- L Voltage rms. 






Schneider Electric IEC Installation guide outlines Thevenin superposition theorem is a proven 
approach, where IEC 60909 formulas [12] are applied at multiple ‘short circuit points’ of the 
electrical network to obtain given fault currents and voltages, thus determining the network 
characteristics, possible fault paths & failure scenarios [8]. Such analysis is generally applied in a 
methodical structured process to improve accuracy of results. A documented method [8] is: 
 
i. Define an equivalent voltage source, to represent system voltage prior to fault occurrence. 
ii. Calculation of all equipment impedances from source to point of faults, as symmetrical 
components. For example, generators, UPS, transformers, busbars, and cabling. 
iii. With (i) and (ii) solved, establish minimum and maximum fault currents. These values can 
then be applied into network grading studies with protective device characteristics and 
grading margins modelled to provide a robust approach. 
 
With research information outlined it can be noted how fundamental an electrical protection system 
can be, with respect to a data centre infrastructure – given the main objective includes operating the 
electrical systems at maximum resilience, achieving fault tolerance, and the highest operational 
availability for critical loads. Empirical investigations of fault studies have shown the application of 
symmetrical component analysis only, and often omitting other important operational factors such as 
pre fault current load characteristics, parallel standby power, mode of operations and transient 
impedances of rotating machines [4] and [17]. Such advanced investigations will require an in-depth 
operational knowledge of the data centre equipment and network configurations. All of which are 
often overlooked in consultant briefs and available onsite literature [17]. When considering fault 
currents in the electrical networks multiple values are desired for a range of network design 
calculations and operational assessments. These values are investigated during this research 
programme, where the below fault currents were established for all installed switchgear. 
 
i. RMS value of symmetrical short current; for breaking capacity, and temperature rise of 
insulation.  
ii. Peak value of symmetrical short circuit current; for making capacity of circuit breakers and 
switches, also calculation of electrodynamic withstands of enclosures. 
iii. Minimum L-L-L short circuit current; to allow protection curves and effective grading. 








To enable an effective peak current calculation the machine or equipment X/R ratio must be 
investigated. Ratios between peak transient and steady state currents can estimate an X/R 
characteristic ratio, with X/R ratios for single equipment being available from equipment 
manufacturers, although parallel machine operations for data centre electrical networks can lead to 
complex calculations to establish transient and steady state time domain conditions. Such analysis is 
applied during the research investigation for both grid and generators operating in synchronism.  
 
Often when calculating generator short circuits, impedance of the generator is far greater than the 
circuit impedance, therefore an identified calculation is based on the generator’s impedance [19]. As 

















cos(𝜔𝑡 + 𝛼) −
𝑉√2 
𝑋𝑑
𝑒 cos 𝛼 
(9) 
Where for equations (9) to (12) 
α is the angle defining the Voltage phase angle at the instant of fault.  
Xd‘’, Xd’, Xd  represent the sub transient, transient, and steady state reactance. 
Td’’, Td’, Tdc  represent the sub transient, transient, and DC offset time constants. 
V represents phase Voltage rms. 
 
Given current i(t) is at a maximum when α=0. 






















The current is the sum of DC offset component and sinusoidal current [19], with the DC offset current 
given by: 





Therefore, the sinusoidal current for phase a is the sum of sub transient current, transient current and 






















The aperiodic current tends to have a significant value for a short duration, in the range of 10 to 60ms, 
whereas research identified the damped sinusoidal component variables change as machine reactance 
is variable due to development of the following periods [9] and [19]. 
 
a. Sub Transient Td’’  lasting for 10 to 20ms after fault initiation. 
b. Transient Td’  lasting for 100 to 400ms. 
c. Steady State which is to be considered after 400ms i.e., transient.  
d. DC offset Tdc. 
e. Sum of all four current values (see below Figure 2.6.2.2). 
 
Note:  Xd > Xd’’> Xd’  which leads to decreasing short circuit current over time.  
As shown in Figure 2.6.2.2 (a), (b), (c) & (d) sub transient current, transient current, steady state 
current and the DC offset current respectively [19]. Figure 10 (e) displays the sum of all four currents 





Figure 2.6.2.2 Plots of Short Circuit Current Contributions [19] 
Where the figures represent; (a) sub transient current, (b) transient current, (c) steady state current, (d) DC offset 
current, (e) Sum of (a), (b), (c) and (d).  
 
Synchronous machines form part of an essential standby power systems for mission critical facilities. 
Often machines will operate in parallel with grid supplies which will contribute to further technical 
complication and requirement for advanced model simulation. Research identified all power sources 
should be considered and fault levels obtained for effective protection co-ordination, ensuring 
maximum Operational Availability (Ao) [7], [8], [26]. Such factors were investigated during this 
research programme, via application of ETAP model simulations to establish the minimum and 
maximum fault currents possible at each critical busbar. key factors included establishment of Short 
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i. Existing equipment strength and capabilities in terms of making, breaking and short time 
current withstand. 
ii. I2t protection for thermal ratings of equipment. 
iii. Maximum and minimum SCC to enable effective protection device co-ordination, and arc 
flash mitigation. 
iv. Phase sequence voltages and currents of unbalanced short circuits, for system protection 
device evaluation. 
2.7 Protection Device Grading & Co-ordination  
Electrical equipment such as switchgear, transformers, generators, and cabling within data centres 
require a varied range of protection devices to safeguard against system faults. In addition to rapid 
disconnection of faults research identified protection devices need to detect, locate, and initiate 
removal of faults in minimal time without effecting healthy parts of the electrical network [6] and 
[10]. This is a pivotal point in terms achieving maximum reliability within a network and uptime of 
critical data centre equipment. Furthermore, consideration must be given to all operational scenarios 
of electrical equipment since this in turn will have a correlation to system fault levels and operation of 
associated protection devices. The requirement for all protection devices, except those directly 
associated with the fault must remain inoperative and minimise network disruption [9] and [10]. The 
basis of a protection scheme is therefore designed on i) Safety ii) Reliability iii) Selectivity. A range 
of operational philosophies can be adopted to achieve an effective electrical protection scheme, a key 
number of those associated with this research programme are explained below. 
2.7.1 Discrimination by Time 
A method for radial circuits where discrimination is achieved by providing a minimum trip time 
setting to the relay closet to the fault, with an increment of time as the protection devices move further 
upstream from the fault and closer to the incoming supply. In practice this will ensure the relay closest 
to the fault operates firstly and leaves remaining sections upstream within the network healthy and in 
service. As noted below research identified it is necessary to leave a minimum grading time interval 
between devices [10] and [19]. 
 
i. Circuit breaker trip times 50 – 150ms. 
ii. Relay time delay errors 150ms. 
iii. Relay overshoot 100ms. 
iv. Relay reset time of 70%, hence the relay must fully rest at 70% nominal current 





Therefore, for all these times to be met a typical grading margin for electromagnetic devices would be 
0.4s whereas a more modern solid-state relay and vacuum circuit breaker 0.25s is a more acceptable 
margin.  
2.7.2 Discrimination by Current Magnitude 
Impedance from source to load within the power circuit limits current flowing at any given point [6], 
[9], [19]. Therefore, in theory a carefully selected current setting for a given relay could provide 
discrimination. In practice, for data centres this is difficult to achieve since its common within 
distribution networks to have multiple feeders and interconnectors which will significantly affect the 
fault current at any point. An application where this method is more proven is for power transformer 
protection where high instantaneous settings can protect the HV winding since a delta wound primary 
will not have zero sequence currents from the LV side under high L-G currents.  
2.7.3 Discrimination by Fault Direction 
Current practice in data centre electrical networks is to add sensing or directional elements to relay 
protection system, which allows a response to both current magnitude and direction [10]. This would 
be typical of a closed loop ring system with parallel feeders, an important consideration is a polarity 
check during commissioning to ensure correct operation of the relay and avoid malfunction.  
2.7.4 Unit Protection  
A protection scheme which locates current transformers at each end of a feeder, transformer, or ‘unit’ 
of a given piece of plant to be protected, in an interconnected zone. A comparison of currents entering 
and leaving each end of the zone is undertaken, thus highlights a difference of current magnitude or 
displacement angle. The following are two important requirements when considering unit protection. 
 
i. Through Fault Stability - If currents entering and leaving the zone are equal protection must 
not operate. 
ii. Sensitivity to Internal Faults - If currents entering and leaving the zone are different by a set 
value protection must operate. 
 
Research identified a major advantage of unit protection is its speed of operation (typically 200msec 
or less) disconnecting only the plant associated with the fault. However, this can be an expensive 
protection scheme with a requirement for communications cabling between each end of the given 




2.8 Limitations of Current Research 
There is currently a known approach for designing the data centre building - Uptime Institutes 
Approach - which utilises inherent design availability data only and does not provide a generalised 
approach for simulation of operational conditions or improvement of reliability metrics.  
 
As detailed in this approach the requirements for data centres is for them to be designed and operated 
to achieve maximise Operational Availability (Ao), thus limiting potential downtime of critical 
systems. Furthermore, such resilient systems drive a requirement to design electrical infrastructures in 
correlation with the Uptime Institutes Tier ratings or ‘N+X’ redundancy topologies. Such designs lead 
to challenges for electrical protection systems since protection equipment will need to be effective for 
all electrical network configurations, both nominal and redundancy mode of operations, involving 
many types of complex electrical equipment. This challenge is supported with six indicated areas 
which can compromise system reliability, with electrical protection being recorded as a cause for 
concern since site audits carried out by consultants indicated a mismatch of protection and examples 
of insufficient grading schemes currently in service.  
 
Despite such indicated issues there are fewer research publications available that detail investigations 
following a complete electrical protection review in such critical infrastructures, or indeed an attempt 
to indicate which protections and modes of operations are most problematic with respects to achieving 
maximum Operational Availability (Ao).  Also, limited data centre research is available that includes 
the application of load flow, arc flash or load point reliability in the field.  
2.9 Chapter Summary 
This literature review highlights the limited publications available to drive successful development of 
electrical infrastructures in data centre environments. Particularly, electrical protection systems and 
achieving the most robust operational configuration for increased Operational Availability (Ao). 
However, the present research available identified six possible areas with a potential to cause system 
issues, although no subsequent investigations and discovery of technical details are apparent, 
particularly for the application of ETAP to create unique models and operational scenarios for data 








Chapter 3 – Defining the RBS System  
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter consists of a written description of the data centre design parameters, its associated 
Uptime Institute Tier Classification rating, operational configurations, and information regarding all 
the installed critical equipment, both LV and HV electrical networks. Chapter 3.1 includes example 
photographs of the data centre critical equipment, and a completed single line diagram showing the 
electrical network and all associated power strings for each of the data halls and building services 
equipment, i.e., encompassing all that has been investigated during the research programme.  
 
Chapter 3.2 details the ETAP power system analysis software in general terms of its features and 
functions which were applicable to this research programme, including all the simulation calculation 
methods, validation governance and international standards applicable to the data centre model 
constructions.  The final section of this chapter is a detailed explanation of the singular model 
components validation, this approach provided a standalone model and simulation for each of the data 
centre electrical equipment, so they could be critiqued against proven theoretical calculations and the 
original equipment manufacturers design data before proceeding to build the complete electrical 
network model and subsequent simulations.    
3.1 System Description  
The Third Data Centre (TDC) building for RBS is in Staffordshire. The TDC has been designed as a 
7.2 MVA secure computer installation which undertakes technology operations for the RBS banking 
business. The sites electrical infrastructure is normally supplied by two dedicated 11KV cable circuits 
from Western Power Distribution 33/11KV substation. The TDC electrical network includes 
installation of on-site standby generation capable of supplying 9 MVA ensuring the total site load is 
powered in the event of prolonged failure of the Western Power supplies. The on-site generators may 
operate in parallel with the grid system with current utilisation of the on-site generators for grid 
balancing solutions. The electrical network is designed as a 2N system from HV incomers to final LV 
loads. The majority of building load being two 1800m2 data halls located on the east and west 
elevations of the building, in total data halls loads are designed for 4.5MW consumption with 
remaining power capacity for mechanical supplies such as chillers, humidification, ventilation and 
other general office areas.  
 
The HV network is nominally a closed ring system, comprising of four main switchgear units which 
in turn supplies sixteen 11/0.415KV distribution transformers. The sixteen Dyn11 distribution 




intake as a duty/standby N+1 system, thus a total of 8 main LV intake substations are located on-site. 
Transformers are in external enclosures and are ONAN construction. Supply conductors at HV&LV 
include a range of cabling and busbar systems, with protection devices installed at both the HV 
VCB’s and LV ACB’s. The site is a twenty-four hours a day seven days a week critical operation with 
an on-site team of 14 engineers both maintaining and responding to any electrical network issue. The 
on-site generator system comprises of a HV duplicate busbar switchgear arrangement connecting five 
synchronous machines with automatic frequency and voltage control as the primary option, also 
manual synchroniser for additional resilience during periods of failure of the automatic system. Faults 
on the HV network can therefore vary in magnitude and duration depending on primary power source, 
both grid connections and standby generators have been assessed in the research programme.  
 
The LV loads comprise of computer equipment supplies which are derived from the Uninterruptable 
Power Supply (UPS) systems and general mechanical loads fed directly from grid sources. In normal 
operation, the rotary UPS electrically isolate the computer supplies from the main supply network 
with regards to fault levels. Faults in the computer supply network are therefore supplied only by the 
UPS, or by the main system bypass if being utilised. The UPS systems have the capability to operate 
for short term duration in parallel with grid feeders and can also supply fault current into the main 












































Below Figures providing examples of the installed rotary UPS. 
 
 















Below Figure providing examples of the installed HV equipment including switchgear, protection 

















Below Figure providing examples of the installed HV equipment including switchgear, distribution 







Figure 3.1.4  Example HV Equipment (2/2) 
 
The below single line diagram is the complete RBS data centre electrical system, this is what was 
utilised for the construction of all power system modelling, the single line diagram includes all 
electrical equipment’s from HV incomers to LV loads, with each power string being notated with a 







Figure 3.1.5 RBS Data Centre Electrical Network Single Line Diagram
DBH1 LV 
DBA1 LV -Blue String 
DBC1 LV -Green String 
LV -Red String LV -Yellow String 
0.415KV LV NETWORK 
11KV HV NETWORK 






3.2 ETAP Software Applications Overview  
ETAP is an electrical power system analysis and operations software that was founded in 1986, 
providing a suited range of software applications allowing analysis, simulation, monitoring, 
optimisation, and automation of electrical power systems [34].  In 2018 ETAP was recognised as the 
gold award winner for product of the year by the consulting engineers’ group. ETAP software has a 
verified and validated set of equipment libraries for cabling, protective devices, power sources and 
dynamic models. ETAP study results have also been validated with hand calculation, field 
measurements and industry standards, over 50,000 ETAP licenses are being utilised by many industry 
sectors, with a 100+ for research and development projects. ETAP software is further supported by 
70+ successful audits by several industry bodies and leading standards [34]. The following ETAP 
modules were utilised during this research programme, with a description provided for each: 
3.2.1 Load Flow Module 
Creates and validates electrical system models, with features including automatic device evaluation, 
summary alarms / warnings, result analyser, and intelligent graphics for an efficient load flow 
programme analyser. ETAP calculates busbar voltages, branch power factors, currents, and power 
flows throughout the electrical system. The module allows for swing, voltage regulated, and 
unregulated power sources with multiple power grids and generator connections. It can perform 
analysis on both radial and loop systems, with selection available for several different calculation 
methods to achieve optimal accuracy. Features of the load flow functions utilised for data centre 
simulations includes: 
 
i. Newton-Raphson, a fast decoupled method suited to interconnect systems. 
ii. Generator governors with droop mode analysis. 
iii. Transformers tap changer.  
iv. Multiple loading & generation conditions. 
v. Swing and voltage regulated power sources.  
vi. Voltage drop calculations.  
vii. Alert view for critical & marginal limit violations, in-line with international standards. 
viii. Busbar, transformer, and cable overload warning.  
ix. Individual demand factors for continuous, intermittent, & spare operating conditions.  






3.2.2 Short Circuit Analysis Module 
Allows determination of system fault currents and automatically compares these values against 
manufacturer short circuit current ratings. Overstressed device alarms are displayed on the single line 
diagram and included within all short circuit study reports. Analyses the effect of fault currents using 
ETAP short circuit analysis software, for L-L-L, L-L, L-L-G and L-G faults. Features of the short 
circuit current analysis module utilised for data centre simulations includes: 
 
i. Application of international standards IEC60909 & IEC61363 to all simulations.  
ii. Determines the short circuit worst-case device duty.  
iii. Displays critical & marginal busbar alerts for breach of current capacity ratings.  
iv. Load terminal short circuit current calculations. 
v. Integrates with star protective device coordination for effective grading of system faults. 
vi. Transition’s fault current values into arc flash analysis simulation model to provide total 
incident energy and arc flash boundary.  
vii. Short circuit reporting for each system busbar. 
3.2.3 Protection & Co-ordination Selectivity Analysis Module 
ETAP overcurrent device protection and coordination provided an intuitive and logical approach to 
curve selectivity analysis, offering troubleshooting of data centre false trips, relay operation, and mis-
coordination with application of Time Current Curves (TCC), protective device coordination & 
selectivity, sequence-of-operation, protection zone selection & viewer, automated protection & 
coordination and verification & validated of protective device libraries. Features of the protection & 
co-ordination selectivity analysis module utilised for data centre simulations included: 
 
i. AC overcurrent protective device coordination & selectivity. 
ii. Graphically adjustable device settings via TCC viewer. 
iii. Equipment damage curve plotting. 
iv. Sequence-of-operation for fault analysis. 
v. Verifying & validating protective device libraries. 
vi. Performing overcurrent protective device coordination. 
vii. Establishing accurate operating characteristics and trip times. 
viii. Predicting false trips and relay mis-coordination.  






3.2.4 Arc Flash Analysis Module 
ETAP arc flash analysis software allows an assessment of arc flash hazards and incident analysis. 
Identifies high risk areas in the electrical power system by simulating and evaluating various 
mitigation methods in arc flash studies. The arc flash analysis programme is a completely integrated 
module that solves multiple scenarios to determine highest energy levels present on the network. 
Features of the arc flash analysis module utilised for data centre simulations includes: 
 
i. Application of arc flash standards to all simulations (IEEE1584-2018 and NFPA® 70E 2018). 
ii. Provides 3-phase and UPS arc flash hazard calculations. 
iii. Considers arc flash in enclosed equipment and switchgear configurations. 
iv. Integrated with ETAP short circuit analysis software and star protective device coordination 
software. 
v. Prints arc flash hazard safety labels and PPE requirements on study completion. 
 
3.2.5 Reliability Analysis Module 
This module provides the most robust method to efficiently model various power system elements and 
devices to include their effects on the distribution system reliability, such as fault isolation and load 
restoration through the operation of switching devices.  Features of the reliability analysis module 
utilised for data centre simulations includes: 
 
i. Modelling reliability characteristics of each component. 
ii. Calculating the busbar and load point reliability indices. 
iii. Calculating system reliability indices, average failure rates, average outage durations, annual 
outage duration.  
 
3.3 Chapter Summary  
This chapter details the RBS data centre system in terms of the construction of its electrical network, 
operational philosophy and key equipment installed.  Providing the single line diagrams of all the 
electrical network equipment that were key for construction of model simulations. Also, detailing the 
ETAP power system analysis software and the module features utilised for the research programme 
including the most applicable for the data centre electrical network i.e., load flow, short circuit 
analysis, protection co-ordination, arc flash and reliability assessment. A reference of key 
international standards for each of the power simulation topics has also been included within the 
software module descriptors, these could be applied with ETAP or other power system simulation 




Chapter 4 – Simulation Methodology  
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter displays the single line diagrams of the data centre electrical network that was modelled 
and simulated in ETAP power system software as part of this research programme. The data centre 
belongs to the Royal Bank of Scotland and is listed on the governments Committee for Protection of 
National Infrastructure (CPNI), hence optimal system reliability is a key objective.   
 
The simulation analysis of the data centres electrical network included carrying out a suite of power 
system studies - load flow analysis, short circuit analysis, protection device grading and co-ordination, 
load point reliability analysis and finally arc flash mitigation. The key to the successful simulation 
approach was to model and simulate each of the singular data centre electrical components and prove 
accuracy of all simulation results in-line with theoretical calculations and manufacturer data i.e., 
before building them into a compete electrical network. Subsequently to this initial step the exiting 
base electrical network (as single line diagrams 4.1.1 & 4.1.2) was built and assessed with ETAP 
simulations for establishing current reliability metrics, at each system busbar, before any further 
power simulations or improvements were obtained. This was to ‘benchmark’ the current electrical 
network performance. 
 
Following ‘benchmarking’ stages the data centre electrical network was subjected to advance 
simulation of all the possible operational scenarios, with data sets and results analysed against 
international standards, allowing recommendation for further improvement to the current operational 
configurations and providing an improved reliability, for of all the installed equipment.  
 
The ‘base’ network was therefore updated to reflect the recommendations given, this upgraded 
configuration was also subjected to the exact same simulations as the base model with a final 
reliability assessment at each busbar, proving the approach had indeed obtained an improving data 
centre operational configuration and reliability. 
 
Each of the simulations, associated scientific theory, calculations, and the approach taken is explained 







4.1 Construction and Validation of Model Equipment  
Before considering the full simulation model of the data centre it is important to outline each of the 
individual components were modelled in ETAP and verified against the original manufacturers data 
and theoretical hand calculation. This approach ensured accuracy of the modelled components 
simulated for; DNO sources, transformers, generators, cables, and UPS. Each of the models and 
calculations are listed in Appendix I. Complied these individual components were utilised to construct 
the full electrical network data centre model as shown in Figure 4.1.1. Also, Figure 4.1.2 showing 































 ETAP Data Centre Electrical Network Model Single Line Diagrams  
 










4.2 Load Flow  
Load flow studies are an important engineering analysis of data centre electrical distribution networks 
to understand steady state fundamental parameters such as voltage magnitude, phase angle, real 
power, and reactive power flow. Such load flow studies on interconnected mesh systems require 
numerous complex iterative calculations to provide the most reliable results [38]. For ETAP 
simulations adaptive Newton Raphson method equation (13) was utilised, allowing a fast responding 
first order iterative method suited to such a large interconnected system [34] i.e., the adaptive Newton 
Raphson method is a formula for solving non-linear equations and is suited to interconnected power 
systems but does require a simulation package and good memory capacity to undertake. Equations 
(13) to (17) numerically describe relationships between changing the phase angle and the magnitude 
of a networks voltage in terms of achieved real and reactive power flow in the system. 
 
        
| |
| |






 = 𝑓(𝑥)                    
                                (13) 
Where, for equations (13) to (17)  
𝑖 & 𝑗 represent system busbar, V  represents Voltage rms at a given busbar, 𝑃 represents real power 
(MW), 𝑄 represents reactive power (MVAr), 𝜃 represents the phase angle at a given busbar. 
 
Taking equation (13) above it can be noted changing the phase angle θ or voltage magnitude |V| 
affects both the real power (P) and reactive power (Q) power, respectively. It is also identified for 
power systems both terms listed in (14) are insignificant and can be ignored [30], thus a final derived 
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The above equation (15) displays a change in real power (P) and reactive power (Q) is directly 
correlated to phase angle θ and voltage magnitude |V| respectively. More commonly a matrix (16) is 

















Where, diagonal elements of  𝑗1 equal; 
 
∅
=  ∑ |𝑉𝑖||𝑉𝑗||𝑌𝑖𝑗|  cos (𝜃𝑖𝑗 −  𝜃𝑖 +  𝜃𝑗)                   
                      
          (17) 
 
With iterative methods detailed another important element of the simulation approach is establishment 
of model input data and possible network configurations to evaluate [33]. The procedure for 
establishing input data for ETAP models includes obtaining. 
 
i. Grid Source Details – set mode of operation as ‘swing mode’ where voltage nominal (𝑉 ) and 
phase angle (θ) are required data values. 
ii. Generator Sources – real power capacity (MW), rated efficiency, maximum and minimum 
reactive power (MVAr) and mode of operations i.e., swing or v-control for each power 
machine was established. 
iii. Transformers – primary and secondary voltage ratings, rated power (MW), percentage 
impedance & X/R ratio, tap changer type including nominal position. 
iv. Lumped Loads – located for each low voltage critical busbar to represent actual connected 
loads, values given in MW and MVAr. Study cases were set to model varying load values for 
all lumped load types. 
v. Busbar – nominal voltage (𝑉 ), rated operating current and type of equipment i.e., switchgear, 
MCC or switchboard. 
vi. Study Case – modelling multiple operating conditions of the electrical network, varying load 
capacities or supply feeders, such as nominal grid or standby generation modes of operation. 
Methods of calculations specified along with maximum iterations and precision required. 
Newton Raphson method was applied allowing the minimum and maximum voltages to be 




4.2.1 Operational Scenarios for Load Flow Modelling 
For the RBS electrical network both nominal and worst-case scenarios for equipment configurations 
were investigated with ETAP model simulations. Given the installation philosophy is to operate as an 
N+1 or 2N configuration the objective was to ensure adequacy of each arrangement, i.e., should an 
online transformer fail the remaining transformer units should be capable of maintaining full load. 
Given supply continuity underpins availability in-line with Table 4.2.1.1 the Uptime Institutes 
Classifications, operational load flow assessments in ETAP provided a comparison against this 
method. 
 
Table 4.2.1.1 Uptime Institute Tier Classifications [2] 
Tier Ratings 1 2 3 4 
No. of Delivery 
Pathways 1 1 
1 Active 
1 Passive 2 Active 
Annual Downtime 28.8 hrs 22 hrs 1.6 hrs 0.4 hrs 
Site Availability 99.67% 99.75% 99.98% 99.99% 
 
The following three typical distribution switchgear arrangements were assessed during load flow 
studies, along with all other system busbars in the main electrical network single line diagram as 
shown in Figure 3.1.4. 
 
Figure 4.2.1.1 Distribution Board Ref.A1 Switchgear Configuration in ETAP 
Where; 
T1&T2 are remote node connections to power transformers; Specification 2.5MVA, 11/0.433KV, Dyn11, 





Figure 4.2.1.2 Distribution Board Ref.Y1 Switchgear Configuration in ETAP 
Where;  
T11&T12 are remote node connections to power transformers; Specification 2.5MVA, 11/0.433KV, Dyn11, 
Zb=6.25%. Both switchgear feeders are BS5467 XLPE 500mm2 cables (5 per phase). 
 
 
Figure 4.2.1.3 Distribution Board Ref.G1 Switchgear Configuration in ETAP 
Where;  
T9&T10 are remote node connections to power transformers; Specification 2.5MVA, 11/0.433KV, Dyn11, 






Load values applied for each switchgear model in ETAP allowed comparison of Tier 3 & Tier 4 
systems, analyising load flow during the following scenarios whilst supplied by either grid feeders or 
standby generators.  
 
Critical busbar loadings: 
i. Normal Operation – 50% of nominal design values to simulate the actual present site loads. 
ii. Design Operation – 100% capacity to simulate designed limits of the system. 
iii. Emergency Operation - 110% of the design capacity, simulation of the worst-case scenario of 
operation for the electrical network, obtaining busbar voltage to ensure voltage drop is not an 
issue for the network equipment.  
 
Along with investigations of the switchgear arrangements, the HV network synchronous generation 
system was also assessed in ETAP study case simulations, ensuring ISO 8528-1 (2005) continuous 
operating power ratings were not exceeded, or generator apparent power capabilities were not 




Figure 4.2.1.4 Brush Turbo Generator Power Capability Curve [43] 
 
Ratings of the data centre generator sets are given in apparent power (MVA) at a given power factor, 
since armature windings are manufactured to allow for a delivered MVA regardless of power factor. 








factor is less than that specified for the generator field windings the machine is to produce less 
apparent power MVA, this relationship is determined by the capability curve. During ETAP study 
cases simulation values were compared with those provided in the specified manufacturer tolerances. 
This is an important point since if the system power factor is less than that specified for the generators 
a cross reference against capability curves is required (Figure 4.2.1.4 indicates the range of operation).  
4.2.2 Voltage for critical busbar loads 
Voltage drop in an electrical network is related to power flow and characteristic impedance of the 
connected equipment [6] and [11], thus an important aspect of a load flow study is to ascertain the 
minimum and maximum busbar voltages, and voltage drops of network feeders [36], [37].  
 
ETAP study cases were set with voltage marginal and critical alarm limits as; over voltage 102% 
marginal and 105% critical, under voltage 98% marginal and 95% critical. These values are supported 
by the standards BS7671 [36], and ANSI C84 [37] which provide guidance on voltage tolerance 
levels in an electrical system.  The ANSI C84 standard provides guidance on both optimal and 
acceptable voltage levels for electrical power systems as shown in Table 4.2.2.1. 
 
Table 4.2.2.1 ANSI C84.1 Voltage limits [37] 
ANSI C84.1 System Voltage Limits  
120V to 600V Systems  Systems Exceeding 600V  
 
Min (% Vn) Max (% Vn) Min (% Vn) Max (% Vn) 
 
95 105 98 105 Optimal System   
92 106 95 106 Acceptable System  
Where: % Vn  represents the nominal system Voltage rms as a percentage.  
 
It is important to note reference bands given between minimum and maximum levels in Table 4.2.2.1 
are to allow for voltage drop in system sub-circuit feeders. Presently the National Electrical Code 
identified a permissible allowance of 5% whereas the BS7671 IET Wiring Regulations recommend a 
value of 5% for distribution circuits, and 3% for voltage sensitive equipment. Since the LV busbar 
investigated in ETAP simulations are at the origin of sub-circuit distribution, margins allocated were 
98% marginal & 95% critical. Since a voltage drop of 5% at the origin would not allow a sufficient 
margin for expected voltage drops in the remaining network circuits. Nominal busbar voltage at 1 P.u 
was stated as 415Va.c., for all ETAP simulations, with another metric utilised to validate voltage drop 




4.2.3 Voltage Security Index  
Voltage Security Index (Vsi) was applied at each ETAP simulation busbar, where the equation applied 
is as equation (18) [38].  
𝑉𝑠𝑖 =  
𝑊
2





|Vi| represents the calculated magnitude of Voltage rms at busbar 𝑖 
|Visp| represents the specified Voltage rms of busbar 𝑖 
 𝚫ViLim  represents the Voltage rms deviation limit of busbar 𝑖 
NB represents the number of load buses in system. 
Wvi represents the weighting coefficient of voltage at bus 𝑖  
 
Research [35], [38] & [39] suggests Wvi and 𝚫ViLim are taken as 1 and 0.075, respectively. Changing 
these values will result in a non-alignment to the international standards and potentially busbar 
voltage deviation in the system. Vsi is a numerical measure of the severity of a given busbar voltage 
in terms of the magnitude of out of limits present, therefore, to improve system voltage drop factors 
such as; equipment selection, distributed loadings, operational network configuration, transformer tap 
changer settings, and embedded generation are to be as assessed in the simulation approach. It is also 
important to note results from the load flow investigations were utilised to undertake the fault current 
analysis investigations, and Vsi  is utilised to validate simulation voltage drops as a different 
calculation approach from the BS7671 standard.  
4.3 Short Circuit Analysis  
The simulation approach to determine fault currents required validation of essential model data 
including equipment: sub transient, transient and steady state impedance. Also, a pre-commencement 
load flow study investigation to highlight the optimum equipment configurations allowing further 
accurate analysis of short circuit currents. With a knowledge of equipment impedance, and sequence 
components, a Thevenin superposition theorem was applied in simulations investigating multiple 
‘short circuit points’ in the electrical network model, including every system busbar. This process 
obtained IEC60909 fault currents Ik’’ & Ip at each critical busbar, detailing all network fault current 
characteristics, fault paths, and failure scenarios. This allowed a critique of results against the effects 
on Ao i.e., highlighting potential points of failure in the electrical network, and or requirements of 
fault ratings of associated connected equipment. This approach assisted with improvement of 





Furthermore, in addition to fundamental impedance data a range of comprehensive operational factors 
were investigated during the simulations. Consideration was given to: 
 
i. X/R ratios of network grid feeders, given higher X/R ratio and stored energy of synchronous 
machines can significantly affect peak fault current levels in the system. 
ii. System load characteristics, since pre fault currents are non-zero in an operational electrical 
network, this included the differing mode of operation for UPS systems. 
iii. Standby synchronous machines and earth arrangements. 
 
Alongside the system impedances the standby power machines will often provide substantially 
different fault current characteristics than those associated with nominal grid feeders. Also, 
considering the requirements to operate nominal grid feeders and standby power machines in parallel 
i.e., for desired no-break transfers of critical busbar load. To obtain effective peak current (Ip) & 
direct offset current (idc) calculations for synchronous machines X/R ratios should be investigated, 








                                                                              (19) 
Where: 
𝐼  represents the Peak current, 𝐼𝑟𝑚𝑠 represents the rms steady state current. 
 
This displays X/R ratio is a function of peak and steady state currents of a given machine or can often 
be obtained from the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).  
4.3.1 IEC60909 Simulation Scenarios  
Fault currents as indicated in IEC0909 standards were established at each system busbar for both Tier 
3 and Tier 4 system configurations, Table 4.3.1.1 lists a series of six simulation models (all 
possibilities for this HV network), Table 4.3.1.2 highlights the UPS scenarios simulated at the LV 










Table 4.3.1.1  ETAP Simulation Scenarios for all Network Faults 
Electrical Power Sources Utilised in ETAP Simulations 
Source Type Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4 Simulation 5 Simulation 6 
DNO supply 1      
DNO supply 2      
Generator 1      
Generator 2      
Generator 3      
Generator 4      
Generator 5      
Where;  represents power sources connected to the network and  represents a power source disconnected. 
Table 4.3.1.2 ETAP Simulated Scenarios for all UPS Faults 
Mode of Operation, Simulated UPS Configurations 
3 UPS Connected in Parallel 
4 UPS Connected in Parallel 
5 UPS Connected in Parallel 
3 UPS + Synchronised to Main Feeders 
4 UPS + Synchronised to Main Feeders 
5 UPS + Synchronised to Main Feeders 
5 UPS on Standby Battery Mode of Operation  
Bypass Mode - All UPS Offline, Critical Load by Main Feeders  
 
4.4 Protection Grading Co-ordination 
A series of ETAP model simulations were created, allowing all the installed protection devices (113 
scenarios in total) and associated protection settings to be simulated for all the electrical network 
operational configurations and fault scenarios (including faults at each system busbar and DNO 
supply side cable feeder faults). Both phase and ground overcurrent’s were investigated along with 
Non Time Current Curve (NTCC) protections such as restricted earth fault, generator protections and 
pilot differential schemes. All protection grading scenarios investigated were inclusive of: 
 
i. Transformer HV to LV grading discrimination, six scenarios investigated.  
ii. HV faults during single DNO supply, five scenarios investigated.  
iii. HV faults during dual DNO supplies, seven scenarios investigated. 
iv. Discrimination during islanded generator supplies, four scenarios investigated. 
v. HV faults during synchronised supplies (DNO & synchronous generators), one scenario 
investigated. 
vi. LV Rotary UPS co-ordination with both upstream and downstream devices, plus bypass mode 
assessment.  
vii. Both HV & LV Non Time Current Curve (NTCC) protection: G59, SOLKAR unit, restricted 





The simulation approach carried out in ETAP allowed each of the above grading scenarios to be 
investigated for parameters listed in Table 4.4.1, and an output assessment in terms of an associated 
grading curve plot, as shown in Figure 4.4.1. 
 






















































































Busbar                 
Cable/Line               
Generator              
Load                
Motor              
Transformer               
Co-ordination Status              
 
 





4.5 Arc Flash Analysis 
The main objective of arc flash analysis is to consider an engineer’s potential exposure to arc flash 
energy, highlighting the requirement and specification of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), [5] 
and [40]. Along with verifying the hazards for electrical equipment. The simulation approach covered 
all the requirements as detailed by the IEEE 1584 guide [42], in terms of establishing incident energy, 
arc flash boundary and fault clearing times for each of the installed switchgears and associated 
protection devices. 
 
Arc flash analysis was therefore performed as a subsequent study following short-circuit and 
protective-device analysis, since peak current values following short-circuit studies along with 
disconnection times for electrical circuit protective devices are both required to complete an effective 
arc flash assessment i.e., without these preceding studies the accuracy of an arc flash assessment is 
impeded.  The arc flash analysis results were utilised to identify the flash-protection boundary and the 
incident energy at assigned working distances of switchgear equipment, throughout the entire data 
centre. This approach ensures a safe working environment for site engineers and allows critical 
preventive maintenance to be undertaken at specified maintenance intervals, supporting the overall 
condition and uptime of equipment. Investigation of protection device settings and their effects on arc 
flash parameters also provided a reduction of incident energy, the required time for disconnection, and 
quantity of PPE required for establishing safe working.  
4.5.1 IEEE 1584 Calculations 
Calculation methods utilised in all simulation models aligned with the IEEE 1584 [42], as equations 
(20) & (21). Where L-L-L currents are established with the equation for arcing current (Ia). 
 




K = -0.097, representing a fully enclosed switchgear configuration. 
Ibf represents the L-L-L fault current (KA). 
V represent the system nominal voltage rms (KV). 









With the incident energy (𝐸) equation for establishing the J/cm2 at the given point of fault. 
 








𝐶  represents the calculation factor, 1 for system voltage above 1KV, 1.5 for voltages below 1KV. 
𝐸  represents the Incident Energy normalised. 
𝑡 represents the Arcing time in seconds (s). 
𝐷 represents the distance of a person from an arc fault (mm). 
𝑥 represents the distance from circuit interrupter and switchgear assembly (IEEE1584 table for 
coefficients of 5 circuit breaker types). 
4.5.2 Arc Flash Simulation Scenarios  
The data centre electrical network is a complex power distribution network with various modes of 
operation, for which each configuration has a potential to affect the system fault current level, this in-
turn impacts on the arc flash assessment. Therefore, preceding the arc flash assessment both 
overcurrent fault analysis and grading protection requirements must be completed, since the incident 
level and fault clearing time is correlated to those boundaries i.e., fault current within the electrical 
system and range of protection device settings. 
 
The simulation approach utilised ETAP arc flash software module to determine the bolted short-
circuit current to calculate the individual arcing current contributions and arc fault clearing time of 
each protective device. This is undertaken by interfacing ETAP Star (protective device selectivity and 
coordination module) for each critical busbar within the electrical network, during the following three 
scenarios. 
 
i. Two Distribution Network Operator (DNO) cable feeders supplying all connected critical 
loads (nominal arrangement). 
ii. Island mode with standby diesel generators connected to critical loads, i.e., removed from the 
grid. 
iii. Standby generators connected in parallel with the two Distribution Network Operator (DNO) 
cable feeders, for short term parallel G59 no-break transfer of critical load. 
 
Figure 4.5.2.1 is an example TCC displaying the benefits of interfacing protection devices and arc 
flash current, both values can be represented on a single plot with adjustable grading parameters to 




comprehensive reporting which displayed all arc flash results for every system busbar. These final 
analysis results were then displayed on arc flash labels which can be located on the actual equipment, 
as recommended by IEEE 1584 [42]. The arc flash labels contain the necessary information to convey 
the associated danger to maintenance personnel.  
 
 
Figure 4.5.2.1 Example Arc Flash Time Current Curve  
4.6 Load Point Reliability Analysis 
Reliability of the data centre was investigated in terms of;  i) Failure rate expressed as failures per 
year per component ii) Downtime to repair or replace component failures, expressed in hours per 
failure per year. These metrics were established for every system busbar.  
 
Such load point reliability analysis, selection of equipment and optimal operational configuration can 
influence the number of forced outages or reduce downtimes. Likewise, system resiliency and tier 
design assessments can be fully understood in an operational setting. When failures do occur the 
return to nominal supply should be within minimal time therefore electrical faults should be quickly 
removed from the remaining network avoiding unnecessary damage to equipment, or loss of 
connected loads. Research identified that analysis of customer failure statistics show that compared to 
Method IEEE 1584 
If = 32.5KA 
IArcing = 12.41KA 
FCT = 3.66S 
IE = 98.44 cal/cm2 
PPE = LEVEL E 




other portions of electrical power systems, distribution equipment failures contribute as much as 90% 
towards the unavailability of supply to load [30].  
 
Therefore, numerous simulations were undertaken in ETAP for each critical busbar in the system, 
these were to highlight and understand the effects of protection device operation and correlating 
reliability effects on the power system. Simulation failure scenarios of each system busbar were 
investigated to highlight the reliability indices as below. 
 
i. Load Point Average Failure Rate (λ). 
ii. Average Outage Duration (tir). 
iii. Annual Unavailability (U). 
 
Where equations (22) & (23) display the numerical calculations utilised in ETAP for establishing 
average failure rate and annual outage duration respectively [44].  
 
Average Failure Rate at Load Point λi (f/yr.):      
𝝀𝒊 = ∑ 𝜆 ,          
.
∈           
            (22) 
Where; 
 𝜆e,j  represents the average failure rate of element j. 
j∈Ne  represents the total number of elements whose fault will interrupt points i.  
 
Annual Outage Duration at Load Point Ui (hrs./yr.):             
  
𝑼𝒊 = ∑  𝜆 ,
.
∈  𝑟 ,           (23) 
Where;  
ri,j  represents the failure duration at load point i due to a failed element j.  
 
The failure rates recorded from simulations were critiqued against Tier classifications and provided 









4.7 Chapter Summary  
This chapter outlined the RBS data centre electrical network in terms of providing a single line 
diagram of the complete HV/LV network, also detailing the models which were constructed in ETAP. 
Details have been provided on the simulation procedures, calculations and operational scenarios 
investigated. Including a range of load flow, actual busbar loadings and Vsi indices at each system 
busbar. Also, detailed the short circuit analysis approach and application of IEC60909 to each 
simulation, during all six operational scenarios – i.e., inclusive of grid feeders, standby generators, 
transformers, cabling, and UPS configurations, allowing IEC60909 fault current values to be 
established at system busbar. Detailed the progression of short circuit studies and onto protection 
device setting analysis, for all 113 devices installed and located in the electrical ETAP model 
simulations. Over 26 protection grading scenarios including Time Current Curve (TCC) devices and 
Non-Time Current Curve (NTCC) assessment, example grading assessments also provide details on 
the parameters investigated which includes protection relay pick up, full load current values, 
equipment damage curves, IEC60909 fault current values, and more importantly grading co-
ordination between all installed devices. 
 
This chapter also outlined the IEEE 1584 arc flash requirements and how this standard was utilised in 
the simulation approach, in terms of establishing each system busbar value for arc flash incident 
energy, arc flash boundary requirements and total fault clearly time. Also, detailing the importance of 
electrical protection devices settings in terms of how they can effective such arc flash requirements, 
with further investigation and recommendations given in this research programme.  The final 
simulation approach details the undertaking of load point reliability analysis, within Chapter 4.6 
detailing which operational scenarios were investigated in order to achieve an improvement in 
Operational Availability (Ao), This simulation approach was completed as the final study which 
supports a quantification of improvements suggested during the preceding power system studies i.e. 
load flow, short circuit analysis and protection device grading i.e. how can improving protection 












Chapter 5 – Simulation Results  
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter includes ETAP software simulation results and associated descriptions for all data centre 
simulations undertaken. Such as load flow, short circuit analysis, protection grading, arc flash and 
load point reliability studies, respectively.  These results are inclusive of all HV & LV data centre 
electrical equipment.  Load Flow studies highlighted busbar voltage alerts for out of tolerance with 
the ANSI C84 guidance, with transformer arrangements not currently having an optimal tap setting. 
Generator stability curves were assessed at the varying connected loads in-line with the original 
system design and manufacturers recommendations, these modes of operation are expressed in a 
vector stability curve diagram.  
 
Short circuit simulations highlighted that the present fault current values, and durations present, were 
more than the installed switchgear ratings and are effected by the associated distribution transformers 
tap setting and installed relay protection device. These protection relay settings were also found 
missing an opportunity to reduce arc flash incident energy and limit damage to equipment should a 
network fault occur. Results are presented in settings tables with all data values included for every 
busbar in the system. In terms of short circuit contributions, it was also found that the rotary UPS 
units have a significant effect on the overall peak fault current at the switchgear, therefore results 
provided a recommendation to reduce the number of operational units during any parallel operations 
i.e., for no-break transfer with grid feeders.  
 
The original system and equipment settings were simulated for reliability, with results providing a 
hours per year (hr/yr.) outage metric for each of the system busbar, with the initial results indicating 
the predicted outage values were in-excess of the original design values, i.e., those suggested by the 
Uptime Tier Classifications table. For example, one busbar in the system resulted in a predicted 48 
hrs/yr. outage with which an improvement through operational settings achieved a reduction to just 
1.27 hrs/yr., this was the case for most system equipment and is explained within the results Chapter 
5.5.  Each of the power system simulation results have been summarised into a table of parameters for 
achieving improvement of operational equipment, i.e., in comparison to utilising the Uptime Tier 
Classification table alone. The basis of these recommendations has been derived from the extensive 
range of simulations undertaken on this data centre and in-line with the requirements of many 
international standards relating to electrical power system operations. These improvement parameters 
can be utilised for any Tier 3 data centre network and have formed a new generalised approach for 





5.1 Load Flow 
Figure 5.1.1, 5.1.2 & 5.1.3 represent the typical LV incoming switchgear arrangements. Results tables 
for these LV switchgears include 50%, 100% and 110% loading to confirm busbar voltage is in-line 
with ANSI C84. Also, both an N+1 and 2N system simulation was undertaken by operation of ACB 
T1 or T2, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.1.1 LV Distribution Board Ref.A1, ETAP Model Block  
 
Where; 
T1&T2 are remote node connections to power transformers; Specification 2.5MVA, 11/0.433KV, Dyn11, 






Figure 5.1.2 LV Distribution Board Ref.Yellow, ETAP Model Block 
 
Where;  
T11&T12 are remote node connections to power transformers; Specification 2.5MVA, 11/0.433KV, Dyn11, 






Figure 5.1.3 LV Distribution Board Ref.G1, ETAP Model Block  
 
Where;  
T9&T10 are remote node connections to power transformers; Specification 2.5MVA, 11/0.433KV, Dyn11, 



















Table 5.1.1 Load Flow Scenarios  















LV A1 415 409.1 365 119  5% 0.126 
LV Yellow 415 406.4 719 235  5% 0.268 
LV G1 415 409 367 81  5% 0.131 
Scenario 1(b) Tier 4 Configuration – Connected Load Values of 50% Design Parameters 
LV A1 (T1) 415 410.2 183 60 
 5% 0.084 
LV A1 (T2) 415 410.2 183 60 
LV Yellow (T11) 415 409.4 364 120 
 5% 0.114 
LV Yellow (T12) 415 409.4 364 120 
LV G1 (T9) 415 410.3 199 48 
 5% 0.080 
LV G1 (T10) 415 410.3 369 81 















LV A1 415 406.9 721 236  5% 0.238 
LV Yellow 415 401.5 1404 459  5% 0.661 
LV G1 415 407.8 729 163  5% 0.188 
Scenario 2 (b) Tier 4 Configuration – Connected Load Values of 100% Design Parameters 
LV A1 (T1) 415 409.1 364 119 
 5% 0.126 
LV A1 (T2) 415 409.1 364 119 
LV Yellow (T11) 415 407.5 721 238 
 5% 0.204 
LV Yellow (T12) 415 407.5 721 238 
LV G1 (T9) 415 409.8 339 67 
 5% 0.098 
LV G1 (T10) 415 409.3 397 95 















LV A1 415 406.4 791 259  5% 0.268 
















































LV A1 (T1) 415 408.9 400 131 
 5% 0.135 
LV A1 (T2) 415 408.9 400 131 
LV Yellow (T11) 415 407.1 791 261 
 5% 0.226 
LV Yellow (T12) 415 407.1 791 261 
LV G1 (T9) 415 409.6 372 74 
 5% 0.106 
LV G1 (T10) 415 409.1 436 105 
 
Where;  
Highlighted cells indicate a marginal alarm since busbar voltage is <98% or >102%, as recommended by ANSI 
C84 [37]. 
 
5.1.1 Discussion of Load Flow Results 
It can be noted in Table 5.1.1 LV DB yellow led to marginal (<98%) system alarms for any given 
simulated load whilst operating in a Tier 3 configuration. Vsi also increased since voltage drops in the 
simulations were outside of ANSI C84 [37] guidelines. Such voltage drop decrease’s reliability and 
has implications on allowable voltage drops of sub-circuit feeders, thus would not provide the most 
robust operational configuration.  
 
All Tier 4 configurations simulated reduced voltage drop and achieved an improved Vsi, although 
further complications maybe encountered since parallel impedances due to Tier 4 configuration may 
significantly increase short circuit current values, requiring further validation against IEC60909 
limits.  
 
Voltage drop issues encountered on busbar ID LV yellow were related to the supply cable feeders on 
the LV side of transformers, in comparison to other system LV busbar which were supplied by 
busbar. The electrical network investigated has several HV transformers where tap changers were set 
to the maximum HV tap position (5%). Table 5.1.1.2 displays the simulated effects on voltage 
security index, and voltage magnitude at the complete range of transformer tap changer settings, along 











Table 5.1.1.1 Transformer Tap Changer Effects on Load Flow  










Energy Cost per 
annum (£m) 
LV Yellow 402 1405 459 5% 0.613 1.231 
LV Yellow 411 1475 482 2.5% 0.058 1.292 
LV Yellow 422 1549 506 0% 0.178 1.357 
LV Yellow 433 1630 533 -2.5% 1.176 1.428 





Orange highlighted cells indicate a marginal alarm since busbar voltage is <98% or >102%, and red highlighted 
cells indicate critical alarm since busbar voltage <95% or >105% of nominal voltage (Vn) - as recommended by 
ANSI C84 [37]. 
 
 
Table 5.1.1.1 displays an optimal tap setting in-line with ANSI C84 [37] and BS7617 voltage limits 
[36] is either 2.5% or 0%. Since a 2.5% tap setting reduces load flow by 74 KVA when compared to 
0% tap, which equates to an operational energy reduction of £75k per annum. Therefore 2.5% would 
be the optimal setting providing desired busbar voltage under all simulated scenarios and reducing 
severity of voltage deviations. A recommended range of tap settings were established for all site 
transformers, positively impacting both operational cost and system voltage drop. 
 
Along with load flow values at simulated busbar the standby generators were assessed at all three load 
cases. Figure 5.1.1.1 displays one of the five modelled and simulated generators, as can be seen within 
Table 5.1.1.2 no issues were identified since simulated loads were within manufacturer ratings for 
apparent power and power factor, respectively. Along with Figure 5.1.1.1.2 which is a graphical 
display showing the generator vector stability curve at normal, design and emergency load values, and 





Figure 5.1.1.1 ETAP Generator Model Block 
 
 
Table 5.1.1.2 Generator Load Flow Capability Checks 
Loads Simulated KW KVAr KVA PF 
Nominal Connected Site Load 
(Currently 50% of Design Capacity) 
927 293 972 0.95 
100% Design Load 1830 614 1930 0.94 
Emergency Load (Design +10%) 2007 681 2119 0.94 







Figure 5.1.1.2 Generator Stability Parameters & Vector Curve 
Where,  
N = Nominal load, D = Maximum design load, E = Emergency load which is 110/% of design value. 
 
 
5.2 Short Circuit Analysis 
Below Figure 5.2.1 is the complete RBS electrical network which was modelled for short circuit 
analysis. Simulation results and conclusions indicate study parameters, simulations undertaken, and 



















5.2.1 Discussion of Short Circuit Results  
During short circuit simulation lump loads for LV distribution boards were investigated in terms of 
constant impedance (Z) characteristic and constant power (KVA), this was to capture and understand 
any additional peak current contribution from the electromagnetic storage for constant KVA loads i.e., 
UPS, motors, or generator. Constant power types led to an increased short circuit current contribution 
of 14.28KA which equated to a busbar Ik’’ of 52 KA, thus highlighted the importance of simulating 
load characteristics to obtain worst case scenario fault currents in the system before selection of 
switchgear.  
 
It was also noted increasing the distribution transformer primary tap settings led to a decrease in 
impedance thus fault currents at the critical busbar are increased, Figure 5.2.2.1.  
 
Simulated high voltage busbar encountered the most significant variation in fault current levels due to 
impedance variations of DNO and standby generator supplies. Simulation levels of  L-L-L peak fault 
current for the high voltage busbar ranged from 9.97KA to 29.28KA thus presented a challenge with 
respect to obtaining effective electrical protection co-ordination, and disconnection of such electrical 
system faults, which were investigated further in the protection grading Chapter 5.3.  
 








It was also noted from the simulation results that IEC 60909 fault calculations provided minimal 
changes in fault current values, and L-G faults currents exceeded the L-L-L values. This was since 
Z1=Z2 and Z0<Z1 for the power transformers simulated [40]. Selection of this type of power 
transformer grounding method (Solid, TN-C) ensures high L-G fault currents which can lead to fast 
protection clearance capabilities although it is not generally used in common network distribution 
schemes. Research identified L-G fault levels are generally 0.86 P.u of the L-L-L value [7] and [8]. 
One important point to note is the peak fault currents (Ip) within the HV network varied significantly 
if either supplied directly by DNO feeders or by standby generation (9.97KA to 29.28KA). 
 
Furthermore, a Tier 4 transformer LV supply configuration was not necessarily the most suitable 
option for this network, despite Tier ratings suggesting such arrangements offer improved resilience 
[15]. Operation of parallel supply transformers (Tier 4) led to significantly increased peak fault 
currents, and in this instance came close to exceeding the bracing peak rating of the installed 
distribution switchgear, thus displayed the importance of such fault studies to select the most resilient 
mode of operation, since a fault on the critical busbar of such a Tier 4 system is likely to damage the 
distribution switchgear beyond a serviceable condition, leading to significant outage times. Results 






















Table 5.2.1.1 Fault Current Values for a Tier 3 & 4 Data Centre Configuration 
Scenario 1 – Tier 3 LV Switchgear Configuration  
DB LV Yellow Ikrms (KA) 
Ip = Ikrms x √𝟐 
(KA) 
L-L-L 37.76 53.40 
L-G 38.82 54.90 
L-L 32.70 46.24 
L-L-G 39.16 55.38 
DB LV A1   
L-L-L 37.46 52.98 
L-G 40.79 57.69 
L-L 32.44 45.88 
L-LG 39.47 55.82 
DB LV G1   
L-L-L 34.88 49.33 
L-G 35.41 50.08 
L-L 30.21 42.72 
L-L-G 35.75 50.56 
Scenario 2 – Tier 4 LV Switchgear Configuration 
DB LV Yellow Ikrms (KA) 
Ip = Ikrms x √𝟐 
(KA) 
L-L-L 60.74 85.89 
L-G 66.54 94.10 
L-L 52.59 74.37 
L-L-G 65.63 92.81 
DB LV A1   
L-L-L 60.24 85.19 
L-G 69.32 98.03 
L-L 52.16 73.77 
L-L-G 66.36 93.85 
DB LV G1   
L-L-L 59.04 83.50 
L-G 65.94 93.25 
L-L 51.13 72.31 
L-L-G 63.66 90.03 
 
Fault current contributions delivered by the rotary UPS system, as Table 5.2.1.2. highlights the 
significant range of modes of operation available, along with the associated effects on fault currents, 
in terms of the UPS input/output switchboards. In relation to the connected electrical protection 
devices the clearing capabilities must remain adequate for the minimum possible UPS fault current. 
However, the more problematic quantity in this case was the peak current (Ip). Since the UPS 
investigated were of a rotary construction therefore the transient reactance is low thus led to high peak 






To illustrate further below Figure 5.2.1.2 shows a single UPS simulated with associated IEC60909 
fault current values, both with and without transient input. Hence a static UPS unit would produce 
much lower peak current (Ip). Such increased fault currents from rotary machines also correlated to 
the arc flash values, in terms of a significant Cal/cm2 increase which would compromise safety of 
maintenance workers and lead to a higher demand for safety equipment, as discussed in arc flash 
analysis Chapter 5.4.  
Table 5.2.1.2 UPS Fault Contributions 
Mode of Operation, 
simulated UPS configurations 
UPS Input (A1) switchboard fault 
currents (KA) 
UPS Output (A2) switchboard fault 
currents (KA) 
L-L-L (rms) L-G (rms)  Ip L-L-L (rms) L-G (rms)  Ip  
3 UPS in Parallel 62.26 64.38 88.04 59.09 61.02 83.57 
4 UPS in Parallel 73.73 73.36 104.27 73.57 77.44 104.04 
5 UPS in Parallel 85.14 86.62 120.41 87.58 93.18 123.86 
3 UPS + Synchronised to Main 
Feeders 
64.8 69.39 91.64 64.8 69.39 91.64 
4 UPS + Synchronised to Main 
Feeders 
78.0 83.85 110.30 78.0 83.85 110.31 
5 UPS + Synchronised to Main 
Feeders 
91.0 98.53 128.69 91.0 98.53 128.69 
5 UPS on Standby Battery  38.0 40.0 53.74 56.06 62.13 79.28 
Bypass Mode - all UPS offline 38.42 40.67 54.33 38.42 40.67 54.33 
 
















L-L-L 19.43 12.40 
L-G 21.14 11.76 
L-L 17.02 10.74 
L-L-G 20.21 12.37 
Ip 48.61 17.88 




5.3 Protection Grading & Co-ordination  
5.3.1 Discussion of protection scenario results  
This section contains the twenty-six protection scenarios investigated with each group of scenarios 
displaying a simplified single line diagram with subsequent grading results and discussion. This 
approach included all overcurrent and unit protections installed within the network. Single line 
diagrams indicate simulation equipment type, sizing, and configuration changes. Results are presented 




Figure 5.3.1.1 Tier 3 HV Transformer Single Line Diagram, Relating to Protection Scenarios 1 to 6 
 
Protection Scenario 1  
Distribution Board A1 - Transformers 1 & 2 Protection Evaluation 
 
Protection evaluation for distribution board DBA1 in terms of the supply equipment and grading of 
HV to LV protection devices is detailed below. Key points have been highlighted in terms of, 
inadequacy of settings for equipment protection, unreasonable discrepancies, safety, or compromises 












GEC 1200A 25KA HV 
LV LOAD 
4000A 25KA LV BUS 





Phase Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
 
i. Transformer 1 and transformer 2 configured to provide a Tier 3 supply to the low voltage 
4000A busbar, DBA1. It was found from the overcurrent protection curves Figure 5.3.1.2 the 
HV relay devices for both transformers (T1&T2) were set differently in terms of overcurrent 
time delay. There is no apparent beneficial reason to set the HV relays differently, given they 
have the same transformer rating, neither settings group provided the most effective option. 
 
Transformer 1 settings: 
Group 1 - trip curve IEC standard inverse, It =263A, Td = 2.45s. 
Group 2 – trip curve definite time, It = 1200A, Td = 0.  
 
Transformer 2 settings: 
Group 1 - trip curve IEC standard inverse, It =263A, Td = 0.590s. 
Group 2 – trip curve definite time, It = 1200A, Td = 0.  
 
Figure 5.3.1.2 displays transformer 1 settings overlap the damage point of the transformer, as 
outlined by the ANSI/IEEE C57.109 standard. There is no beneficial reason to have such a 
time delay on the overcurrent protection, settings were improved according to the ANSI/IEEE 
C57.109 standards. The shift curve on the HV side protection is to be less than 87% of the 
transformer maximum thermal rating  Tr =  I  t or 1250A in this case. 
 
ii. Transformer 2 overcurrent time delay of 0.590s failed co-ordination with the transformer LV 
side ACB protection, hence under phase overcurrent faults upstream protection of the 
transformer may operate before the LV. Whilst in practice it’s not essential to grade 
protection devices on either side of the supply transformer they operate signalling relays 
within the system, which would indicate to the operator the fault is within the incorrect part of 
the system and may lead to a delayed restoration of the standby supply. There is no beneficial 
reason for the current time delay of transformer 2, which is shown in Figure 5.3.1.2.  
 
iii. Transformers 1&2 - HV pick-up settings were 263A. The rated primary current of the 
transformers is 131.2A, thus pick-up current is currently twice the full load capacity, whilst it 
is reasonable to allow a small percentage overload such as 125%, the significant value of 
263A is not a recommended setting. Likewise, transformer LV rating is 3333A and the LV 





Figure 5.3.1.2 Overcurrent Protection TCC for Transformers 1&2, HV & LV Equipment 
 
i. UPS input and output low voltage protections are set identical in terms of overcurrent 
values.  
 
UPS input settings LT = 1600A, INST = 22400A. 
UPS output settings LT = 1600A, INST = 22400A. 
 
Whilst there is not a practical benefit in time and current grading the UPS input/output 
(for disconnection purposes), presently the output settings are twice the machines Full 
Load Current (FLC) and not in-line with the manufacture’s recommendations. 
Furthermore, the instantaneous setting is overlapping the transformer incomer (HV) 
protection thus an O/C fault on the output of a UPS cable for example may operate the 
HV transformer protection leading to an unnecessary loss of supply to all online UPS 






Figure 5.3.1.3 Overcurrent Protection TCC for Transfomrers 1&2, HV & LV Including Downstream 
Devices 
 
Ground Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
 
i. Figure 5.3.1.4 TCC ground fault plots both transformers 1&2 ground fault settings, the 
protection relay is currently set a 3A. This is outside of the manufacturer’s recommendation 
of 0.3 x FLC. For this case full load current is. 
 
𝐼𝑠𝑐 =  
2.5MVA
 √3 x 11000 𝑉
= 131.213A. 
  
Therefore, ground setting should be 0.3x131.213 = 39.64A. 
 
ii. Arcing current at DBA1 is Ia = 14.59KA with a fault clearing time of 1.957s. This leads to a 
62 Cal/cm2 incident energy, an improvement could be made by applying an instantaneous 






Figure 5.3.1.4  L-G Protection TCC for Transformers 1&2, HV & LV Equipment  
 
Protection Scenario 2 
Distribution Board C1 - Transformers 5 & 6 Protection Evaluation 
 
i. Transformer HV/LV protections failed co-ordination between 8948A & 31485A, hence under 
phase overcurrent faults upstream protection of the transformer may operate before the LV 
devices. Whilst in practice it is not essential to grade devices on either side of the supply 
transformer it operates signalling relays within the network which would indicate to operators 
a fault is within the incorrect part of the system and may lead to a delayed restoration of the 
standby supply i.e., an actual LV fault would be indicated on the HV remote trip indication. 
The LV IDMT protection curve may be re-configured to address this issue, given current 
settings are more than the LV busbar rating.  
 
ii. Both transformers 5&6 HV relay pick-up settings are 263A. The rated primary current of the 
transformers is 131.2A, thus the pick-up was 2 x FLC, whilst it is reasonable to allow a 
percentage overload, such as 125%, the value of 263A is not a practical setting. Likewise, the 
transformer LV rating is 3333A and the LV incoming protection devices are set with a pick-





iii. Consideration for arc flash levels at the current installed protection settings. The arcing 
current at DBC1 is Ia = 14.52KA with a fault clearing time of 1.958s. This leads to 62 
Cal/cm2 incident energy, an improvement could be made by applying an instantaneous setting 
to the main incomer IDMT, as shown is Chapter 6.2. 
 
iv. Arcing current at DBC1 is Ia = 14.52KA with a fault clearing time of 1.958s. This leads to 62 
Cal/cm2 incident energy. Improvement could be made by reduction of settings. Closing both 
supply transformers onto the busbar increases Ia = 21.39KA and the incident energy to 161 
Cal/cm2 - above the rating of available personal protective equipment (PPE) i.e., this would 
not be safe for maintenance activities. 
 
 









Protection Scenario 3  
Distribution Board B1 or D1 - Transformers 7 & 8 Protection Evaluation 
 
Phase Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
 
i. Transformer HV/LV protections failed co-ordination up to 15.38KA at the LV side of 
transformer, under phase overcurrent faults upstream protection of the transformer may 
operate before the LV devices, on INST operation. Whilst in practice it is not essential to 
grade devices on either side of the supply transformer it operates signalling relays within the 
network which would indicate to operators a fault is within the incorrect part of the system 
and may lead to a delayed restoration of the standby supply i.e., an actual LV fault would be 
indicated on the HV remote trip indication. The LV IDMT protection curve could be re-
configured to address this issue. 
 
ii. Transformer 7 & 8 full load current is 52.49/1333A HV & LV, respectively. HV protection 
relay pick-up is set at 131A which is over 200% of the transformer’s capacity. This leads to 
an LV load capability of approx.3480A whereas the actual busbar ampere capacity is 2000A. 
The LV IDMT is set with a pick-up of 2400A which again more than the busbar capacity. 
Therefore, a short circuit on this equipment would lead to an increased disconnection time 
and damage to components, thus leading to a great outage of critical supplies. The direct 
effect on Ao is discussed in Chapter 6.1. 
 
iii. Arcing current at DBD1 is Ia = 12.31KA with a fault clearing time of 1.26s. This leads to a 







Figure 5.3.1.6 Overcurrent Protection TCC for Transformers 7&8, HV & LV Equipment 
 
Ground Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
 
i. Below TCC ground fault plot, both transformers 7 & 8 ground fault protection is set to 1.5A. 
This is to low and outside of the manufacturer’s recommendation of 0.3 x FLC. Since FLC 
rms is: 
𝐼𝑠𝑐 =  
1 MVA
( √3 x 11000𝑉 ) 
= 52.94A. 
  
Therefore, ground fault setting should be 0.3 x 52.94 = 15.75A. 





Figure 5.3.1.7  L-G Protection TCC, for Transformers 7&8  
 
Protection Scenario 4  
Distribution Board R1 or Y1 Transformer 11 & 12 Protection Evaluation 
 
i. Transformer 11 & 12 full load current is 131.2/3333A HV & LV, respectively. HV protection 
relay pick-up is set at 225A which is significantly greater than the transformers capacity. 
Also, LV incomer is set to pick up at 4000A which is again above the actual capacity of the 
transformer - 3333A. 
 
ii. Transformer HV/LV protections failed co-ordination at any overcurrent range at the LV side 
of the transformer, hence under phase overcurrent faults upstream protection of the 
transformer may operate before the LV devices on INST operation. Whilst in practice it’s not 
essential to grade devices on either side of the supply transformer it operates signalling relays 
within the network which would indicate to operators a fault is within the incorrect part of the 
system and may lead to a delayed restoration of the standby supply i.e., an actual LV fault 
would be indicated on the HV remote trip indication. The LV relay protection curve could be 





iii. Arcing current at DB Yellow Input is Ia = 13.75 KA with a fault clearing time of 2.86 s. This 
leads to 85 Cal/cm2 incident energy. Improvement could be made by reduction of settings. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.1.8 Overcurrent Protection TCC for Transformer 11&12, HV & LV Equipment  
 
Protection Scenario 5  
Distribution Board H1 Transformer 13&14 Protection Evaluation 
 
i. Transformer 13 & 14 full load current is 131.2/3333A HV & LV, respectively. HV protection 
relay pick-up is set at 225A which is significantly greater than the transformers capacity. At 
the current instantaneous setting (1538A/42000A) there is less than 20ms grading margin 
between the HV & LV devices. Whilst in practice it is not essential to grade devices on either 
side of the supply transformer it operates signalling relays within the network which would 
indicate to operators a fault is within the incorrect part of the system and may lead to a 
delayed restoration of the standby supply i.e., an actual LV fault would be indicated on the 






Figure 5.3.1.9  Overcurrent Protection TCC for Transformers 13&14, HV & LV Equipment  
 
Protection Scenario 6  
Distribution Board G1 Transformer 9&10 Protection Evaluation 
 
DBG1 is a Tier 3 power supply arrangement, for which the relay protections are assessed separately 
due to the differences in equipment types, which differed from any other LV board within the data 
centre electrical network.  
 
Transformer 10 
Phase Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
 
i. Transformer 10 full load current capacity is 131.2/3333A, HV & LV, respectively. HV 
protection relay pick-up is set at 225A which is significantly greater than the transformers 
capacity. The LV incomer at DBG1 is set to pick up at 5250A which is also above the FLC of 





ii. There is no instantaneous setting on the LV incomer therefore an overcurrent fault exceeding 
1350A (HV base) would operate the HV protection oppose the desired downstream device 
closer to the fault. Whilst in practice it is not essential to grade devices on either side of the 
supply transformer it operates signalling relays within the network which would indicate to 
operators a fault is within the incorrect part of the system and may lead to a delayed 
restoration of the standby supply i.e., an actual LV fault would be indicated on the HV remote 
trip indication. 
 
iii. Arcing current at DB G1 Transformer 10 Ia = 19.29 KA with a fault clearing time of 0.92s. 
This leads to 39 Cal/cm2 incident energy. 
 
 










Ground Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
 
i. Below TCC plot for transformer 10 ground fault protection is set a 3A. This is considerably 
too low and outside of the manufacturer’s recommendation of 0.3 x FLC. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.1.11  L-G Protection TCC for Transformer 10   
 
Transformer 9 
Phase Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
 
i. Transformer 9 full load current capacity is 131.2/3333A, HV & LV, respectively. HV 
protection relay pick-up is set at 187.5A which is allowing at 45% overload margin, this 
setting could be reduced to 25% as per the original manufacturer’s recommendations. 
 
ii. The LV incomer at DBG1 is set to pick up at 1225A which is considerably lower than the 
actual transformer LV FLC of 3333A. On investigation the LV fuses were fitted in the LV 
transformer cable box upstream of the LV IDMT. Fuses were BUSSMANN gg 800A 80KA 




IDMT settings in terms of load current and fault levels thus no additional upstream fuses are 
required. The upstream fuses do not discriminate with the LV IDMT incomer, thus above 
10602A the LV fuses would operate before the LV IDMT relay therefore transformer inter-
tripping would be lost.  
 

















Ground Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
 
i. Below TCC plot for transformer 9 ground fault protection is set a 3A. This is considerably too 
low and outside of the manufacturer’s recommendation of 0.3 x FLC. 
 
 







Figure 5.3.1.14 DNO & Main Incomer Single Line Diagram, Relating to Protection Scenario 7. 
 
Protection Scenario 7  
Assessment of High Voltage Grid Feeder (X) and VCB A1  
 
Phase Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
i. No 3-phase grading achieved at grid fault levels of 6KA, DNO feeder trips at 0.79s whereas 
A1 SEPAM relay operates at 2.4s, for busbar faults on String 1(A). Under fault conditions 
this could lead to a pro-longed outage of one of the two site DNO supplies.  
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Figure 5.3.1.15  Overcurrent Protection TCC for DNO grid feeder VCB X & Data Centre Main 
Incomer VCB A1  
 
Ground Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
 
i. As shown below failed protection co-ordination for L-G faults at DNO VCB X and Main 
incomer VCB A1. VCB A1 SEPAM takes longer than 3.0s to clear L-G fault current. Note 
also B2 & A2 VCB’s operate with identical settings, therefore a fault on opposite string 
extensions may result in disconnection of the GEC busbar. VCB C has L-G protection, which 
is set at 600A, currently considerable too high for the system fault current. L-G settings on the 


























Figure 5.3.1.17 Single Line Diagram of the DNO Supply for Evaluation of Protection Scenarios 8 to 
11. 
 
Protection Scenario 8  
Bus Bar Faults on the HV Ring Main Extensions String 1A or String 1B, whilst supplied by a 
Single Incomer (DNO) 
 
Phase Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
i. A fault current value for L-L-L of ≥2.86KA will operate the definite time settings on VCB A 
or VCB B with a potential loss of the GEC HV BB and all associated connected loads, 10 No. 
distribution transformers. 
ii. Despite the Definite Time (DT) setting on VCB’s A & B there is just 200ms grading for L-L-
L faults between VCB A2/B2 against VCB C (bus coupler on GEC HV busbar). A fault on 
either string 1(A or B) busbar could potentially operate VCB C disconnecting an additional 5 
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Figure 5.3.1.18 Overcurrent Protection TCC for busbar Fault on HV String Extensions  
 
Ground Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
i. Although busbar L-G faults are less likely, String 1A/B operates the corresponding VCB’s 
A2/B2 thus removing13 No. connected distribution transformers. Not the 3 No. required for a 
genuine busbar fault on the HV substation extensions, note below TCC plot. A more 
appropriate range of L-G settings on VCB C could assist with mitigating this issue and 












Figure 5.3.1.19  L-G Protection TCC Plot for busbar Fault on HV String Extensions  
 
Protection Scenario 9  
Single Feeder Network, Transformer supply side fault on String Extensions (String 1A or 1B)
  
i. No issues for L-L-L, L-L, L-G or L-L-G faults. Transformer SEPAM relays operate before 
upstream device with good discrimination margins.  
 
Protection Scenario 10  
Single Feeder Network, busbar Fault on the Main GEC HV Switchgear  
 
i. All GEC busbar O/C faults, VCBA/B operate before ‘C’, so does VCBA2/ B2 thus a busbar 
fault cannot be cleared on the main GEC busbar without losing both sides of the busbar 
coupler (VCB C), during a single feeder network situation. This is an unlikely occurrence 
although settings on VCB C could be improved to mitigate this issue. Likewise, for L-G faults 
VCB A2/B2 would operate since maximum L-G fault is 570A. VCB ‘C’ would minimise the 
disconnection of critical loads, unfortunately L-G setting is currently 600A (SI Curve) – there 





Figure 5.3.1.20 Overcurrent Protection TCC plot for L-G Faults at the GEC HV Substation 
 
Protection Scenario 11 
Single Feeder Network, Cable Fault on the Supply Side of Transformers Connected to the Main 
GEC HV Switchgear  
 
i. No issues for L-L-L, L-L, L-G or L-L-G faults. Transformer SEPAM relays operate before 
upstream device, providing good discrimination. Although transformer relay pick-up currents 














Figure 5.3.1.21  Dual Feeder Network Single Line Diagram, Grid Incomer (DNO) Evaluations 
Relating to Protection Scenarios 12 to 17. 
 
Protection Scenario 12 
Busbar Faults on the HV Ring Main Extensions String 1A or 1B 
 
i. No issues noted for L-L-L, L-L, L-G or L-L-G faults. Transformer SEPAM relays operate 
before upstream device, providing good discrimination.  
 
Protection Scenario 13 
Cable Fault on Supply Side of the Transformers Connected to the HV Ring Main Extensions 
String 1A or 1B 
 
i. No issues noted for L-L-L, L-L, L-G or L-L-G faults. Transformer SEPAM relays operate 
before upstream device, providing good discrimination. Although transformer relay pick-up 
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Protection Scenario 14 
Busbar Fault on the Main HV GEC Switchgear 
 
i. Failed protection co-ordination for any fault on the GEC busbar. Definite time setting of VCB 
A or VCB B leads to instantaneous operation & loss of all connected transformer loads, it 
would be advisable to remove the definite time setting and obtain discrimination between 
VCB C and VCB A2/B2. Allowing isolation of either the LHS or RHS under fault condition. 
At present settings between VCB C and VCB A2 or B2 do not allow enough margin for any 
overcurrent fault, such as L-L, L-L-G or L-L-L faults. 
 
 









Protection Scenario 15(a) 
L-G Faults on the Main HV GEC Switchgear  
 
i. Ground fault settings on VCB A2 or B2 trip instantaneously thus L-G faults on the GEC 
busbar, either LHS or RHS disconnects all connected transformers. Ground fault protection on 
VCB C could be investigated to improve this and limit the disconnected loads under a busbar 















Protection Scenario 15(b) 
 Cable Fault located from DNO VCB to VCB A1 or VCB B1(Main DNO Incomers)  
 
i. L-L-L fault level at the incoming supply cable is approximately 3KA, due to parallel supplies 
on the HV network VCBA/B definite time settings or A2/B2 tripping of 3005A at 0.66s 
(upstream of VCBA/B if DT is removed) operate firstly. The cable fault would remain until 
the DNO protection operates/trips 3044A at 1.14 Secs. This would unnecessarily loose 
voltage at the GEC busbar and one of the HV string extensions (i.e., 2 of 3 substations lost for 
L-L-L cable from DNO to site incomers). This is a significant issue since the VCB’s either 
side of the cable fault should remove without impacting on the other substation equipment. 
Practically for site operators this would pose a significant challenge to restore the site supply 
given the available time of standby equipment i.e., UPS uninterruptable power supply 
batteries 15 minutes at FLC. 
 
 






Protection Scenario 16 
Cable Faults on the Supply Side of the Transformers Connected to the HV GEC Switchgear  
 
i. Effective grading for phase overcurrent’s has been achieved between the GEC busbar 
transformer supply feeders and upstream devices. However, note on the TCC a 300ms grading 
margin between a transformer supply and main VCB ‘A’ or ‘B’ definite time settings. 
Therefore, grading margins could be improved.  
 
 












Protection Scenario 17 
Cable L-G faults on the Supply Side of the Transformers connected to the Main HV GEC 
Switchgear  
 
i. The below TCC ground fault plot for transformer 1 shows ground fault protection set at 3A 
rms. This is considerably too low and outside of the manufacturer’s recommendation of 0.3 x 
FLC rating.  
 
𝐼𝑠𝑐 =  
2.5MVA
√3 x 11000 𝑉
= 131.213 A rms 
  
Therefore, ground fault setting should be 0.3x131.213 = 39.64A rms 
 
 








Figure 5.3.1.27  Standby Generators Single Line Diagram, Relating to Protection Scenarios 18 to 21. 
 
 
Protection Scenario 18  
Standby Supply Scenario with busbar Faults on the HV Ring Main Extensions String 1A or 1B 
 
Phase Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
i. No issues recorded with regards overcurrent faults, VCB A clears L-L-L faults at 4800A at 
0.3s which is proceeding VCB A2 4841A at 0.4s, both clear before generator protection which 
operates at 1200A at 0.9s. Therefore, achieves a minimum of 500ms clearance between all 
protection devices.  
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Figure 5.3.1.28 Overcurrent Protection TCC for Energy Centre busbar Fault Whilst Supplied by 
Generators 
 
Ground Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
i. VCB A or A2 discriminate with generators 1, 2 & 3. Although there is only 100ms clearance 
between VCB A or A2 and generators 4&5. This grading margin could be improved to ensure 
in the unlikely event of an energy centre substation BB L-G fault, that generators remain 
online and unaffected. Fault current and operating times are as follows; VCB A2 (498A at 






Figure 5.3.1.29 L-G Protection TCC for Energy Centre busbar Fault, Whilst Supplied by Generators 
 
Protection Scenario 19  
Standby Supply, Faults on the HV Ring Main Extensions, String 1A or 1B (outgoing circuits) 
 
i. No issues recorded for L-L-L, L-G, L-L-G, L-L, Energy centre BB outgoing transformer 














Protection Scenario 20  
Standby Supply, Faults on the Main HV GEC busbar.  
 
i. For the current protection scheme a GEC front busbar O/C fault whilst being supplied by the 
standby generators could not isolate the fault from the busbar, thus supply would be lost 
(generators). VCB ‘C’ does note discriminated for O/C faults with generators 4 & 5, there is 
also no protection enabled on VCB ‘D’ or ‘E’ thus the synchronous engines would continue to 
feed the faulted BB until local engine protection operated and supply was lost from the 11KV 
GEC BB. This could be improved by investigating protection settings on VCB ‘D’ & ‘E’ and 
or operating with an open busbar coupler. The L-G setting on VCB’C’ is also set to pick up at 
600A which is well above the L-G currents within the system whilst on generator supply. 
 
 







Protection Scenario 21  
Standby Supply, Assessment of Faults on the GEC (outgoing circuits)  
 
i. No issues recorded for L-L-L, L-G, L-L-G, L-L. The GEC BB outgoing transformer feeder 




Figure 5.3.1.31 Generators & Grid Feeders Single Line Diagram for Parallel Protection Evaluation 
Scenario 22. 
 
Protection Scenario 22 
Faults on the DNO Supply Side whilst in Parallel with Standby Generators  
 
Phase Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
 
i. No issues recorded for L-L-L, L-L or L-L-G. The WPD directional protection is first to 
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Figure 5.3.1.32 Overcurrent Protection TCC for Grid Faults Whilst in Parallel Operation with 
Generators 
 
Ground Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
 
i. During a L-G fault on the DNO supply side VCB A2 operates prior to the DNO feeder 
protection, thus the 11KV supply to the energy centre substation (String 1A or 1B) would 
be disconnected. This would remove three distribution transformers for a non-genuine 
reason (i.e., fault free and on-load). VCB A1 L-G time delay is 2.55s which is 
significantly too high leading to mis co-ordination with the DNO. 
 
 
Relay Location L-G  Current (A) Operating Time (S) 
VCB A2 485 0.08 
WPD (Directional) 572 0.186 
VCB A 485 0.59 



























Figure 5.3.1.34 Rotary UPS Single Line Diagram, Relating to Protection Scenario 23. 
 
Protection Scenario 23  
Rotary UPS Assessment for Normal & Failure Modes Including Input and Output Switchgear 
and Critical Loads. 
 
Phase Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
i. All load circuit cable faults for the UPS inputs are cleared by local protection with no 
upstream discrimination issues. 
ii. The UPS input/output protection relays do not discriminate although there is no benefit or 
requirement to since operation of either protection will disconnect machine from the network.  
iii. For L-L-L faults on the bypass line - Air Circuit Breaker (ACB) protections do not 
discriminate with the upstream transformer feeder, although there is no requirement to.  
 
 
Ground Overcurrent Protections and Equipment Ratings: 
i. No L-G protection settings are present on the UPS input ACB’s thus a L-G fault on a UPS 
input is likely to operate the main transformer incomer losing supply to all UPS units. This 
would remove supply from critical loads and should be addressed.  
ROTARY UPS X5 
625KVA, Xd’’ = 7.7% 
SC Contribution x14 FLC 
I/P FLC = 920A 











A1 - LV INPUT BUS 
BAR 





ii. L-G faults of PDU outgoing supplies from A2 discriminate with UPS outputs with adequate 
grading margins. 
iii. Whilst in bypass mode there is insufficient L-G grading between outgoing PDU fuses and 
main transformer incoming protection, hence an L-G on an outgoing circuit may trip the main 





Figure 5.3.1.35 L-G protection TCC for Switchgear DBA2 – UPS Incomer and Loads during Bypass 










Figure 5.3.1.36 L-G Protection TCC plot for Switchgear DBA1 and UPS Input ACB’s 
 
5.3.2 Non Time Current Curve (NTCC) Protection Evaluation  
Tables 5.3.2.1 & 5.3.2.2 contain an analysis of the generator Non Time Current Curve (NTCC) 
protection settings. A comments column has been provided against each protection type highlighting 
















Xd > Xd’ > Xd’’ and Td’ > Td’’ 
IEC 60909 fault 
current values (Ik’’) 
Apparent Power 
(MVA): 2.2 MVA Xd 136%   L-L-L 1.194 KA 
Power factor (PF): 0.8 Xd’ 20% Td’ 5.25s L-L 780 A 
Active Power 
(MW): 1.8 MW 
 
Xd’’ 10.5% Td’’ 0.03s L-L-G 820 A 
Reactive Power 
(MVAr): 1.16 MVAr 
Grounding 
L-G 160 A 
FLA: 118.1 A Resistor: 42.33 Ω VL-G 6.351 KV CT ratio 
RPM: 1000 Amp Rated: 150 A VL-L 11 KV 150/1 - 5P10 - 10VA 
 
Table 5.3.2.1 Generators Protection Evaluations for Non Time Current Curves (NTCC) 
Generator 
Ref No. 






BS ISO 8528 
Operating limits 
for Class 2 
Governors 
Actual Relay Settings 
Deviations and Actions 
Required to Improve Settings 








to phase short 
circuits  
1.2 x In 
1.2 x 118.1 = 141.6A.  
 
Setting must be no > 
2.5 x In or restrained 









Increase to 145A to provide full 
1.2 x In 
 
  
4 & 5 
  
280A non-IEC EI  
  
O/C value is approx. 2 x FLC of 
generator rating, set as 1.2 x In 
  
1, 2 & 3 
 
 
  L-G 50N/51N 
Protection for 
external line to 
ground short 
circuits  
Io sum to be greater 
than 12% of CT rating. 
 
Inst setting equal to 
0.2 x NER value. 
 
IDMT setting of 0.1 x 
resistor value, curve to 
be graded against 
downstream. 
 
CT primary is 150 A, 
so Io @ 12% = 18A. 
Inst @ 20% = 30A and 




7.2A DT (Td = 1s) 
 
  
No IDMT setting present. 
 
 DT setting of 7.2A is below 
recommended stability for IO sum 
i.e., 12% of CT rating (50x0.12 = 
18A). 











IDMT values not in-line with 
recommended 10% of NER (150 x 
0.1 = 15A) 
 
No DT setting of 20% NER value 
(150x0.2=30A). 
 
Curve type is non-IEC therefore 
pick up of EF would be 1.2x67.5A 
= 81A  













Iset = 0.05 to 0.15 x In 
Td = 0s 






Ict = 150/1  
 
8A is 6.77% of FLC. 
 




100%- (6.77/5.2) = 98.69% of 
stator winding protected – good. 
  










Iset = 0.15 x In  
 
























BS ISO 8528 
Operating limits 
for Class 2 
Governors 
Actual Relay Settings 
Deviations and Actions 
Required to Improve Settings 









internal phase to 
frame short 
circuits 
Iset = 0.2 x In  
Td = 0 
N/A 






Ict = 150/1  
 
8A is 6.77% of FLC. 
 




100%- (6.77/1.06) = 93.61% of 
stator winding protected – good.  









Qset = 0.3 x Sn   
Td = 3s 
Reactive power 
sharing between 20 
to 100% of Qn is 
10% 





 None Present 
  
  
Sn = 1.16MVAr therefore 0.3 x 
Sn = 348KVAr 









Motor operation  
Pset = 0.05 to 0.2 x Pn 




between 20 to 80% 
of Pn is 10%, 
 
between 80 to 100% 
of Pn is 5%.  
 
Taking 10% as 
worse case 1800x0.1 
= 180KW  














1,2 & 3 
 
 
Under or over 
frequency 81L 
& 81H 
f ± 2Hz 
Td = 3s 
*ISO load steps 
 
Droop mode 
 < 0.05x Fn = 2.5Hz 
 
Steady state 
 <0.015xFn =0.75Hz  
 
RoCoF  
0.01xFn = 0.5Hz  
 
*note recovery time 
Td = 5s  
+5Hz (Td = 5s) 
 -5Hz (Td = 1s)  
Set to: 
ISO worse case ±2.5Hz  
Td = 5s 





+3Hz (Td = 0.5s) 




1,2 & 3 
  
Under voltage  
27 
Uset = 0.75 to 0.85 x 
Un  
 
time delay depending 
on selectivity of the 
network 
*transient during 
load steps. Sudden 
power increase in-
line with ISO -20% 
of Vn.  
 
Td = 6s 
0.85 x Un  






0.8 x Un 





0.90 x Un  
Td = 3s  





Uset = 1.1 x Un 
Td = 1s 
*transient during 
load steps. Sudden 
power decreases in-
line with ISO +25% 
of Vn.  
 
Td = 6s 
1.1xUn   
Td = 3s 
  
Set to: 
1.1 x Un  











when in parallel 
with utility & 
mains fail 
Pset = 1 to 2% of: 
 
 
1.732 x InCT x UnVt  
      
Where; 
InCt = CT rating (A) 
UnVt = VT rating (V) 
Td = 0s 
n/a 
Gen 32P = 225KW 
 
Main A1/B1 (VCB’s) 
32P = 1.25MW 
Set to: 
 
2% Pset of generators is 57KW 
(1.732x150x11000)  
 
2% of main feeders is 152KW 
(1.732x400x11000) 
 






Protection Scenario 25 - G59 NTCC protection. 
 
Table 5.3.2.2 analyses the electrical networks G59 settings, against the guidelines for both short- or 
long-term paralleling conditions. The electrical network within the study is currently operating on a 
short-term agreement with the local DNO. 
 




Stage 1 (A) 
Long Term  
Stage 2 (B) 
Short Term 
  






-13 % Vn 
Td = 2.5s  
-20 % oVn  
Td = 0.5s  
-6 % Vn 
Td = 0.5s 
-10% Vn 
Td = 5s 
This data centre is a 
participant in a 
demand response 
scheme and should 
therefore comply 
with long term 
settings. A 
recommendation 
given to change & 
test in accordance 
with (A) & (B) 
noted in this table. 
O/V 59 
+10 % Vn 
Td = 1s  
+13 % Vn 
Td = 0.5s  
+ 6 % Vn 
Td = 0.5s  
+10% Vn 





Td = 0.5s 
50.5Hz  
Td = 0.5s 
50.5Hz  
Td = 0.5s 
U/F 81L 
47.5Hz  
Td = 20s 
47Hz  
Td = 0.5s 
49.5Hz  
Td = 0.5s 
47Hz  
Td = 0.5s 
LOM Vector ± 6 degrees  N/A N/A 
LOM RoCoF 0.125 Hz/s N/A 0.8Hz/s 
 
Where: 
Short term settings are applicable for generator systems which only parallel with grids for <5 minutes, and or 
run more than once per week. VCB A1 & VCB B1 are the data centres main incoming circuit breakers utilised 
for parallel operations.  
 
Protection Scenario 26 - SOLKAR Line Differential NTCC Protection. 
Table 5.3.2.3 is a review of the line differential protection of the two interconnectors within the high 
voltage electrical network. Protection of the interconnectors is paramount to prevent a complete loss 
of the network during a ring circuit fault.  








level (A)  
DNO 2- 
Fault 












time (ms)  
Action required to 
improve settings 
L1-G 100 
535 557 1092 
10.92 
<45 
L-G setting on DNO 1 
or DNO 2 operates 
within 70ms for a fault 
≥ 535A. Leaving just 
25ms grading margin, 
primary setting to be 
increased. 
L2-G 128 8.53 
L3-G 168 6.50 
L1-L2 500 
2630 2930 5560 
11.12 
L2-L3 500 11.12 






Protection Scenario 27 – Restricted Earth Fault (REF) Protection. 
The below is an example of a restricted L-G calculation for a data centre distribution transformer 
(Transformer 1 feeding switchgear DBA1), calculations were undertaken for all transformer within 
the electrical network and no issues were identified in term of the actual setting values or required 
circuit resistors. 
 
Transformer 1 REF Calculations: 
        
 System Voltage   (V) 415 V 
 System Frequency   (Hz) 50 Hz 
 Transformer/Generator Rating  (KVA) 2,500 KVA 
 Transformer Impedance  (Z) 7.4 % 
 CT Primary Ratio   (Cpr) 3,500 A 
 
CT Secondary 
Ratio   (Csr) 5 A 
 CT Vk Setting   (Vk) 70 V 
 CT Rct Setting   (RCT) 0.4 Ω 
 Number of CT's   (n) 4  





 Cable Resistance per km   7.98 Ω/km 
 Length of CT Leads   4 m 
 CT Lead Resistance   (Rl) 0.0319 Ω 
 Instrument Burden   (Rb) 1 VA 
 Instrument Insulation Value   3,000 V 
 √3     1.732  




 REF Protection Setting   10 % 
        
Transformer Full Load Current (FLC)     
 FLC = (2500 x 1000) / (√3 x 415) FLC = 3478.01 A 
        
Transformer Fault Current (If)      
 If = (100/Z) x FLC  If = 47.00 KA 
        
CT Secondary 
Current (Ic)       
 Ic = (IF/Cpr) x Csr  Ic =  67.14 A 
        
Maximum Voltage Across Relay 
(Vs)      
 Vs = Ic x (RCT + 2 x RL)  Vs = 31.14 V 
 Vs = 67.14 x (0.4 + (2 x 0.06384))    




Maximum Volt Settings - CT Knee Point Check    
        
Recommended - CT Vk rating MCAG Protection Relay    
 Vk ≥ (2 x Vs)   2 x Vs = 62.28 V 
     Max Volts OK ≤ 70V 
        
Effective Relay 
Setting       
 Is = CT secondary output @ Protection ratio Is = 0.50 A 
        
Stabilising Resistor Value      
 Rst = (Vs / Is) - (Rb / Is²)  Rst = 58.28 Ω 
        
Metrosil Calculation       
 Vf = Ic * (Vs / Is)  Vf = 4181.78 V 
 Vp = 2 *  (2 x Vk) x (Vf − Vk) Vp = 1517.43 V 
 Vp = 2 * (2 x 62.28) x (4181.78 − 62.28)               Metrosil Not Required 
 
Where; 
Vf  represents the voltage level produced due to a secondary fault current within the associated circuit 
transformer.  
Vp represents the voltage level, at a given fault current, which is required to check confirmation of the REF 
relay rating and outlines if an additional metrosil resistor is required (to prevent relay damage). i.e., due to high 
voltage being produced in the current transformer secondary during an associated network L-G fault.  
 
5.4 Arc Flash 
The below Table 5.4.1 displays the results from ETAP scenarios simulated for arc flash analysis. Arc 
flash values were evaluated at all busbar within both the HV & LV networks. 
 
i. Two Distribution Network Operator (DNO) cable feeders supplying all connected critical 
loads (nominal arrangement). 
ii. Island mode with standby diesel generators connected to critical loads, i.e., removed from 
grid. 
iii. Standby generators connected in parallel with the two DNO cable feeders, for example as 
short term parallel G59, no break transfer of critical load. 
 
It is important to note research identified incident energy levels above 1.2 cal/cm2 can cause second 
degree burns if maintenance personnel encounter the incident [41]. Likewise, the NFA 70E standard 
does not provide Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) guidelines for incident energy levels 
exceeding 40 cal/cm2 due to the associated arc flash blast hazards. Specific guidance within NFA 70E 




above this value should be reduced. Furthermore, it is important to note that PPE would be a last 
resort for maintenance operatives if all other preventive methods have been investigated and applied. 
 
In terms of electrical protection devices, a range of topologies and settings can be applied to the 
network devices to assist in reducing arc fault clearing times, thus lowering the energy incident levels 
& associated boundary clearances. Chapter 6.2 of this report discusses potential solutions and 




Table 5.4.1 ARC Flash Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Analysis 
Where, levels G & F indicate total energy levels recorded at a given switchgear was above NFPA 70E guidelines, for which PPE cannot to purchased. Thus, limiting the safe maintenance and 
operation of critical data centre equipment.  
Switchgear 


























































































































A1 BB LHS 62 29 F 98 66 30 F 123 101 40 G 179 
A1 BB RHS 62 29 F 98 84 30 F 123 95 39 F 169 
A1 to A2 Bypass 62 29 F 98 66 30 F 123 95 39 F 169 
A2 BB LHS 64 30 F 111 70 32 F 140 105 42 G 202 
A2 BB RHS 64 30 F 111 70 32 F 140 105 42 G 202 
B1 BB LHS 28 17 E 62 29 17 E 72 46 24 F 92 
B1 BB RHS 39 21 E 73 38 21 E 80 46 24 F 92 
C1 BB LHS 62 29 F 98 66 30 F 123 65 30 F 115 
C1 BB RHS 62 29 F 98 66 30 F 123 65 30 F 115 
D1 BB LHS 28 17 E 63 29 17 E 73 39 21 E 77 
D1 BB RHS 39 21 E 74 38 21 E 81 28 17 E 68 
DBA9 0 1 A 3 0 1 A 3 0 1 A 3 
G1 BB LHS 1 2 A 1 1 2 A 1 1 2 A 1 
G1 BB RHS 3 4 B 4 3 4 B 4 3 4 B 4 
GEC Rear BB N/A N/A 2 4 A 14 
GEC FBus LHS 3 7 B 19 1 4 A 19 2 4 A 14 
GEC FBus RHS 3 7 B 19 1 4 A 19 2 4 A 14 
H1 BB 93 38 F 141 118 45 G 209 118 45 G 209 
PDU A2 0 1 A 1 0 1 A 1 0 1 A 1 
PDU A21 0 0 A 1 0 0 A 1 0 0 A 1 
RED INPUT BB 80 35 F 127 99 40 F 184 92 38 F 165 
String 1A 10 26 D 63 1 4 A 19 2 6 B 19 
String 1B 10 26 D 63 5 13 C 63 2 6 B 19 
YELLOW 
INPUT BB 85 36 F 143 104 42 G 205 98 40 F 185 
PPE levels A B C D E F G >G        




5.5 Load Point Reliability  
The below tables display the effects associated with reliability of the electrical network, in terms of 
potential increased annual outage duration during operation of protective devices in relation to mis co-
ordination of settings.  Each of the tables include a column indicating the calculated average annual 
outage duration of a ‘healthy network’, with a further column providing results for protection 
operations with both effective time current grading and the increased outage times due to inadequate 
relay settings.  
 
The summary of protection setting reliability is displayed within each table, as an increased outage 
time (hours per year) due to the given protection operations. Therefore, to increase reliability of the 
electrical network an improvement of protection settings is desirable.  
 
Such reliability analysis is in direct relation to the protection device grading results of this report i.e., 
non-satisfactory grading curves were simulated in terms of reliability effects leading to below results. 
This provided a numerical quantity to such relay malfunctions and a metric to drive operational 
improvement, given current research indicates the average cost of data centre downtime is estimated 





















Table 5.5.1 Reliability Analysis for Protection Scenario 7&8 
Busbar ID Annual Outage Duration (hrs/yr.) Increased outage time due to 
poor Protection 
Coordination (hrs/yr.) 
VCB A2/B2 trip  
(Mis-Coordination) 
VCB A1/A2 trip  
(With Effective Protection 
Operations) 
A1 BB LHS 50 1.279 48.72 
A1 BB RHS 50 0.902 49.1 
A1 HV 50 1.663 48.34 
B1 BB LHS 50 6.075 43.92 
B1 BB RHS 50 4.848 45.15 
B1 HV 50 0.362 49.64 
C1 BB LHS 50 6.075 43.92 
C1 BB RHS 50 4.848 45.15 
D1 BB LHS 50 6.085 43.91 
D1 BB RHS 50 4.858 45.14 
G1 BB LHS 50 6.272 43.73 
G1 BB RHS 50 7.005 42.99 
GEC FBus LHS 50 2.029 47.97 
GEC FBus RHS 50 1.052 48.95 
LV BB DBA1 LHS 50 5.308 44.69 
LV BB DBA1 RHS 50 3.329 46.67 
LV BB DBB1 LHS 50 5.298 44.7 
LV BB DBB1 RHS 50 4.471 45.53 
LV BB DBC1 LHS 50 5.298 44.7 
LV BB DBC1 RHS 50 4.471 45.53 
LV BB DBD1 LHS 50 5.308 44.69 
LV BB DBD1 RHS 50 4.481 45.52 
LV BB DBG1 LHS 50 5.608 44.39 
LV BB DBG1 RHS 50 4.311 45.69 
T1 HV 50 0.752 49.25 
T2 HV 50 5.308 44.69 
T3 HV 50 3.329 46.67 
T4 HV 50 5.298 44.7 
T5 HV 50 4.471 45.53 
T6 HV 50 5.298 44.7 
T7 HV 50 4.471 45.53 
T8 HV 50 5.308 44.69 
T9 HV 50 4.481 45.52 






Table 5.5.2  Reliability Analysis for Protection Scenario 10, 14 & 15 
Busbar ID Annual Outage Duration (hrs/yr.) Increased outage time due to 
poor Protection Coordination 
(hrs/yr.) 
VCB A&B DT Trip 
(Mis Coordination)  
VCB A&C Trip (With 
Effective Protection 
Operations)  
A1 BB RHS 50 0.902 49.1 
B1 BB RHS 50 4.848 45.15 
C1 BB RHS 50 4.848 45.15 
D1 BB RHS 50 4.858 45.14 
G1 BB RHS 50 6.028 43.97 
GEC FBus RHS 50 1.052 48.95 
LV BB DBA1 RHS 50 3.329 46.67 
LV BB DBB1 RHS 50 4.471 45.53 
LV BB DBC1 RHS 50 4.471 45.53 
LV BB DBD1 RHS 50 4.481 45.52 
LV BB DBG1 RHS 50 4.311 45.69 
T2 HV 50 3.329 46.67 
T4 HV 50 4.471 45.53 
T6 HV 50 4.471 45.53 
T8 HV 50 4.481 45.52 
T10 HV 50 4.311 45.69 
 
Table 5.5.1 Reliability Analysis for Protection Scenario 17 
Busbar ID Annual Outage Duration (hrs/yr.) Increased outage time due 
to poor Protection 
Coordination (hrs/yr.) 
No trip (With Effective 
Protection Operations)  
Spurious EF trip of TX1 or TX2 at the 
Low Voltage setting (Mis Coordination) 
A1 BB LHS 1.279 4.33 3.051 
 
Table 5.5.4 Reliability Analysis for Protection Scenario 18 
Busbar ID Annual Outage Duration (hrs/yr.) Increased outage time due 
to poor Protection 
Coordination (hrs/yr.) 
VCB A2 trip clears EC BB fault 
(With Effective Protection 
Operations) 
VCB A2 Plus G4 & G5 trip (Mis 
Coordination) 
Rear Bus Ext 1.524 51.524 50 
G4 6.402 56.402 50 







Table 5.5.5 Reliability Analysis for Protection Scenario 20 
Busbar ID Annual Outage Duration (hrs/yr.) Increased outage time 
due to poor Protection 
Coordination (hrs/yr.) 
VCB D&C trip clear GEC 
BB Fault (With Effective 
Protection Operations)  
Standby engines trip for GEC BB 
fault (Mis Coordination) 
A1 BB RHS 0.902 2.902 2 
A1 HV 0.362 2.362 2 
A1 to A2 Bypass 1.506 3.506 2 
A2 BB RHS 1.652 3.652 2 
B1 BB RHS 4.848 6.848 2 
B1 HV 0.362 2.362 2 
C1 BB RHS 4.848 6.848 2 
D1 BB RHS 4.858 6.858 2 
G1 BB RHS 6.028 8.028 2 
G1 HV 6.402 8.402 2 
G2 HV 6.402 8.402 2 
G3 HV 6.402 8.402 2 
G4 HV 6.402 8.402 2 
G5 HV 6.402 8.402 2 
GEC FBus RHS 1.052 3.052 2 
LV BB DBA1 RHS 3.329 5.329 2 
LV BB DBB1 RHS 4.471 6.471 2 
LV BB DBC1 RHS 4.471 6.471 2 
LV BB DBD1 RHS 4.481 6.481 2 
LV BB DBG1 RHS 4.311 6.311 2 
LV BB DBH1 
Supply2 
4.176 6.176 2 
LV BB RED Supply2 4.181 6.181 2 
String 1B 0.752 2.752 2 
T2 HV 3.329 5.329 2 
T4 HV 4.471 6.471 2 
T6 HV 4.471 6.471 2 
T8 HV 4.481 6.481 2 
T9 HV 4.399 6.399 2 
T10 HV 4.311 6.311 2 
T12 HV 4.171 6.171 2 
T13 HV 4.006 6.006 2 
T14 HV 4.176 6.176 2 
T16 HV 4.181 6.181 2 
YELLOW INPUT BB 5.418 7.418 2 
G1 6.402 8.402 2 
G2 6.402 8.402 2 




Busbar ID Annual Outage Duration (hrs/yr.) Increased outage time 
due to poor Protection 
Coordination (hrs/yr.) 
VCB D&C trip clear GEC 
BB Fault (With Effective 
Protection Operations)  
Standby engines trip for GEC BB 
fault (Mis Coordination) 
G4 6.402 8.402 2 
G5 6.402 8.402 2 
 
Table 5.5.6 Reliability Analysis for Protection Scenario 22 
Busbar ID Annual Outage Duration (hrs/yr.) Increased outage time 
due to poor Protection 
Coordination (hrs/yr.) 
VCB A2 Trip  
(Mis Coordination) 
DNO Feeder Trip (With Effective 
Protection Operations) 
LV BB DBH1 
Supply1 
50 5.908 44.09 
LV BB RED Supply1 50 5.913 44.09 
LV BB YELLOW 
Supply1 
50 5.903 44.1 
T11 HV 50 5.903 44.1 
T13 HV 50 5.908 44.09 
T15 HV 50 5.913 44.09 
 
Table 5.5.7 Reliability Analysis for Protection Scenario 23(a) 
Busbar ID Annual Outage Duration (hrs/yr.) Increased outage time 
due to poor Protection 
Coordination (hrs/yr.) 
UPS Input ACB Trip 
(With Effective Protection 
Operations) 
Main TX incomer ACB Trip  
(Mis Coordination) 
A1 BB LHS 5.9859 50 44.01 
A1 BB RHS 5.6089 50 44.39 
A1 to A2 Bypass 6.2129 50 43.79 
A2 BB LHS 8.6087 50 41.39 
A2 BB RHS 7.1109 50 42.89 
DBA9 8.7407 50 41.26 
PDU A2 8.6957 50 41.3 







Table 5.5.8 Reliability Analysis for Protection Scenario 23(b) 
Busbar ID Annual Outage Duration (hrs/yr.) Increased outage time 
due to poor Protection 
Coordination (hrs/yr.) 
Circuit fuse trip (With 
Effective Protection 
Operations) 
Main bypass ACB Trip 
(Mis Coordination) 
A1 BB LHS 5.1589 50 44.84 
A1 BB RHS 5.9859 50 44.01 
A1 to A2 Bypass 5.5359 50 44.46 
A2 BB LHS 7.0929 50 42.91 
A2 BB RHS 8.0699 50 41.93 
DBA9 7.2249 50 42.78 
PDU A2 30 50 20 
PDU A21 7.2549 50 42.75 
 
Note the associated protection settings for these reliability scenarios are listed within the Appendix II.  
5.6 Chapter Summary  
The load flow section details which scenarios were simulated and what issues were encountered, 
particularly the LV busbar systems in terms of cabling supplies when compared with busbar systems. 
Effects of the transformers tap setting and associated busbar Voltage Security Index (Vsi). Also, 
investigation of standby generators for design load scenarios against the manufacturer vector 
capability curves, power flow and reactive power limits.  
 
Short circuit current analysis results highlight load characteristics can lead to an increase of 14.28KA 
rms on the LV busbar. Also, the range of HV fault currents due to the electrical network supply 
options proved challenging for achieving effective protection settings. The 2N systems simulated also 
increased peak fault currents (𝐼𝑝)  above the rating of installed switchgear, along with rotary UPS 
modules which have a potential to increase busbar fault levels by over 50% of base values, when 
transient effects are considered.   
 
This chapter also provides details of all twenty-six protection scenarios simulated, over two hundred 
results in total. Graphical Time Current Curves (TCC) with associated descriptions for each scenario, 
considering both L-G, L-L-G, L-L-L faults. Non Time Current Curve (NTCC) protections have also 
been considered in terms of standby generator protection, differential cable protection, G59 schemes 
and transformer restricted L-G relay. The coherent link between short circuits, protection grading, and 
arc flash provides a results tables for each simulated busbar, establishing; incident energy, arc flash 
boundary, fault clearing time and required PPE for safe operation and maintenance of equipment. 




mitigation.  Lastly, these protection issues were simulation for results of load point reliability analysis. 
An expression of hours per year failure (hrs/yr.) or downtime for a given protective device grading 
scenario issue. Results tables in Chapter 5.6 detail an expected downtime for both a healthy and 
faulted network scenario, with numerous faults having potential for increasing outage times more than 
40 hrs/yr. In-fact with optimal protection settings predicted outage times can be less than 5% of those 






























Chapter 6 – Implications & A New Generalised Approach  
6.0 Introduction 
This Chapter considers the implications associated with this research works, focusing on improving 
operational configurations of electrical protection systems and ultimately increasing data centre 
reliability. It is important to note the protection grading scenarios utilised within this Chapter are as 
those listed within Chapter 5.3. However, in this section each grading scenario has been updated with 
a new and improved settings configuration. Therefore, each protection relay in all model simulations 
were updated before re-evaluation and simulations were carried out, which in turn provided a new and 
improved set of Time Current Curves (TCC). These modifications, over 390 for this network, were 
achieved by utilising the outlined ‘improvement parameters’ stated in each of the simulations and 
shown in Appendix IV, each were crafted from a range of international standards and guidance for 
best practices in electrical power systems, along with an extensive investigation and analysis of this 
data centre’s actual operational settings and available equipment manufacturers guidance.  
 
Options have considered the implications associated with application of electrical protection in data 
centres specifically, providing key solutions for obtaining improved Time Current Curves (TCC), and 
ensuring effective operation of circuit devices, thus mitigating unnecessary outages of the 
infrastructure. Ultimately, increasing the potential Operational Availability (Ao) of the critical 
electrical equipment and detailing further considerations for arc flash assessment and its direct 
correlation to electrical protection settings, and the safety of data centre engineering maintenance 
staff.  Where possible a before and after list of availability metrics have been provided against each 
protection scenario, with an example TCC curve evidencing that tangible benefits which can be 
achieved with this approach.  
 
Importantly, these findings have allowed formulation of a new approach detailed in Chapter 6.3, 
which provides a summarised flowchart or generalised approach to improving a data centres 
operational reliability, this approach can be utilised or applied to any other data centre and was 
individually formed as part of this research programme, as a contribution of knowledge to this field 
and an improvement to the existing philosophy, more specifically the Uptime Institutes Tier 









6.1 Improving AO metrics with Protective Device Grading  
Following on from the listed results in Chapter 5.3, the exact same operational scenarios have been 
utilised below, i.e., for investigation of how to obtain relay protection grading improvements.  
 
Scenario 1  
DBA1 Transformer 1 (T1) & Transformer 2 (T2) Protection Evaluation 
 
i. T1 & T2 settings changed to IEC EI curve. Pick up reduced to 165A, thus provide a 
reasonable overload margin for the base current rating of 131.2A. The proposed new curves 
within transformer damage point of the transformer, and in-line with IEEE C57.109.  
 
ii. These proposed overcurrent settings improved grading margins. LV to HV devices now 
segregated by 400ms under all short circuit faults, this will eliminate the original grading 
issues encountered, and will also lead to an effective inter-trip signalling for the operator and 
quick restoration under genuine system fault, improving operational availability by limiting 
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR).  
 
iii. Below L-G fault plot, T1 & T2 ground fault protection displaying a setting of 22.5A, this is 
in-line with manufacturer’s recommendation of 30% transformer FLC in comparison to the 






































Scenario 2  
DBC1 Transformer 5 (T5) & Transformer (T6) Protection Evaluation 
 
i. Proposed Transformer settings ensure HV & LV protection devices co-ordinate effectively. 
Noted in the TCC plot below devices have, as a minimum, 400ms time grading margin 
between the pick-up current of approximately 4000A through to the short circuit value 42KA. 
Alongside grading co-ordination, the improvement of settings ensures the inter-trip signalling 
operates as designed, allowing the network operator to quickly locate and rectify any network 
faults.   
 
ii. T5 & T6 settings changed to IEC EI curve type. Pick up current setting also reduced to 165A, 
thus a reasonable overload margin allowed for the base current rating of 131.2A. Proposed 
new curves are within transformer damage point and in-line with IEEE C57.109.  
 
 





i. The below TCC ground fault is relative to both T5 & T6 ground fault protection, displaying a 
setting of 22.5A, this is in-line with manufacturer’s recommendation of 30% transformer FLC 
in comparison to the exiting 3A which is more likely to cause spurious trips during 
transformer energisation.  
 
 














Scenario 3  
DBB1 or D1 Transformers 7 (T7) & Transformer 8 (T8) Protection Evaluation 
 
i. Proposed settings ensure transformer HV & LV protections co-ordination for the full range of 
present system fault current, with a minimum of 200ms margin. Ensuring inter-trip relays 
within the network operate effectively and assist operators during network faults for quick 
restoration. Note TCC plots below of both HV & LV devices. 
 
ii. Pick up current values proposed for both transformer 7 & 8 to the HV & LV settings of 
80A/1520A respectfully. These values ensure effective overload margins for the transformer, 
in comparison to the original settings which exceed 200% of transformer FLC ratings. 
 
 





iii. Below TCC L-G fault plot displays both T7 & T8 ground fault protection set at 11.25A. This 
is approximately 20% of the transformers rating, as suggested by manufacturer’s 
recommendation, removing possibility for spurious trips on transformer energisation.  
 
 














Scenario 4  
DBR1 or DBY1 Transformer Protection Evaluation 
 
i. Transformer 11 & 12 full load current 131.2/3333A (HV & LV respectively). The proposed 
protection settings ensure the transformers HV to LV windings provides effective grading and 
operation of inter-trip relay, i.e., within a minimum of 200ms grading at all system fault 
current levels.  
 
 










Scenario 5  
DBH1 Transformer Protection Evaluation 
 
i. Proposed overcurrent settings utilising manufacture guidance and experimentation with TCC 
curves improved grading margins. Both the LV & HV devices segregated by 400ms under 
short circuit currents, thus eliminates the original grading margin issues encountered. These 
settings will also lead to an effective inter-trip signalling for the operator and quick 













Scenario 6  
DBG1 Transformer Protection Evaluation 
DBG1 has a duty/standby power supply from transformer 9 & transformer 10, both are detailed 
separately below due to the differences in supply equipment, which differed from any other LV board 
within the data centres electrical network.  
 
Transformer 9 (T9) 
i. Proposed overcurrent settings for transformer 9 ensures full load current capacity is not 
exceeded, proposed 150A (pick up) allows adequate margin for overload and is in-line with 
manufacturer’s recommendations.  
ii. The recommendation to remove LV fuses since these do not grade with the LV IDMT 
incoming (upstream) relay, the relay can also be adequately set to protect the LV supply cable 
with a reduced overload capacity. Settings proposed as TCC below; curve VI, pick up 1225A, 
0.5s delay. These proposed settings ensured the transformer damage point is adequately 
protected and improved the original settings.  
 
 





iii. Below TCC ground fault plot, both T9 & T10 ground fault protection displaying a setting of 
37.5A, this is in-line with manufacturer’s recommendation of 30% transformer FLC in 


















Transformer 10 (T10) 
iv. Proposed overcurrent settings for transformer 10 ensures full load current capacity is not 
exceeded, 150A (pick up) allows adequate margin for overload and is in-line manufacturer’s 
recommendations. The LV incomer at DBG1 is also set at 4250A, i.e., in-line with the LV 
busbar rating. 
v. A recommendation for an instantaneous setting on the LV incomer of 36.2KA since this value 
ensures grading with the upstream devices and clearance of the L-L-L fault level within 
approximately 50ms. Also, improving inter trip relay functions and restoration of supplies 
following network fault conditions. 
  
 








Scenario 7  
Main Site Feeder VCB (X) and VCB A1 & A2 Protection Evaluations  
 
i. The below TCC plot highlights the proposed settings display adequate grading co-ordination 
for phase overcurrent’s between main ring feeders VCB ‘X’, VCB A1 & A2. To achieve 
grading co-ordination the following changes are recommended. Feeder ‘X’ time delay 
increased td = 0.3s. Both A1 & A2 curves to be IEC standard inverse, time delays to td = 0.6s 
& td’ = 0.25s, respectively. Also note the pick-up current of VCB A2 has been decreased to 
520A, the existing 600A setting is unnecessarily high for the connected network loads and 
makes grading margins impossible to achieve. These changes led to an improvement of load 
point reliability 48.72 hrs/yr., prior to protection setting updates the reliability metric was 50 
hrs/yr., reducing to 1.279 hrs/yr. with these listed improvements.   
 
 





ii. The below TCC plot shows protection co-ordination for L-G faults at DNO X and INCOMER 
VCB A1 achieving grading margins more than 500ms. The existing VCB A1 SEPAM settings 
required 3.0s to clear L-G faults, operation is now within approximately 0.3s. VCB C L-G 
setting reduced in-line with system L-G fault current levels present, ensuring adequate 
grading with both upstream VCB A2 & B2 during L-G faults. These changes led to an 
improvement of load point reliability 48.72 hrs/yr., prior to protection setting updates the 
reliability metric was 50 hrs/yr., reducing to 1.279 hrs/yr. with these listed improvements.   
 
 










Scenario 8  
Single Feeder busbar Faults on String Extensions VCB A/B 
 
i. Proposed the removal of definite time settings for VCB’A’ & ‘B’, also new settings for VCB 
‘C’ which ensures a clearance with VCB ‘A2’ or ‘B2’, at least a 300ms grading margin. Both 
recommendations ensure effective operation under fault conditions, disconnecting the 
minimum amount of equipment within the network, TCC plot below displays new curves. 
These changes led to an improvement of load point reliability 48.72 hrs/yr., prior to protection 
setting updates the reliability metric was 50 hrs/yr., reducing to 1.279 hrs/yr. with these listed 
improvements.   
 
 





ii. Note L-G settings in the below TCC plot applied to VCB ‘C’ ensured any ground faults on 
String 1A or 1B does not operate VCB’s A2/B2, therefore the 10 x connected distribution 
transformers are not unnecessarily disconnected during an energy centre L-G fault. VCB ‘C’ 
settings proposed includes curve IEC VI, pick up = 66A, td = 0.3s. These changes led to an 
improvement of load point reliability 48.72 hrs/yr., prior to protection setting updates the 
reliability metric was 50 hrs/yr., reducing to 1.279 hrs/yr. with these listed improvements.  
  
 
Figure 6.1.16 L-G Protection TCC for busbar Faults on the HV Extension Switchgear 
 
Scenario 9  
Site supplied by a single DNO feeder, Transformer supply side fault on HV String Extension 
Incoming Switchgears. 
 
i. No issues for L-L-L, L-L, L-G or L-L-G faults. Transformer SEPAM relays operate before 





Scenario 10  
Site supplied by a single DNO feeder, investigation for faults on the Main HV GEC switchgear. 
 
i. Below TCC plot displays proposed protection settings on VCB C ensuring discrimination 
with upstream devices for both L-L-L and L-G fault scenarios. Due to the number of 
series protection devices located in the system only 200ms grading margin can be 
achieved. These changes led to an improvement of load point reliability 49.1hrs/yr., prior 
to protection setting updates the reliability metric was 50 hrs/yr., reducing to 0.902 hrs/yr. 
with these listed improvements.   
 
 
Figure 6.1.17 Overcurrent Protection TCC for a busbar Fault on the GEC Switchgear, whilst supplied 







Figure 6.1.18 L-G Protection TCC for busbar Faults on the GEC Switchgear, whilst being supplied by 
a Single DNO Feeder 
 
Scenario 11 
Site supplied by a single DNO feeder; Faults investigated on the supply side of Transformers 
connected to the Main HV GEC busbar. 
 
No protection issues encountered for L-L-L, L-L, L-G or L-L-G faults. The transformer SEPAM 
protection relay operates before upstream devices, providing good discrimination, FLC settings for 











Site supplied by dual DNO feeders; Faults investigated on the HV String Extensions (String 
A&B) 
 
No protection issues encountered for L-L-L, L-L, L-G or L-L-G faults. The transformer SEPAM 
relays operate before upstream device, providing good discrimination, FLC settings for each of the 
connected transformers is 125% of rated nominal rated current. 
 
Scenario 13 
Site supplied by dual DNO feeders; Faults investigated on the supply side of transformers 
connected to the Main HV GEC busbar. 
 
No protection issues encountered for L-L-L, L-L, L-G or L-L-G faults. The transformer SEPAM 
relays operate before upstream device, providing good discrimination, FLC settings for each of the 



























Site supplied by dual DNO feeders, investigated busbar phase Faults on the Main HV GEC 
switchgear. 
 
i. Definite time settings removed from VCB A&B. Also, settings proposed on VCB A2, 
VCB B2 & VCB C ensuring effective discrimination for all system fault currents, as 
shown in the below TCC. These changes led to an improvement of load point reliability 
48.95hrs/yr., prior to protection setting optimisation the reliability metric was 50 hrs/yr., 
reducing to 1.052 hrs/yr. with these listed improvements.   
 
 
Figure 6.1.19 Overcurrent Protection TCC for busbar Faults on the GEC Switchgear, whilst being 








Site supplied by dual DNO feeders, investigated L-G faults on the GEC switchgear. 
 
i. VCB A2 & B2 instantaneous settings removed, replaced with Time Current Curve (TCC) 
as shown in the below TCC, proposed settings on VCB C improved overall grading co-
ordination for both L-L-L & L-G fault types. These changes led to an improvement of 
load point reliability 48.95hrs/yr., prior to protection setting optimisation the reliability 
metric was 50 hrs/yr., reducing to 1.052 hrs/yr. with these listed improvements.   
 
 
Figure 6.1.20 L-G Protection TCC for busbar Faults on the GEC Switchgear, whilst being supplied by 









Site supplied by dual DNO feeders, investigated cable faults from WPD VCB to VCB A1 
INCOMER 
 
i. L-L-L fault levels cleared with effective discrimination, noted on below TCC plot. 
Proposed Definite Time (DT) settings for VCB A2 & VCB B2 removed issues with 
regards to a cable fault between the DNO incomers (WPD VCB) and either VCB A1 or 
VCB B1. A 600ms margin was achievable at a network fault level of 3KA. Likewise, 
proposed L-G setting also improved co-ordination. 
 
 


























Site supplied by dual feeders, investigated phase faults on the supply side of all Transformers 
connected to the Main HV GEC switchgear. 
 
i. Effective grading for phase overcurrent’s with removal of definite time settings from VCB ‘A’ 
& ‘B’, a grading margin more than 1s is available between transformer supply protection and 
related upstream relay devices.  
 
 










Site supplied by dual DNO feeders, investigated L-G faults on the supply side of the 
Transformers connected to the Main HV GEC switchgear.  
 
i. Proposed L-G settings from WPD incomers to transformer HV loads: 
WPD A/B Curve SI, I=120A, td = 0.325s 
A1/B1 Curve IEC VI, I=100A, td = 0.4s 
A2/B2 Curve IEC VI, I=80A, td = 0.4s 
A/B = DT setting removed. 
TX1 DT, I = 22A 
 
Below TCC settings provided optimal grading co-ordination, also transformer L-G 
settings are now in-line with IEC guidelines. These changes led to an improvement of 
load point reliability 3.051hrs/yr., prior to protection setting optimisation the reliability 
metric was 4.33 hrs/yr., reducing to 1.279 hrs/yr. with these listed improvements.   
 
 





Scenario 18  
Site fed by Standby Generator supply, investigated faults on Energy Centre HV Strings 1A & 
1B 
 
i. No issues for clearance of overcurrent faults, VCB A clears L-L-L faults at 4800A in 0.3s 
which is proceeding VCB A2 4841A in 0.4s, both clear before generator protection which 












However, a change of generator 4&5 protection settings to align with other generators (1 to 3), 
provides an overall improved co-ordination – as below TCC.  
 
Generators (1 to 5):  L-G fault of 139.6A device trips in 1.02s. 
VCB A2 & VCB B2:  L-G fault of 1082A device trips in 0.277s. 
 
Therefore, the proposed settings achieve improved protection co-ordination. These changes led to an 
improvement of load point reliability 50 hrs/yr., prior to protection setting optimisation the reliability 
metric was 56.402 hrs/yr., reducing to 6.402 hrs/yr. with these listed improvements.  
 
 







Scenario 19  
Site fed via Standby Generator supply, investigated faults on the Energy Centre outgoing 
circuits i.e., HV transformer cables. 
 
i. No protection issues present for L-L-L, L-G, L-L-G, L-L, energy centre outgoing 
transformer feeder SEPAM relay operates before any upstream protection devices, with 
adequate grading margins as shown in the TCC below.  
 
 



























Scenario 20  
Site supplied via the Standby Generator; Faults investigated on the Main HV GEC switchgear. 
 
The original protection scheme on the GEC front busbar provided no co-ordination for overcurrent 
faults whilst being supplied by standby generators. Therefore, the existing scheme could not isolate a 
fault from the busbar and supply would be disconnected. VCB ‘C’ did not discriminate for overcurrent 
faults with generators 4 & 5, also no protection parameter was set on VCB ‘D’ or ‘E’ thus the 
synchronous generators would continue to feed a system fault until local engine protection operated 
and standby supply was tripped from the 11KV GEC busbar. Proposed improvements to the following 
protection settings, both L-L-L & L-G are:  
 
VCB C (L-L-L) – IEC VI, Is = 540A, t = 0.15s     VCB C (L-G) – IEC VI, Is = 65A, t = 0.3s 
VCB D & VBC E (L-L-L) – IEC VI, Is = 480A, t = 0.3s    VCB D/E (L-G) – IEC VI, Is = 100A, t = 0.6s     
 
These changes led to an improvement of load point reliability 2 hrs/yr., prior to protection setting 
updates the reliability metric was 2.902 hrs/yr., reducing to 0.902 hrs/yr. with these listed 
improvements.  
 





























Site supplied via Standby Generators; Faults investigated on the Main HV GEC switchgear 
outgoing circuits.  
 
No issues for L-L-L, L-G, L-L-G, L-L, All GEC switchgear outgoing transformer feeder circuit 
SEPAM relays operate before any upstream protection with adequate grading margins. 
 
Scenario 22 
Faults Investigated on the DNO cable feeder side, whilst in Parallel with Standby Generators. 
 
VCB A2 & VCB B2 protection settings were recommended as part of other fault scenarios, therefore 
there is no longer L-L-L & L-G discrimination issues to consider. The DNO directional protection 
operates over 400ms quicker than any of the downstream protection devices, as shown below. These 
changes led to an improvement of load point reliability 44.09 hrs/yr., prior to protection setting 
optimisation the reliability metric was 50 hrs/yr., reducing to 5.908 hrs/yr. with these listed 
improvements.   
 






Rotary UPS Protection Assessment for Nominal & Failure Modes, considering both Input and 
Output Switchgear, Air Circuit Breakers and Associated Critical Load Supplies. 
 
To allow for 150% overload of machines discrimination between the input and output ACB’s is not 
possible with the current installed devices, although there is no benefit to achieving this co-ordination 
since operation of either the input or output ACB will remove the unit from operation.  
 
No L-G settings were present on the UPS input circuit breakers although the supply distribution 
transformer is delta/star configuration so there is no flow of zero sequence currents in the transformer 
primary winding for a given secondary L-G fault. Hence, the installed protection scheme is reliant on 
the overcurrent (L-L-L) setting which discriminated with all downstream devices. Protection settings 
on the UPS primary circuit breakers allows the required 150% overload, as recommended by the 
manufacturers.  
 
Given the LV distribution switchgear busbar is rated for a continuous current of 4000A, the five UPS 
machines connected at full load require an input current of >5000A therefore the specified machines 
are overrated given the constraints of the LV switchgear. Likewise, for the HV & LV transformer 
secondary which is rated at 3333A could not nominally load all 5 UPS machines, or 4 as an N+1 
system, see Table 6.1.1. 
 
Table 6.1.1 LV Switchgear Distribution Board Ref.A1 Power Ratings 
Type of Distribution Equipment 
Nominal Current 
Rating (A) 
Total Amperes for N+1 system  
(N = 4 UPS Online) 
Supply transformer (2.5MVA Dyn11) 3333 3333 
LV Switchgear input busbar  4000 4000 
LV Switchgear output busbar 4000 4000 
1 UPS Input (without battery charge current) 967 3868 
1 UPS Input (with battery charge current) 1027 4108 > Ampere rating 
1 UPS Input (with battery charge & discharge 
current) 
1148 4592 > Ampere rating 











TCC for scenario 23 showing overcurrent relay aspects.  
 
 

















TCC for scenario 23 showing overcurrent relay aspects.  
 
 
Figure 6.1.33 Overcurrent Protection TCC for UPS Power Supply String, during Bypass Mode 
 
Ultimately, recommendations to the UPS system (scenario 23) led to an improvement of load point 
reliability 44.84 hrs/yr., prior to protection setting optimisation the reliability metric was 50 hrs/yr., 











Scenario 24  
Proposed Generator Unit Protections Settings, for all Five Machines Installed within the Data 
Centre Electrical Network.  























1 Protection for 
external phase 





1.2 x In = 1.2 x 
118.1 = 141.6A. 
Settings must be 
no ≥ 2.5 x In or 
restrained 
Voltage setting 







Current setting could be 
increased to 145A to 







150A IEC SI Curve 
2 
3 
4 280A - non-
IEC EI 
Curve  
O/C value is approx. 
double the FLC of the 





short circuits - 
L-G 50N/51N 
Io sum to be > 




equal to 20% of 
NER value. 
 
IDMT setting of 
10% of resistor 





CT primary is 
150 A, Thus, Io 
@ 12% = 18A. 
Inst @ 20% = 
30A and IDMT 










No IDMT setting present 
only DT, 7.2 A is below 
the recommended stability 























IDMT values not in-line 
with recommended 10% 
of NER value i.e., 15A. 
Also, no DT setting of 
30A. Curve type is non-
IEC so pick up of EF 
setting would be 
1.2x67.5A = 81A. 
 










rises - Hset = 
115% to 120%. 
Time constant 
to be taken from 
generator spec. 










control panel, 1st and 







to phase short 
circuit/protecti




Iset = 5 to 15% 
In with no time 
delay. 
n/a 






Ict = 150/1 
8A is 6.77% of the full 
load current. 
Maximum through fault 
current is 780A (5.2x CT 
rating). 
Therefore; 100%- 
(6.77/5.2) = 98.69% of 














































current 46  
Iset = 15% In 





In = 118.1 therefore 15% 
In = 17.72A 




Set to alarm/latch to 
22% of Ib, with 














Iset = 20% In 
with no time 
delay. 






Ict = 150/1  
8A is 6.77% of the full 
load current. 
Maximum through fault is 
160A (1.06 x CT rating) 
Therefore; 100%- 
(6.77/1.06) = 93.61% of 


















Power 32Q  
Qset = 0.3 x Sn 
(Apparent 





20 to 100% of 






Suggest the following 
setting. 
Sn = 1.35MVAr therefore 




Trip at 810 KVAr 















Pset = 5 to 20% 




Between 20 to 
80% of Pn is 
10% 
Between 80 to 
100% of Pn is 
5%.  
 




































81L & 81H 
Frequency ± 
2Hz, time delay 
of 3s. 
During load step 
changed Hz 
droop < 5% Fn 




Hz droop <1.5% 
Fn = 0.75Hz. 
 
Rate of Change 
of frequency 
(RoCoF)  
0.2 to 1% of Fn 
= 0.5Hz. 
Recovery time 







Mixture of incorrect Hz & 
time delay, ISO class too 
worse case is 2.5Hz with 







Set All Generators 
in-line with ISO 
speed droop 
classifications table, 
given for each 











































voltage - 27 
Uset = 0.75 to 
0.85 x Un  
Time delay 
depending on 
selectivity of the 
network. 
Transient case 
i.e.  during load 
steps. Sudden 
power increase 
in-line with ISO 
-20% of Vn.  
With 6s 
recovery period.  








Currently set above the 
recommended  













Uset = 1.1 x Un 
with approx. 1s 
time delay 
Transient case 
i.e., during load 
steps. Sudden 
power decrease 
in-line with ISO 
+25% of Vn. 6s 
recovery period  
1.1 x Un 
3s time 
delay 
Currently set above 
recommended ISO time 
delay requirements.  
1.1 x Un  
5s time delay 2 
3 
















fail - Reversal 
in active 
power 32P 
Pset = 1 to 2% 
of 1.732 x In 
CT x Un Vt     
   
Where;  
In Ct = CT 
rating & Un  
Vt = VT 















2% of main feeders is 838 
KW (1.732x400x11000) 
Set Generators to: 
300KW 0.25s time 
delay. 
Set main feeders to: 
























Proposed G59 settings  
Protection recommendations to align with the ENA G59, including site main feeders, generators, and 
UPS systems.  




Setting (Long Term) 
Stage 2 
Recommended 
Setting (Long Term) 
Short term 
5 minutes per month & 
once per week max. 
VCB A1 & B1 
(Existing 
Settings) 
VCB A1 & B1 
(Proposed 
Settings)  
Under voltage  
ANSI 27 
-13 %  Vn with 2.5s 
time delay.  
-20 % Vn with 0.5s 
time delay.  
- 6 % Vn with 0.5s time 
delay.  
-10% Vn with 5s 
time delay.  
-10% Vn with 
2.5s time delay. 
Over voltage  
ANSI 59 
+10 % Vn with 1s time 
delay.  
+13 % Vn with 0.5s 
time delay.  
+ 6 % Vn with 0.5s time 
delay.  
+10% Vn with 
500mS time 
delay.  
+10% Vn with 
0.5s time delay. 
Over frequency 
ANSI 81H 
51.5Hz with 90s with 
delay. 
52Hz with 0.5s time 
delay. 
50.5Hz with 0.5s time 
delay. 
50.5Hz with 
0.5s time delay. 
52.5Hz with 0.5s 
time delay. 
Under frequency  
ANSI 81L 
47.5Hz with 20s-time 
delay. 
47Hz with 0.5s time 
delay. 
49.5Hz with 0.5s time 
delay. 
47Hz with 0.5s 
time delay. 
47.5Hz with 0.5s 
time delay. 
Loss of Mains 
(LOM) Vector 
6˚ Degrees N/A N/A N/A 




0.125Hz/s N/A 0.8Hz/s 
N/A – Remove 
current 0.8Hz/s. 
Where; Vn is the nominal system voltage (VL-L) rms.  
 
UPS Synchronising Data 
UPS Mains 1 pathway = under voltage -15%, over voltage +10%, over frequency +5%, under frequency -5% 
UPS Mains 2 pathway = under voltage -8%, over voltage +8%, over frequency +1%, under frequency -1% 
 
 





Scenario 26  
SOLKAR Line Differential Protection Assessment 
Below Table 6.14 provides the recommended change to the SOLKAR protection scheme.  
 







at VCB A2 
(A) 














Time (ms)  
Observations  
L1-E 100 
535 557 1092 
10.92 
<45 
Settings to be changed on 
VCB A2 & VCB B2, so 
that the trip time is 
greater than 1s, achieving 
an increased margin with 
SOLKAR protections. 
L2-E 128 8.53 
L3-E 168 6.50 
L1-L2 500 
2630 2930 5560 
11.12 
L2-L3 500 11.12 
L3-L1 248 22.42 
 
 
Scenario 27  
Transformer Restricted Earth Fault L-G (REF) Relay Assessment  
 
No improvement to REF protection settings were required following this investigation, in terms of 
numerical adjustments, however it was found during site testing the inter-tripping between HV & LV 
Equipment was not connected thus limits the practical effectiveness of the scheme. REF protection 
must inter-trip the corresponding circuit breakers either side of the protected power transformer.  
 
Appendix II displays protection settings tables, covering all the above scenarios and devices. Where, 
highlighted orange cells suggest an improvement of protection co-ordination can be achieved and an 
associated set of optional protection relay settings have been provided as part of this research 
programme. In-fact, for the low voltage distribution system a total of 54 improvements from an 
existing 337 settings have been proposed along with 339 from the required 1136 high voltage system 
protection settings too. Highlighting the significant opportunity available to improve data centre 
electrical protection for increased system Operational Availability (Ao). Chapter 6.2 will apply focus 





6.2 Protection Device Grading and Arc Flash Implications 
Although protection settings discussed and proposed in Chapter 6.1 (listed in Appendix II) of this 
report will provide effective discrimination and disconnection of faulty equipment, consideration must 
also be given to arc flash and the safety of engineering personnel. This is significantly important to 
the overall uptime of the data centre equipment i.e., allowing maintenance engineers to effectively 
complete life cycle maintenance activities, respond to issues, or indeed ensure arc flash energy levels 
do not damage switchgear beyond economical repair, should a fault occur.  
 
Below Table 6.2.1 displays both the ‘base’ and ‘proposed’ relay protection settings for achieving 
effective discrimination, it can be noted the associated incident energy levels are greater than the 
NFPA 70E or IEEE1584 guidelines, and available PPE. Therefore, achieving effective discrimination 
may not provide mitigation of arc flash hazards and further measures are often required.  In this 
scenario it is likely the switchgear would have to be taken out of service for any scheduled 
maintenance activity, which naturally incurs additional unwanted downtime and costly shutdown 
activities for the data centre services. Table 6.2.1 display the arc flash levels for each of the data 
centre switchboards.  
 
Table 6.2.1 Protection Device Grading and Associated Arc Flash Implications 
Base Relay Protection Settings 
  
Proposed Relay Protection Settings for 
improved Co-ordination.   





























0.415 256.17 76'3" 
> Level 
G 






0.415 254.54 75'11" 
> Level 
G 




A1 HV 11 6631.85 6'2" 
> Level 
G 




A1 to A2 
Bypass 
0.415 254.54 75'11" 
> Level 
G 






0.415 365.43 97'1" 
> Level 
G 






0.415 365.43 97'1" 
> Level 
G 






0.415 27.87 16'11" Level E 60.97 27.87 16'11" Level E 60.97 
B1 BB 
RHS 
0.415 39.37 21'5" Level E 72.26 39.37 21'5" Level E 72.26 
B1 HV 11 6634.84 6'2" 
> Level 
G 











































0.415 27.96 16'11" Level E 62.03 27.96 16'11" Level E 62.03 
D1 BB 
RHS 
0.415 39.23 21'4" Level E 73.02 39.23 21'4" Level E 73.02 
DBA9 0.415 0.332379 0'10" Level A 2.25 0.332379 0'10" Level A 2.25 
G1 BB 
LHS 
0.415 0.818717 1'7" Level A 1.3 0.818717 1'7" Level A 1.3 
G1 BB 
RHS 








11 6.93 18'2" Level C 38.11 15.93 42'9" Level D 87.64 
GEC 
RBus 
11 1.99 5'0" Level A 13.5 1.99 5'0" Level A 13.5 




0.415 256.17 76'3" 
> Level 
G 







































































































PDU A2 0.415 0.359424 0'11" Level A 0.5 0.359424 0'11" Level A 0.5 
PDU A21 0.415 0.131741 0'5" Level A 0.5 0.131741 0'5" Level A 0.5 
Rear Bus 
Ext. 




0.415 77.39 33'10" Level F 119.34 94.91 38'10" Level F 146.37 
String 1A 11 11.5 30'7" Level D 63.41 9.41 24'11" Level D 51.91 
String 1B 11 11.5 30'7" Level D 63.41 15.85 42'7" Level D 87.37 
T1 HV 11 451.61 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T2 HV 11 450.8 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T3 HV 11 451.38 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T4 HV 11 451.4 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T5 HV 11 466.49 1'8" 
> Level 
G 




T6 HV 11 451.38 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T7 HV 11 450.8 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T8 HV 11 450.83 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T9 HV 11 452.08 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T10 HV 11 451.96 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T11 HV 11 451.57 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T12 HV 11 451.77 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T13 HV 11 451.3 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T14 HV 11 451.55 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T15 HV 11 451.03 1'7" 
> Level 
G 




T16 HV 11 451.23 1'7" 
> Level 
G 







0.415 82.55 35'4" Level F 135.17 100.2 40'4" Level G 164.07 
 
Given arc flash values above level G provide a challenge to maintenance persons safety, other 
mitigating measures should be applied, such as below Figures 6.2.1 & 6.2.2 providing an example of 
how relay protection settings can affect arc flash in terms of i) Required arc flash boundary distance 




It can also be noted several of the original protection settings achieved a level F PPE rating (100+ 
cal/cm2), due to the dangerous length of time the relay settings required to clear the arc fault current. 
Figure 6.2.1 displays an improved range of protection settings, specifically concentrating on an 
optimal short time setting to reduce the arc fault clearing time and thus lower the incident energy and 
requirement for such excessive cal/cm2 PPE rating. This approach will allow a significant safety 
improvement of personnel and reduction in PPE requirements, along with a reduction of arcing 





Figure 6.2.1 Arc flash Pre-Protection Setting Assessment  
 
Figure 6.2.2 Arc flash Post Protection Setting Assessment 
 
Trip Device 
TERASAKI AGR -L 
LT = 4000A 
LT BAND = 0.5 
ST = X10 
ST BAND =0.1 
 
Trip Device 
TERASAKI AGR -L 
LT = 4000A 
LT BAND = 0.9 
(3600) 
ST = X3 
ST BAND =0.1 
INST = X12 
Noted in the adjacent TCC protection curve 
the red circle indicates the time to clear the 
arc fault current, which is 2.557s. This is 
because the Short Time (ST) setting for this 
relay is set at In x 10 (40KA). There is no 
reason for such a high setting given the 
connected loads, including any inrush 
contributions, are significantly below this 
value. 
Due to the high ST setting and long clearing 
time the Ie is significant and poses a 
challenge with purchasing effective PPE or 
indeed working in the substation given 
required safety boundary is 34.9ft. 
 
Noted in the adjacent TCC protection curve 
the green circle indicates the time to clear arc 
fault current, which is 0.171s. This is 
significantly reduced from the above because 
the short time setting proposed is x3 (12KA). 
This setting allows for all connected loads 
and inrush contributions whilst reducing the 
arc Incident Energy (Ie) and requirements for 
Personal Protective Equipment.  
Given the Ie reduced arc fault boundary 
distance to 6.3ft, this is an improved practical 





Table 6.2.2 displays a reduction in arc flash incident energy which can be achieved by improving the 
protection relay curves to clear arc currents as quickly as possible whilst maintaining effective 
discrimination. Note: DB A1, H1 & yellow/red strings arc energy could not be sufficiently reduced as 
the other installed LV switchgear, this is due to the ACB protection curve on the LV supply side of 
the transformers. Typical ACB relay curves do not provide the range of curves as the IDMT type. 
Therefore, a setting could not be provided to reduce arc flash incident levels without compromising 
on co-ordination of the scheme relays.  
 
Table 6.2.2  Arc Flash Incident Energy Improvements 
Reduction of Arc Flash Incident Energy with Improved Protection Relay Settings 
ID kV  
Total Energy 
(cal/cm²) 
AFB (ft-in) Energy Levels 
Final FCT 
(cycles) 
A1 BB LHS 0.415 10.2 8'7" Level D 13.56 
A1 BB RHS 0.415 10.2 8'7" Level D 13.56 
A1 HV 11 7.9 20'10" Level C 51.82 
A1 to A2 Bypass 0.415 10.2 8'7" Level D 13.56 
A2 BB LHS 0.415 21 13'11" Level D 13.5 
A2 BB RHS 0.415 21 13'11" Level D 13.5 
B1 BB LHS 0.415 11.43 9'3" Level D 25.52 
B1 BB RHS 0.415 11.43 9'3" Level D 25.52 
B1 HV 11 7.9 20'10" Level C 51.82 
C1 BB LHS 0.415 18.87 12'12" Level D 25.1 
C1 BB RHS 0.415 18.87 12'12" Level D 25.1 
D1 BB LHS 0.415 11.45 9'3" Level D 25.91 
D1 BB RHS 0.415 11.45 9'3" Level D 25.91 
DBA9 0.415 0.367266 0'11" Level A 2.57 
G1 BB LHS 0.415 14.68 10'9" Level D 0.34 
G1 BB RHS 0.415 14.68 10'9" Level D 0.34 
GEC FBus LHS 11 7.92 20'10" Level C 51.97 
GEC FBus RHS 11 4.21 10'11" Level C 27.59 
GEC RBus 11 1.99 5'0" Level A 13.5 
H1 BB 0.415 17.15 12'2" Level D 23.5 
LV BB DBA1 
LHS 
0.415 126.74 47'4" > Level G 200.78 
LV BB DBA1 
RHS 
0.415 126.74 47'4" > Level G 200.78 
LV BB DBB1 
LHS 
0.415 18.39 12'9" Level D 35.02 
LV BB DBB1 
RHS 
0.415 18.9 12'12" Level D 35.41 
LV BB DBC1 
LHS 




ID kV  
Total Energy 
(cal/cm²) 
AFB (ft-in) Energy Levels 
Final FCT 
(cycles) 
LV BB DBC1 
RHS 
0.415 24.77 15'7" Level D 32.94 
LV BB DBD1 
LHS 
0.415 18.39 12'9" Level D 35.02 
LV BB DBD1 
RHS 
0.415 18.8 12'11" Level D 35.7 
LV BB DBG1 
LHS 
0.415 7.44 3'9" Level C 5 
LV BB DBG1 
RHS 
0.415 20.73 13'10" Level D 27.52 
LV BB DBH1 
Supply1 
0.415 162.46 17'5" > Level G 110.57 
LV BB DBH1 
Supply2 
0.415 162.46 17'5" > Level G 110.57 
LV BB RED 
Supply1 
0.415 162.47 17'5" > Level G 110.59 
LV BB RED 
Supply2 
0.415 162.47 17'5" > Level G 110.59 
LV BB YELLOW 
Supply1 
0.415 172.21 17'12" > Level G 125.78 
LV BB YELLOW 
Supply2 
0.415 172.21 17'12" > Level G 125.78 
PDU A2 0.415 0.323031 0'10" Level A 0.5 
PDU A21 0.415 0.126236 0'5" Level A 0.5 
Rear Bus Ext. 11 1.99 5'0" Level A 13.5 
RED INPUT BB 0.415 17.69 12'5" Level D 23.63 
String 1A 11 7.9 20'10" Level C 51.82 
String 1B 11 7.9 20'10" Level C 51.82 
YELLOW INPUT 
BB 
0.415 14.13 10'8" Level D 20 
 
 
Below Figure 6.2.3 & 6.24 TCC display the key differences between protection settings on the main 
LV incoming devices and how these relate to eliminating the arc fault currents and associated incident 
energy. The goal to improve safety of working operatives and limit damage to the switchgear 
following a fault of equipment. Therefore, the IDMT relay would provide the best option at the 







Figure 6.2.3  ACB Protection Curve and Associated Effects on Arc Flash 
 
 
Figure 6.2.4 IDMT Protection Curve and Associated Effects on Arc Flash 
 
Example 1 – ACB Curve 
It can be noted from the Time Current Curve 
(TCC) the protection device on the HV side 
of supply transformer is an IDMT relay, with 
an Extremely Inverse IDMT curve. The LV 
device is an ACB time/current protection 
which does not allow for an IDMT curve 
types, only LT/ST/INST settings. 
The issue is limited curve flexibility, with 
protection clearance time (arcing current) of 
2.8s. If the curve type of the IDMT relay is 
changed to Standard Inverse (SI) the arc 
current is cleared much quicker although 
discrimination between the devices is lost. 
Note below for an improved option. 
 
Example 2 – IDMT Curve  
In this example both the HV & LV side of 
the transformer has IDMT type protections 
installed, which allows SI curves to be 
applied at both relays. This IDMT provides 
flexibility of curve types and ensures 
effective overload and short circuit 
protection. Also, more importantly achieving 
an improved clearance of arc fault current by 
2.2 seconds – whilst maintaining time 
discrimination of devices. Thus, an improved 
scheme is achievable in comparison to the 






6.3 A Generalised Approach Flowchart for Improving Operational Availability in a 
Tier 3 Data Centre 



































COMPLETE A SITE AUDIT AND ESTABLISH THE CURRENT OPERTIONAL PHILOPSOHY AND 
CONFIGURATION  
Carry out an extensive audit of the electrical network and associated documentation, obtaining details for design 
parameters, load connections, single line diagrams, operational philosophy, and current Tier ratings. Details required as a 
minimum includes: 
Tier rating (Tier 3 or 4), total design capacity (MVA), number of HV supplies provided by the DNO including MVA 
capacity and nominal voltage ratings (KV), operating configuration for DNO and standby power generators, number of data 
halls including design load capacity (KA), current connected bus loadings and emergency requirements. Quantity and types 
of LV & HV switchgear, circuit breakers, and protection relays. Also, details of all Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) 
including types, nominal ratings (KVA & PF), mode of operations and bypass connections. Finally details for all cabling 





SPECIFIC DATA COLLECTION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENTS AND OPERATIONAL SETTINGS 
Following STEP (1A) the below specific data will be required for construction of the individual simulation components 
which later compile to the full electrical network construction.  
GRID INCOMING FEEDER – L-L-L voltage rating (KV), short circuit capacity (MVA) including L-L-L and L-G values 
which can be established by enquiry to the network operator, X/R ratio.  
STANDBY GENERATOR - L-L-L voltage Rating (KV), power capacity (MVA), Power Factor rating (PF), number of 
poles, grounding types including resistor value (Ω) or resistor maximum current at L-G voltage (KV), exciter type i.e., 
salient pole, governor droop mode (%), values for reactance’s Xd’’≤ Xd’≤ Xd and associated Time Domains Td’’≤ Td’≤ Td. 
POWER TRANSFORMER – IEC insulation type, power rating (MVA), vector shift i.e., Dyn11, FLC (A), percentage 
impedance (%Z), X/R ratio, voltage ratios - Vp/Vs (KV), range of transformer voltage tap settings, grounding configuration 
i.e., solid or grounding resistor, inrush current (KA), L-L-L symmetrical fault current (KA). 
UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLIES (First establish static inverter or rotary construction) - For static inverter: 
power capacity (KVA), power factor rating (PF), input/output L-L-L voltages (KV), FLC (A), short circuit contribution 
(KA), grounding configuration i.e., TNC or TNC-S. For rotary construction: power capacity (KVA), power factor rating 
(PF), input/output voltages (KV), FLC (A), grounding type i.e., TNC or TNC-S, values for reactance’s Xd’’≤ Xd’≤ Xd and 
associated time domains Td’’≤ Td’≤ Td. 
SWITCHGEAR – Voltage rating (KV), continuous current rating (A), peak current rating (KA), selected conductor 
materials i.e., copper or aluminium, constructed gaps between conductors L-L and L-G (mm). 
CIRCUIT BREAKERS - Manufacturer, model class, voltage rating (KA), continuous current rating (A), peak current 
rating (KA). 
PROTECTION RELAYS - Manufacturer, model class, current transformer inputs - type/class, Rated Accuracy Limiting 
Factor (RALF), power rating (KVA), primary current rating (A), secondary current rating (KA). Voltage transformer inputs 
- primary voltage rating (KV), secondary voltage rating (KV), connection to trip outputs (LOGIC), overcurrent settings for 











































STEP 1(B) CONTINUED 
SPECIFIC DATA COLLECTION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENTS AND OPERATIONAL SETTINGS 
CABLES – Voltage rating (KV), frequency rating (Hz), British standard construction type i.e., BS6622 which is an XLPE 
multicore, conductor cross sections area CSA (mm2), Insulation thickness (mm), cable diameter (mm), British standard 
value for insulation tolerance i.e., ±15% for BS6622.  
BUS LOADS – Voltage rating (KV), apparent power (KVA), reactive power (KVAr), active power (KW), Power Factor 
(PF), characteristics - static or dynamic (%).  
RELIABILITY DATA – Applicable for grid incoming feeders, standby generation, power transformers, UPS, circuit 
breakers and cables.  Active failure rates expressed as failure per year, Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) rate per year, to be 
noted as per manufacturer guidelines or IEC Std.493 (where manufacturer data is not available). 
 
STEP 1(C) 
SINGULAR EQUIPMENT MODEL SIMULATIONS AND PROOF OF THEORETICAL CALCULATION  
Each of the following data centre equipment are key to the successful system construction and simulation, therefore each 
model component must be individually simulated, as far as reasonably practical, and proven to be accurate (±2.5%) against 
the manufacturers literature and theoretical calculations, As detailed below: 
GRID SOURCES – Information of grid incoming supplies will firstly be established by enquiry to the DNO, calculation of 
short circuit currents is to be in-line with IEC60909 where L-L-L symmetrical fault currents will be calculated by 
 
√  .
  base impedances will also be verified with the following calculation 𝑍 =   and the converted to 
100MVA base to compare with the values provided by enquiry and simulation results i.e.  𝑍𝑝𝑢 = 𝑍 .
 
 
IEC60909 values are established at the first system bus connected to the DNO feeder.  
 
Figure 6.3.1- Example Single Grid Source Model  
DISTRIBTUION TRANSFORMERS – Carry out a theoretical calculation of L-L-L symmetrical fault current in-line with 
the IEC60909, once this value is established it must be converted to a transformer secondary current and subjected to the 
IEC60909 Cfactor then compared against the manufacturers test data and simulation results for proven accuracy. 
Calculations utilised; Primary fault current 𝐼 =  
 
√  .
  converting primary to secondary current  . 𝐼 =
𝐼   application of IEC factors for symmetrical fault current 𝐼 =  𝐼 √2 then utilsing Cfactor i.e 
.
 for systems ≤1001 
VA.C. Construction of the model for trial simulations must be as the most simplist form with one single input and ouput bus, 
no load, and cable lengths set to the minimum i.e negating any further system impedances at this proof of concept stage. 












































STEP 1(C) CONTINUED 
SINGULAR EQUIPMENT MODEL SIMULATIONS AND PROOF OF THEORETICAL CALCULATION  
 
Figure 6.3.2 – Example Single Transformer Model  
STANDBY GENERATOR – The generator manufacturers data must be utilised for impedance (Xd’<Xd’<Xd) and time 
constants (Tdo’’<Tdo’<Tdo)  to calculation theoretical fault currents, firstly during open time constants by utilising the 
following equations:  
𝐸 = [ 1 + 𝑋𝑑 𝐼 𝑆𝑖𝑛(𝜃) + 𝑋𝑑 𝐼 𝐶𝑜𝑠(𝜃)  ]  
𝐸 = [ 1 + 𝑋𝑑 𝐼 𝑆𝑖𝑛(𝜃) + 𝑋𝑑 𝐼 𝐶𝑜𝑠(𝜃)  ]  
𝐸 = [ 1 + 𝑋𝑑 𝐼 𝑆𝑖𝑛(𝜃) + 𝑋𝑑 𝐼 𝐶𝑜𝑠(𝜃)  ]  
 
𝐼 =  
𝐸
𝑋𝑑
 x 𝐹𝐿𝐶 
𝐼 =  
𝐸
𝑋𝑑
 x 𝐹𝐿𝐶 
𝐼 =  
𝐸
𝑋𝑑
 x 𝐹𝐿𝐶 
Where: I is the P.u value of 1 at rated MVA, given Cos(θ) is load PF, assuming EMF = V, FLC = Full Load Current (A). 
Once these values are established further equations can be utilised for calculation of currents during transient time 
constants, firstly establishing the decay period between I’ and I  
During short circuit time constants equations become: 
Td =  
𝑋𝑑
𝑋𝑑




Therefore, fault current at a given time constant (t): 
 
𝑖 = 𝐼  𝑒 + 𝐼 
Where:  











































STEP 1(C) CONTINUED 
SINGULAR EQUIPMENT MODEL SIMULATIONS AND PROOF OF THEORETICAL CALCULATION  
Construction of the model for trial simulations must be in the most simplist form with a single generator under investigation  
at anyone time, no load connections, and cable lengths set to the minimum i.e negating any further system impedances at 
this proof of concept stage. Symmetrical fault currents after trasnient decay should be compared between simulation, 
theoretical calulation and manufacturers data ensuring an accuary of < ± 2.5%. 
 
Figure 6.3.3 - Example Single Generator Model 
ROTARY UNINTERUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY – Note rotary UPS machines shall follow the same proof of concept 
process as the above synchronous generators, with exception to a synchronous motor at negative Power Factor (PF) utilised 
to represent the transient data of a given UPS machine (see below example construction). A static UPS construction can be 
represented as a multiplier of its base rating within the ETAP standard model block i.e.  𝐼 =  𝐼  . 𝑥  (where Ib is the 
machines base current rating in Amperes). IEC60909 L-L-L symmetrical fault current values between theoretical 
calculations, manufacturers data and simulation should be within an accuracy limit of < ± 2.5%.  Construction of the model 
for trial simulation must be as the most simplist form with a single UPS under investigation  at anyone time, no load 
connections, and cable lengths set to the minimum i.e negating any further system impedances at this proof of concept 
stage. 
 






























STEPS 2: BUILDING A COMPLETE DATA CENTRE ELECTRICAL NETWORK MODEL AND 












STEP 1(C) CONTINUED 
SINGULAR EQUIPMENT MODEL SIMULATIONS AND PROOF OF THEORETICAL CALCULATION  
DISTRIBUTION CABLING – Confirmation of the accuracy of theoretical calculations, simulation, and manufacturers 
values (X P.u) for all the different cable construction types installed within the data centre electrical network must be 
completed utilising:  
𝐿 = 0.46 log   𝜇𝐻/𝑚  
Where: d represents the distance between conductors (mm), Re represents conductor geometric mean radius (mm) L is the 
Inductance (H) 
Once the cable inductance has been established the inductance reactance (XL) and P.u value can be calculated with 
application of: 
X = 2πfL 
X P. u =  
MVA
KV
 . X  
 
STEP 1(D) CHECKPOINT  
Confirm accuracy of singular 
model components are ± 
2.5%of calculated values (and 
manufacturers data if available) 
DO NOT PROCEED TO 
STEPS 2 
Go to Step 1(B)  
STEPS 2(A) – CONSTRUCTING THE COMPLETE ETAP MODEL FROM SINGULAR COMPONENTS 
CREATING A BASE MODEL PROJECT - Create an ETAP project file (*Oti), set project standards to IEC 50Hz, 
utilising the singular model components from steps 1(C) construct the complete electrical network model, ensuring this is 
an exact replica of the data centre power system and data resourced from the audit and single line diagrams in steps 1(A). 
Within ETAP ‘Data Manager’ this model becomes ‘BASE 1’ and should represent the system in nominal configuration. 
‘BASE 2’ ‘BASE 3’ etc. can be copied from this original ‘BASE 1’ network and allow further changes of operational 
configuration to suit several system loadings or operational configurations. These loadings and site configurations should 
align with the operational philosophy for a given data centre, as discovered in steps 1(A) i.e., the site audit, design Tier 
rating and system/literature reviews.  
ESTABLISHING PARAMETRES AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR STUDY BASE MODELS – Once 
the base models are constructed and checked for accuracy against the original single line diagrams, a set of international 














































STEPS 2(A) – CONTINUED  
STUDY TYPE 
 
PARAMETRES TO ASSIGN 
 
LOAD FLOW  
 
 
Calculation method: Adaptive Newton Raphson (Max iterations 99, Precision 0.001) 
Initial bus voltages: set as normal bus loadings. 
Loading categories x3: set as normal current system load, also design capacity (as Tier 
ratings), then emergency (design capacity +10%) 
Diversity factor: None (unless established as a requirement in Step 1A). 








Standard: IEC60909 (X/R Calculation Method C) 







Standard: IEC60909  
Cmax Factor 1.05 
Fault values: KA Symmetrical rms 
Fault types: L-L-L, L-L, L-L-G, L-G  
consideration of upstream protection devices: value should match data from steps 1(A) i.e., for 





Arc flash standard: IEC 1584:2002 
Bus fault current: Calculated  
Fault clearing time: Auto select from upstream protection device. 
Incident energy standard: NFPA 70E 2012:2018 
 
STEP 2(B) CHECKPOINT  
Confirm base model(s) are aligned with 
information from Step 1(A) i.e., audits/ 
single line diagrams, also all model 
components utilised are proven as Step 1(C). 
Plus, model standards have been applied as 
Steps 2. 
DO NOT PROCEED TO 
STEPS 3 











































STEP 3(A) – SIMULATE THE CURRENT SYSTEM RELIABILITY  
Complete a suite of reliability assessment calculations in ETAP power system simulation software, initially on each of the 
base models. Record each bus bar load point reliability index, expressed as the average annual failure rate hrs/yr (λi).   
These steps have modelled the complete data centre electrical network and provided a benchmark reliability index, as per 
the installed equipment and operational configurations. The result values can be compared to the system design criteria as 
outlined in the original Tier rating i.e., Tier 3 or 4. The proceeding steps in section 4 will now focus on a sequential 
methodology of studying and each power system study, with a view to improving the overall system reliability as described 
in Steps 5 onward.  
STEP 4(A) – LOAD FLOW ANALYSIS  
Arrange the complete system model into the correct Tier 3 or Tier 4 configuration (as per original design criteria). Apply 
the following load values to the ‘healthy’ system bus bars as three sperate simulations; 1) Normal Operation i.e., to simulate 
the actual present network loads. 2) Design Operation – 100% load capacity of each system bus bar i.e.  to simulate design 
limits of the electrical network. 3) Emergency Operation - 110% of design capacity i.e., simulation of the worst-case 
scenario of operation for the electrical network. For each simulation ensure the following simulation values are recorded for 
each system bus bar. VL-L, KW, KVAr. Also, where possible during normal operation record the actual system busbar 
voltages VL-L for comparison with simulation 1.  
With these simulated values established, for a healthy network, a Voltage Security Index (Vsi) can be established for each 
system bus bar, utilising the following: 
𝑉𝑠𝑖 =  
1
2




|Vi| represents the calculated magnitude of Voltage rms at busbar i.  
|Vi sp|  represents the specified Voltage rms of busbar i. 
NB represents the number of load buses in System.  
 
With an initial load flow study complete and results captured for the data centres electrical network in nominal 
configuration the standby power generation must also be considered. Firstly, the complete network model will need to be 
updated to reflect disconnection of grid supplies and connection on nominal standby generators i.e., the complete network 
being supplied by temporary power sources (e.g., BASE X). The system is again subjected to the same simulation scenarios 
as those listed above for the healthy network. For this generator scenario the results captured should focus on the generator 
capability curves and ISO8528-1 operating limits. Therefore, the following values must be recorded VL-L, KW, KVAr, PF. 
STEP 4(B) – SHORT CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 
The complete system model must be subjected to IEC60909 fault analysis with short circuit current values captured at each 
system bus bar (KA), this is to be inclusive of the electrical network during its varying operational scenarios as defined in 












































STEP 4(B) – CONTINUED 
Electrical Power Sources – Example Configurations for Short Circuit Analysis. 
DNO supply 1      
DNO supply 2      
Generator 1      
Generator 2      
Generator 3      
Generator 4      
Generator 5      
Where;  is a Power Source connected to the Network and  is a Power Source Disconnected from the network. 
As for generators the UPS simulation scenarios will be complex and should include all the below, for a given Tier 3 or Tier 
4 data centre.  
UPS - Mode of operations to be Simulated for Short Circuit Current Analysis, at each system bus bar connected to the UPS. 
3 UPS in parallel configuration, connected to the network. 
4 UPS in parallel configuration, connected to the network. 
5 UPS in parallel configuration, connected to the network. 
3 UPS synchronised to the site main incoming supplies (i.e. for no break transfer requirements) 
4 UPS synchronised to the site main incoming supplies (i.e. for no break transfer requirements) 
5 UPS synchronised to the site main incoming supplies (i.e. for no break transfer requirements) 
5 UPS during standby battery operation, during loss of main supply.    
Bypass mode – All UPS offline and disconnected from the network (i.e. during maintenance periods and hard bypass arrangements)  
 
For each of the short circuit simulations above the symmetrical and peak fault currents at every system bus bar should be 
recorded, including L-L-L, L-L, L-L-G, L-G values (KA).  
STEP 4(C) – PROTECTION COORDINATION  
Protection assessments are essentially split into two separate investigations, which are Time Current Curve (TCC) and Non-
Time Current Curve (NTCC). For TCC protection assessments the following scenarios should be investigated in ETAP star 
evaluation model (inclusive of all overcurrent and ground faults). 
TCC PROTECTION SCENERIOS 
Transformer HV to LV grading discrimination. 
HV ring system faults during single DNO supply. 
HV ring system faults during dual DNO supplies. 
Discrimination during islanded generator supply, with downstream devices.  
HV faults during synchronised supplies (DNO & synchronous generators) – focus on main ring feeders, interconnectors, 
and parallel points.  
LV Rotary UPS co-ordination with both upstream and downstream devices, including bypass mode assessment and 
transformer incomer circuit breakers.  
 
*Note these TCC scenarios must include all operational configurations as defined in Steps 1(A), i.e., ‘BASE 1’ ‘BASE 2’ 
etc. 
NTCC protection devices shall also be assessed with ETAP star evaluation module and against manufacturers data defined 










































STEP 4(C) – CONTINUED 
NTCC PROTECION SCENERIOS  
G59 synchronised settings for the main High Voltage (HV) ring main incoming circuit breaker protections and generator 
outputs.  
SOLKAR unit protection on any HV ring cable interconnectors.  
Restricted L-G (REF) settings on all HV distribution transformers.  
Generators ANSI 49RMS, 87M, 46, 32Q, 32P, 81L, 81H, 27, 59, confirmation of settings against manufacturers guidance 
and international standards.  
 
Any protection setting issues or mis-coordination must be recorded in a TCC characteristic curve plot or protection settings 
table for NTCC allowing further investigation and improvement detailed in Steps (5). All installed devices within the 
network (from main incomer to critical load PDU should be investigated) these devices will have been discovered is Steps 
1(A). 
 
STEP 4(D) – ARC FLASH ANALYSIS  
Utilising ETAP Arc Flash IEEE1584 module a series of operational configurations are to be assessed, providing the 
established arc incident levels at each system bus bar, simulation values are to be recorded for each system bus bar, which 
includes Total incident energy (J/cm2), arc flash boundary levels (m), fault clearing times (s) and required PPE rating. 
Operational scenarios for a Tier 3 data centre must include. 
1) Parallel operation of Distribution Network Operator (DNO) cable feeders supplying all connected critical loads. 
2) Island mode of operation i.e., with standby diesel generators connected to critical loads and removed from grid (DNO). 
3) Standby generators connected in parallel with distribution network operator (DNO) cable feeders, for example as a short 
term parallel G59, no break transfer of critical load. 
 
STEP 4(E) CHECKPOINT  
Confirm simulation results are 
recorded, for all operational 
scenarios as defined in Steps 
4(A), 4(B), 4(C), 4(D) 
DO NOT PROCEED TO 
STEPS 5 




STEP 5(A) – LOAD FLOW ANALYSIS  
Load flow results recorded must be analysed against ANSI C84 and BS7671 specified values, which were set as simulation 
parameters in Step 2(A), where equipment do not align with these values improvements can be achieved. The three areas 










































STEP 5(A) – CONTINUED 
CONDITION 1: DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMERS  
The operational cost of a distribution transformers and system voltage is a function of the transformer tap setting, where at 
nominal load the installed transformer energy costs align with the below condition, i.e., the optimal tap setting has been 
obtained for a Tier 3 data centre system.  
 
TX Ecost ≤ 0.5428 
 
Where; 
TX Ecost is the total annual energy cost for a distribution transformer, per MVA (£m) and can be calculated at a given 
loading with unit cost of £0.10 per KWh. 
 
CONDITION 2: SWITCHGEAR VOLTAGE SECUIRITY INDEX 
All installed switchgear busbar voltage security indices must comply with the below condition, this will ensure a nominal 
bus voltage within ANSI C84 and BS7671 specified limits, thus providing sufficient capacity for voltage drops and 
connecting design loads (as established in Step 1(A)). 
 
 0.25 ≥  0.5  
Where; 
Vi represents the simulated Voltage rms (VL-L) 
Vsp represents the specified Voltage rms (415VL-L) 
Vlim represents the Voltage rms deviation (VL-L) 
 
CONDITION 3: GENERATOR VECTOR STABILITY CURVES 
During operational simulation scenarios defined in Steps 1(A) the generator vector stability curve should not be exceeded 
and follow the below condition, ensuring optimal bus voltages throughout the range of system loadings. These load values 
must be plotted or compared with manufactures curve guidelines.  
 
Pn < Pd < Pd x 1.1 
Where; 
Pn  represents the nominal site load power (MW) 
Pd represents the system power design capabilities (MW) 
Pd x 1.1 is 110% of the system design capacity 
STEP 5(B) CHECKPOINT  
Confirm all simulation results 
achieved load flow conditions 
1,2 & 3 before proceeding 
with short circuit analysis.  
INVESTIGATION REQUIRED 
BEFORE PROCEEDING TO STEPS 
5(C) 
Go to Step 4(A) to re-simulate load flow 
scenarios, investigating range of 
transformer tap settings, available design 
loads, cable feeders and standby generator 
bus voltage set points.  
For optimal operational reliability, all 3 











































STEP 5(C) – SHORT CIRCUIT ANALYSIS 
The data centre electrical network short circuit results must be analysed against the manufacturers guidance and 
international standards, the following six conditions will ensure compliance with these attributes and optimal management 
of such faults. Thus, improving the operational availability of the network and support optimal protection operations and arc 
flash mitigation as described in Steps 5(E) & 5(F) 
CONDITION 1: SWITCHGEAR BASE CURRENT RATINGS  
Switchgear base current ratings must not exceed the below, note for any input switchgear on UPS power strings the battery 
charge current and Tier 3 configurations must also be considered, these operational philosophies are established in Steps 
1(A) & 1(B): 
 
In ≤ 0.95 x Ib 
 
Where; 
In represents the nominal connected bus load currents (A) including any Tier 3 redundant capability.  
Ib represents the switchgear continuous current rating (A) as specified by ANSI C37.20.2. 
 
CONDITION 2: SWITCHGEAR FAULT CURRENT RATINGS  
Each of the installed switchgears must comply with the below condition where the L-L-L fault current value is a criterion 
from the IEC60909 study in Step 4(B). 
L-L-L < IEEE Std. C37.21  
 
Where; 
IEEE Std. C37.21 specifies switchgear short circuit current withstand ratings. 
 
CONDITION 3: CONSIDERATION FOR UPS STATIC OR ROTARY TYPE FAULT CONTRIBUTIONS 
UPS static path fault contribution for model components must align with below optimal condition: 
 
Kac = 1200 to 1400%  
 
Where; 
Kac represents the short circuit current value expressed as percentage of nominal UPS current rating. 
 
However, UPS rotary construction types must include transient impedances and time constants as below. This will provide 
a true accurate representation of fault currents and must be considered for equipment fault ratings and associated protection 
settings.  
 
A synchronous motor (model block) is to be utilised in any simulation, for representation of the rotary UPS sub transient 
components, where transient data is sourced from the OEM: 
 
Xd’’ < Xd’ < Xd 
 
Where;  
OEM  is the Original Equipment Manufacturers 
Xd’’ represents the Sub Transient Impedance, Xd’ represents the Transient Impedance, Xd represents the Steady 
State Impedance 
CONDITION 4: GENERATOR STATOR RATING 
For all operational scenarios defined in Steps 1(A) the standby generator stator operation must not exceed IEC60034 
specified values, which can be plotted in the associated TCC curves. 
 
2.18 x FLC  is less than 10seconds load duration 
 











































STEP 5(C) – CONTINUED 
Also, allow consideration for equipment fault ratings i.e. that equipment connected to the generator system must be 
confirmed as sufficient rating for the fault currents present, these fault current will be proportional to the generator system 
impedance as shown below. 
 
Xd’ < Xd 
 
Where; 
Xd’ represents the direct axis transient reactance 
Xd  represents the direct axis synchronous reactance 
 
CONDITION 5: DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMERS  
For all operational scenarios defined in Steps 1(A), a distribution transformer fault current must satisfy: 
 
Im < In x 8 
Tm < 6 cycles 
 
Where; 
Im represents the distribution transformer magnetising current, expressed as multiple of nominal current rating.  
Tm represent the time in seconds for transformer inrush to clear i.e., return to steady state conditions.  
 
Faults current scenarios simulated from steps 1(A), on the transformers secondary connections must include all system 
impedances as: 
 
Z = Zs + Zt 
 
Where; 
Z represents the total impedance for a given fault on the transformer secondary.  
Zs represents the upstream system impedances. 
Zt represents the specific transformer impedances. 
 
Short circuit current values obtained for the distribution transformers must comply with both frequent and infrequent values 
as IEEE C57. This will ensure the magnitude and duration of either fault type will not deteriorate or damage transformer 
windings, which may lead to future reliability issues.  
 
I2 t = K < IEEE C57.109 specified values 
 
Where; 
I represents the symmetrical fault current expressed as a multiple of the transformers nominal current rating.  
K represents the constant determined at maximum I when t=2. 
 t represent the time Seconds (s) 
STEP 5(D) CHECKPOINT  
Confirm all simulation results 
achieved short circuit conditions 
1,2,3,4 & 5 before proceeding 
with protection co-ordination.   
INVESTIGATION REQUIRED BEFORE 
PROCEEDING TO STEPS 5(E) 
Go to Step 4(B) to re-simulate short circuit 
scenarios. 
For optimal operational reliability, all 5 












































STEP 5(E) – PROTECTION CO-ORDINATION  
For all the protection devices installed within the data centre electrical network, as defined in steps 1(A), the below outlines 
optimal protection conditions for each of the critical equipment which are located within such Tier 3 electrical networks.  
SYNCHRONOUS GENERATORS  
Curve type = IEC SI 
Phase Overcurrent 50/51: 1.2 x In 
Earth Fault 50N/51N: 10% of NER rating 
Machine Differential 87M: 5 to 10% In (stator), 20% In (frame faults) 
Reverse Active Power 32P: 5 to 20% Pn, Td = 3 
Under/Over frequency 81L/H: ± 2Hz, Td = 3 
Under voltage 27: 0.75 to 0.85 x Un, Td = 3 
Over voltage 59: 1.1 x Un, Td = 5 
 
Note: Where settings deviate from those above, for any overcurrent and earth fault settings, time discrimination between 
protection curves (TCC) should be a minimum Td > 200ms, including the output circuit breakers of any generator and HV 
ring feeder circuit breaker protections. 
 
Where; 
In represents the nominal current rating (A), for the generator in this case. 
Pn  represents the generator continuous power rating (MW). 
NER represents the neutral earth resistor rating (A). 
Td represents the time delay in seconds (s).  
Un represents the  L-L Voltage rms (Vrms). 
 
Example generator TCC with Tn >200ms time discrimination from upstream circuit breaker, important to note system fault 












































UNINTERRUPITBLE POWER SUPPLIES (UPS) 
Optimal settings for UPS online mode: Overcurrent settings for Long Time (LT) pick up current ≥ 1.5 x In, Td > 200ms - 
relevant to both the UPS input and output circuit breaker protection devices since continuous ratings will be different.   
 
Note: For issues encountered with the time element of UPS protection relays, it’s possible target for Td = 0, between UPS 
input and output circuit breakers, i.e., no requirement to time grade between either side of the machine connections in terms 




LT represents the protection relay long-time pick-up current setting (A). 
In represents the nominal current rating (A), for the UPS in this case. 
Td represents the time delay in seconds (s). 
 
For UPS whilst in offline/bypass mode: overcurrent settings must follow: I1 > 1.5 x I2  and  Td1 > Td2 + 200ms  
(for bypass protection against all downstream outgoing power distribution unit (PDU) data hall loads). 
 
Where; 
I1 represents the bypass protection relay current setting (A), I2 represents the downstream PDU relay current setting (A) 
Td1 represents the time delay on bypass protection relay (S), Td2 represents the time delay on downstream PDU protection 
relay (S) 
 
UPS voltage and frequency operational protection settings (listed as ANSI codes) must comply with: 
 
81L/81H/27/59 < ENA G59 limits  
 
Where; 
81L/81H are the underfrequency and over frequency relay settings (Hz) 
27/59 are the undervoltage and over voltage relay settings (V) 
 
Also, UPS input circuit breaker instantaneous protection setting must not exceed: 
 
IINST ≤ 10 x In 
 
Where; 
In represents the nominal continuous current rating (A), for the UPS in this case.  
IINST = UPS circuit breaker instantaneous current setting, expressed as multiple of machine nominal rating.  
 
DISTRIBTUION TRANSFORMERS 
Optimal overcurrent protection settings for the data centre distribution transformers:  LT > 1.25 x In & < 1.5 x In. 
Whereas ground fault current settings must align with Ig = 0.3 x In. Time delay for both overcurrent and earth fault, 
between transformer feeder and upstream protection devices must satisfy Td1 > Td2 + 200ms. Definite Time (DT) settings 
must be avoided, also no reliability benefits to time grade either side if the transformer i.e., HV & LV devices.  Where REF 
is fitted knee point voltage must comply with Vk > 2 x Vs.  
Where; 
In represents the nominal continuous current rating (A), for the transformer in this case.  
LT represents the protection relay long-time pick-up current setting (A). 
In represents the protection relay ground fault setting current (A). 
Td1 represent the time delay setting of upstream protection device (s). 
Td2 represents the time delay setting of the transformer protection device (s). 
Vk represents the setting voltage of REF relay (V), Vs represent the voltage present at the REF relay (V), during an Earth 
Fault L-G (Ig). 
System fault currents simulated in Step 4(B) must comply with the transformer thermal ratings specified by the IEEE 
C57.109, this will ensure symmetrical fault currents do not damage the transformer winding insulations and can be added to 
the associated protection TCC plot within ETAP i.e., cross referencing both Short Circuit Current (SCC) values and relay 










































STEP 5(E) – CONTINUED 
I t = K < 𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸 C57.109 specifications 
Where; 
I  represent the symmetrical fault current expressed as a multiple of the transformer continuous current rating (A). 
K represents the constant determined at maximum I when t=2. 
t represents the time taken for the protection relay to operate, with installed settings (S). 
 
HV & LV MAIN FEEDERS 
Optimising settings for HV main incoming supplies, for ground fault L-G and differential protection conditions: 
 
Ig Td < (Igdno Tddno)+ 200ms  
DNOdp Td > 200ms + (PNOdp Td) 
 
Where; 
Ig represents the relay ground fault current settings (A), Igdno represents the DNO relay ground fault current settings 
(A). 
Td represents the time delay on main feeder protection (s), Tddno represents the time delay DNO circuit breaker (s). 
DNOdp represents the DNO differential protection setting (A), including time delay (s).  
PNOdp represents the PNO differential protection setting (A), including time delay (s). 
 
 
For a Tier 3 data centre network with short term paralleling requirements feeder protection settings should comply with the 
ENA G59 requirements as outlined below.  
 
UV & OV  ± 6% Un, Td = 0.5 
UF & OF  ± 0.5 Hz, Td = 0.5 
Where; 
UV  represents undervoltage (KV), OV  represents over voltage (KV) 
UF  represents underfrequency (Hz), OF  represents over frequency (Hz) 
Un represents  L-G Voltage rms (KV) 
Td represents the time delay (s) 
 
Optimising settings for LV Main feeder protections, pick up and instantaneous currents. 
 
INST > 12 x In < 14 x In.  
LT > 1.25 x In. 
 
Where; 
In represents the nominal current (A), for the switchgear in this case.  
INST  represents the instantaneous current setting of the relay(A). 
LT  represents the protection relay long-time pick-up setting (A). 
 
OTHER GENERALISED OPERTAIONAL REQUIREMENTS   
 For continuous improvement of Operational Availability (Ao) and to support onsite maintenance engineers the following 
measures must be applied: 
Protection schemes should include operational relays to denote signalling of LV inter-trip received, HV inter-trip send, and 
vice versa, that is applicable for every distribution transformer within the network. This will support a speedy restoration by 
engineering operatives should a fault occur (i.e., Improving MTTR rates). Single Line Diagrams (SLD) and circuit breaker 
protection records must be periodically updated, as part of preventative maintenance schemes, during audits it was found 
may records were legacy and did not accurately represent the system settings. 
A duplicate copy of all protection relays settings and grading curves (including TCC plots) is to be held on secure, on-site 
electronic storage media with copies of all software and Equipment required to connect with relay devices, this is to support 









































STEP 5(E) – CONTINUED 
Critical spares for all protection equipment should be identified, procured, securely stored, and periodically checked for 
functionality and availability. This can be achieved through the preventative maintenance scheme.  
Onsite maintenance teams must be suitably trained for HV network operations, including those tasks associated with the 
installed protection devices. This will support the safe operation of all electrical network equipment during both normal and 
fault scenarios.  
A suite of Emergency Operational Procedures (EOPS) must be created, reviewed, and approved annually. These EOPS are 
to cover disaster scenarios planning i.e., unexpected failures in the electrical network, and for control of standby power 
machines - including manual controls and synchronising, these can often be the last opportunity to limit network issues and 
provide uptime of critical equipment, during periods of network issues.  
STEP 5(F) – ARC FLASH CONDITIONS   
To ensure a reduction of arc flash incident energy to an amount which is significantly less likely, under fault conditions, to 
permanently damage the equipment and enable the safe use of PPE for maintenance operations, the following conditions 
must be achieved, for each of the switchgears installed within the data centre’s electrical network.   
 
E < 30 J/cm2 
FCT < 35 cycles 
INST < In x 14 
or 
RSO > 25m from the installed switchgear & equipment 
 
Where; 
E  represents the arc flash incident energy (J/cm2). 
FCT  represents the relay fault clearing time (ms). 
INST  represents the associated upstream protection relay’s instantaneous setting, for any given fault simulated.  
RSO  is the Remote Switching Operations i.e., an ability to open/close circuit breakers from remote locations. 
 
Below protection relay Time Current Characteristic (TCC) displays the important of ensuring the correct instantaneous 
protection setting of the upstream circuit breaker is achieved, with application of an instantaneous current setting, over and 
above a short time current setting, it noted the arc fault boundary distance is reduced from 34.9m to 6.3m and incident 
energy reduced from 81.04 J/cm2 to 6.447 J/cm2. This is because the instantaneous setting ensures a quicker clearance of 











































STEP 5(G) CHECKPOINT  
Confirm all simulation results 
comply with conditions in 
5(E) and 5(F) before 
proceeding to steps 6.  
INVESTIGATION REQUIRED 
BEFORE PROCEEDING TO STEPS 6.  
Go to steps 5(E) to re-evaluate system 




STEP 6(A) – SIMULATE THE IMPROVED SYSTEM RELIABILITY  
The final step is to again run the reliability assessment calculations in ETAP power system simulation software, i.e., on the 
improved base model which has achieved all 5 steps criteria of this flowchart. Simulation results should be recorded for 
each bus load point reliability index as an average annual failure rate hrs/yr (λi).  
This process will have successful modelled the complete data centre electrical network and provided a new reliability index, 
as per the installed equipment and operational configurations (improved). These values can be compared to the original 
design criteria as outlined in the original Tier rating i.e., Tier 3 or 4 (as Step 1A) and the original system performance 
discovered in Step 3(A) – before improvements were made. The generalised approach will improve electrical network 
operational issues and lead to improved reliability metric, as the below is one example of many encountered with this Tier 3 
system. 
In this example a L-G fault was simulated on the DNO incoming supply (No.1), whilst the data centre was in parallel i.e., 
operating their standby generators which is common for no break transfers. Before improvements were made utilising this 
approach VCB A2 protection operated before the DNO therefore the critical distribution transformers (STRING 1A) were 









































STEP 6(A) – CONTINUED  
PROTECTION CHARACTERISTICS BEFORE AND AFTER APPLICATION OF THIS GENERALISED 
APPROACH: 
 
Relay ID CT Ratio 
Tap (Pickup)  Time Dial / Mult. 
Curve Type  
Range Setting Primary Range Setting 
A2 SEPAM 400:05:00 0.01 - 1  x CT Sec 0.1 40 0.1-12.5 0.12 SI 
A1 SEPAM 400:05:00 0.01 - 1  x CT Sec 0.3 120 0.1-12.5 2.55 SI 
WPD A MCCG52 400:05:00 0.05 - 2.4  x CT Sec 0.3 120 0.05-1 0.325 SI 
A2 SEPAM 400:05:00 0.01 - 1  x CT Sec 0.1 40 0.01 - 1 0.12 EI 
A1 SEPAM 400:05:00 0.01 - 1  x CT Sec 0.3 120 0.01 - 1 2.55 EI 
WPD A MCCG52 400:05:00 0.05 - 2.4  x CT Sec 0.4 160 0.01 - 1 0.1 SI 
*Required changes are highlighted with the colour red.  
CORRESPONDING IMPROVED RELIABILITY BY APPLYING THIS GENERALISED APPROACH: 
The below table relates to the reliability indices from the above protection scenario, it can be seen with an effective system 
the expressed hrs/yr precited outage duration is 5.9, whereas with the original protection settings (before improvements 
were achieved) the calculated outage duration is 50 hrs/yr, this is an increase of 44 hrs/yr. Yes, a significant 90% 
improvement which can be achieved through the application of robust operational settings i.e., by following the 6 steps in 
this new generalised approach.  In fact, over 330 protection settings were requiring improvements for a Tier 3 system 
investigated when it was subjected to this generalised approach. 
Example: Protection Scenario 22 (Before & After Reliability Improvements)  
Bus ID’s 
All Connected to HV 
String 1A  
(as above diagram) 
Predicted Annual Outage Durations for Connected Load Points, Expressed as (hrs/yr) 
 
‘Grading not achieved’.  
i.e., VCB A2 trips, not the DNO 
incomer. 
 
‘Healthy protection grading’  
i.e., The DNO feeder trips and 
limits removed Equipment. 
Increased outage from 
incorrect protection 
operation. 
LV BB DBH1  50 hrs/yr 5.908 hrs/yr 44.092 hrs/yr 
LV BB RED  50 hrs/yr 5.913 hrs/yr 44.087 hrs/yr 







6.4 Chapter Summary  
Chapter 6.1 provides a recommended range of protection device settings for all twenty-six operational 
scenarios investigated. Descriptions list Time Current Curves (TCC) and display improved time 
grading margins. The proposed (improved) protection settings comply with both the IEC International 
Standards and specific equipment manufactures recommendations, reducing the probability of 
protection grading issues during system faults thus improving system Operational Availability (Ao), 
and limiting predicted downtime of critical equipment.  Final protection device settings tables list the 
recommended 339 changes for the HV devices and 54 for the LV network, respectively. With Chapter 
6.1 also listing the associated improved reliability metrics after such protection changes are 
undertaken.  
 
Chapter 6.2 specifically details further protection setting advancements to improve and limit arc flash 
incident energy, simulated at each of the system switchgears under network fault scenarios. Such 
changes also ensure compliance with the IEEE 1584 in terms of limiting arc flash incident energy to 
an acceptable level, reducing Fault Clearing Times (FCT) and ultimately reducing the required 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) levels required to safely operate and maintain the switchgear – 
all of which support the successful Operational Availability (Ao) of equipment and infrastructure.  
 
Chapter 6.3 consists of a flowchart which details a new and improved approach ‘A Generalised 
Approach for Improving Operational Availability (Ao) of Data Centres’. This methodology provides a 
step-by-step detailed approach for assessing and improving the Ao of data centre electrical networks. 
The flowchart was constructed from the finding of this research programme and provides an 















Chapter 7 – Conclusions  
Chapter 7.1 consists of a re-evaluation of research methods, detailing why this research programme is 
important and what challenges its addresses. Listing the key aspects of the current field research, and 
which areas are suggested to affect the Operational Availability (Ao) of data centre electrical 
networks, and how the author’s research continues to build on these findings. Also, within this section 
a summary is provided for each of the power system studies undertaken in terms of what topologies, 
international standards and critical assessment methods were applied, and how these methods 
challenged the current Uptime Institute Tier Classification approach, which considers Inherent 
Availability (Ai) alone and not the operational factors. Chapter 7.1 details the findings of this research 
programme, which have been listed against each of the power system studies, with emphasis on 
highlighting weaknesses or issues within the original system and how these can ultimately affect the 
data centres Operational Availability (Ao). This Chapter also summarises the extensive modelling and 
simulation approach, over one hundred operational scenarios investigated in total, which has allowed 
a multitude of recommendations, all of which have been proven to positively impact the availability 
metrics of data centres and build on the current Uptime Institute Tier Classification approach. These 
findings have produced a new and improved approach to assessing Operational Availability (Ao) of 
the data centre electrical networks, which is presented as a step-by-step flowchart with essential 
criteria noted against each power system study type and coherent links to improving Operational 
Availability (Ao). 
 
Chapter 7.3 discusses why the author believes Operational Availability (Ao) is currently being 
overlooked in the design and operation of data centres, and why this is detrimental and costly for the 
data centre owners and success of their operations. The research significance is largely summarised 
into seven key sections based around each of the separate power system studies undertaken, although 
more importantly details how these link together and how this research programme had allowed 
formation of a new ‘Generalised Approach’ to achieving improved Operational Availability (Ao), 
which is an improvement on the current Uptime Institute Tier Classifications table, or designing and 
building data centres based on utilising Inherent Availability (Ai) metrics alone. Included within this 
research programme was publication of one UPEC research paper [3] and two IEEE industry 
application papers [1] and [2], along with collaboration with the Industrial Applications Society (IAS), 
or more specifically formation of a new ‘Data Centre Working Group’. Alongside challenges this 
Chapter finishes with an explanation of future works, and the recommendation which involves 
undertaking other power system studies, such as transient stability during no break transfers and 
assessment of CBEMA power quality, which were not included within this research objectives but 






As a summary this research programme included completion of an extensive investigation of mission 
critical electrical infrastructures, more specifically the data centre buildings owned by the Royal Bank 
of Scotland (RBS). The research programme required undertaking a range of power system studies of 
the actual RBS live sites, equipment, and connected loads. A holistic approach was undertaken 
sequentially studying each section of the electrical networks for load flow, short circuits, protection 
device co-ordination, Operational Availability (Ao), and arc flash mitigation. The findings from this 
work have provided a ‘Generalised approach to achieving improved Operational Availability (Ao) of 
data centre infrastructures’, this approach is an advancement on the current Uptime Institutes Tier 
Classification table and can be utilised for any data centre building.  
 
Background History  
Given data centre buildings have been referred to as the ‘Modern Industrial Revolution’ with an ever-
growing dependence on computing, this has driven a requirement for increased resilience and 
reliability of the data centres infrastructures, these data centre buildings underpin the success of such 
operations. Often loss of continuous data centre operation can lead to multimillion-pound financial 
penalties and loss of customer trust. For RBS their critical buildings are partnered with The Centre for 
Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) which have identified an outage of an RBS data centre or 
part of its operation will negatively impact the wider UK economy and services, highlighting just how 
important these data centre buildings are. 
 
Therefore, with this in mind i.e., such a significant demand for 100% uptime of equipment the 
question which soon arises from data centre operators is - what can we do to improve our reliability & 
resiliency? Or what do we need to investigate to make sure we achieve 100% Uptime of critical 
services? Unfortunately, although these are simple questions in principle there is certainly no simple 
answer. For an industry which is so critical to our economy you may be surprised there is currently 
limited technical standards available to guide building services engineers on how best to design, select 
and operate what is a vast range of complicated electrical equipment. 
 
Often data centres are power hungry and can consume as much as 80MW, hence the high demand for 
such a vast range of electrical equipment, such as; multiple high voltage grid connections, standby 
generators, battery storage, renewable technologies, synchronisers, power transformers, cabling, 
busbar, switchgear, circuit breakers, power factor correction, active filters, surge suppression, 
protection relay devices – to name few of many. Over and above the technical challenge of arranging 
these types of equipment in an optimal way the data centre leadership team also consider; Emergency 




the recovery duration of any system issues or more specifically the absolute Operational Availability 
(Ao). 
 
The current guidance within the data centre industry is largely driven by the Uptime Institute with few 
other organisations providing an alternative view. The Uptime Institute, in brief, provides a table of 
Tier Classification ratings which indicates the nominal operational philosophies and how reliable the 
vendors can expect each Tier rating to be in terms of site availability and annual downtime. However, 
there is little other valuable guidance to support this approach in terms of the effects of the electrical 
network, in practical terms. For example, in an operational system what happens to downtime or 
availability if protection grading is not effective? If short circuit currents are more than switchgear 
ratings? If optimal load flow is not achieved, if arc flash incidents are significant? If load types 
change or load rejections occur? – just to name a few typically scenarios which occur but appear to be 
overlooked in current industry guidance, standards, or Tier ratings specifically. After all its the goal of 
Operational Availability (Ao) for live systems which concerns the data centres owners, not merely the 
Inherent Availability (Ai) indicated at the design stages.  
 
However, there is research from Eaton, Schneider and ABB which identified the following six areas 
and stated they effect Ao. 
 
i. Protection Device Grading and Co-ordination. 
ii. Critical System Monitoring. 
iii. Surge Protection. 
iv. Wiring Methods. 
v. Earthing & Grounding and System Design.  
 
There are also more specific issues documented with areas of electrical protection co-ordination, dual 
fed power transformers, standby generator system protections, busbar and cabling designs in high 
voltage networks and operationally proving Tier 4 systems are Fault Tolerant (FT). Other 
documentation available is generally commercial driven (white papers) and focused on achieving Ai at 
the design stage which is not the most suitable practice for live systems and the operational 
engineering team.   
 
This research programme investigates and details further the ‘six areas’ of electrical systems in data 
centres i.e., the areas with a potential of negatively effecting Ao, highlighting how to achieve a robust 
holistic approach to drive out operational weaknesses and categories them in terms of increased 
outages or negative effects on the electrical networks – i.e., increasing the measurement of success 




The research was completed on the electrical networks for RBS with use of an electrical power 
software package ETAP. This software allowed the modelling of several system studies providing a 
holistic approach with respect to the electrical systems investigation. Studies carried out were load 
flow analysis then followed by short circuit analysis, protection device grading, arc flash mitigation 
and lastly load point reliability analysis. The below descriptions provide further simulation details, 
with the overall results and analysis allowing the formation of a new and improved methodology for 
improving data centre Operational Availability (Ao) 
 
Load flow analysis investigated operational equipment within the distribution network at both HV & 
LV voltage levels. Applied Newton Raphson calculation methods at all major busbars to highlight real 
and reactive power flows of the entire system, also providing the voltage security index and voltage 
deviation at each busbar. The electrical network model was studied in three modes of operation, as 
below. 
 
i. Normal operation with actual site connected loads.  
ii. Actual design loads stipulated in the design philosophy documentation, on site.  
iii. At emergency load values (design value plus 10%).  
 
Voltage drop of cable feeders and system busbar were crossed referenced to the industry standards, 
ANSI C84 and BS7671. Consideration was also given to the standby power sources capability curves, 
tap setting of primary transformers and Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) machines – with a desire 
to confirm the optimal configuration of the network before proceeding to short circuit analysis 
simulation.  
 
Short circuit current analysis investigated the networks with application of the IEC60909 & IEC61368 
international standards for short circuit values at all system busbar to establish the below parameters.   
 
i. Equipment strength and capabilities in terms of making, breaking and short time current 
withstand.  
ii. I2t protection for thermal ratings of equipment.  
iii. Maximum and minimum short circuit currents to enable effective protection device co-
ordination, and arc flash mitigation.  
iv. Phase sequence voltages and currents of unbalanced short circuits, for system protection 





Applying both the IEC60909 & IEC61368 standards to the model simulations the following current 
values were established which provided a detailed assessment of each system busbar to ensure its 
adequacy for the fault currents present.  
 
i. Initial sub-transient short circuit current (Ik’’) – Which is the Ia.c. r.m.s. value of 
symmetrical component of prospective current at the instant of short circuit. 
ii. Peak SC current (Ip) – Which is the maximum possible instantaneous value of the 
prospective short circuit current. 
iii. Symmetrical SC breaking current (Ib) – Which is the Ia.c rms value of symmetrical 
component of prospective current at the instant of the first pole open of a switch device. 
iv. Steady-State SC current (Ik) –Which is the rms value of short circuit current after 
transient decay. 
 
Alongside the system busbar other equipment were considered for fault tolerance. Such as, UPS & 
generator systems which provided significantly different fault current issues than when connected to a 
grid supply alone. The UPS were of a rotary construction which led to a unique model simulation 
block, ensuring transient elements of the synchronous machines were understood. Over forty 
operational scenarios were investigated ensuring the actual minimum and maximum values were 
established, these values are essential for specifying equipment ratings and the application of 
protection grading studies. Both of which can severely affect the Ao if found as incorrect or 
compromised.  
 
Protection device analysis investigated the safety, selectivity, and reliability of all the electrical 
network HV & LV protection devices, over twenty-six operational grading scenarios with various 
upstream and downstream device investigations. The protection devices were assessed in terms of 
current magnitude and time, in the form of Time Current Curves (TCC). Also, a range of Non-Time 
Current Curves (NTCC) investigations for unit protections. 
 
All the data centre specialist equipment such as the rotary UPS and standby generators were 
investigated, including a series of ETAP models created to allow the 113 protection devices and 
associated settings to be simulated under various operational modes and fault scenarios. Both phase 
and ground overcurrent settings along with Non-Time Current Curve (NTCC) protections such as 
restricted L-G, generator protection and SOLKAR pilot differential. Examples are detailed below. 
 
i. Transformer HV to LV grading discrimination, six scenarios investigated.  
ii. Assessment of HV faults during single DNO supply, five scenarios investigated.  




iv. Discrimination during islanded generator supplies, four scenarios investigated. 
v. Assessment of HV faults during synchronised supplies (DNO & synchronous generators), one 
scenario investigated. 
vi. Rotary UPS co-ordination with both upstream and downstream devices, plus bypass mode 
assessment.  
vii. Non time current curve (NTCC) protection investigated was G59, SOLKAR unit, restricted L-
G (REF), Generators ANSI 49RMS, 87M, 46, 32Q, 32P, 81L, 81H, 27, 59.  
 
All the above protection scenarios included assessment of pick-up currents, transformer damage 
curves, excitation limit curves, motor acceleration and curve co-ordination assessment.  
 
Arc flash analysis simulations proceeding short circuit current analysis and protection device grading. 
This is because the arc flash incident energy will have a direct correlation to the short circuit values 
and associated protection device settings. The model simulations were based on the IEEE1584, NFPA 
70E and OSHA 29 guidance, given there is currently no final UK standard. The goal of the model 
simulations is to obtain the incident energy at any given piece of switchgear, during the following 
three scenarios.  
 
i. HV & LV network connected to two grid feeders. 
ii. HV & LV network connected to one grid feeder. 
iii. HV & LV network in island generator mode.   
 
This incident energy is important for addressing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) requirements 
and applying warning notices to equipment. Also, if the incident energy values can be reduced 
damage during a fault can be significantly less and reduce downtime of critical data centre power 
equipment. Results were displayed in a TCC so the fault current, protection curve and arc flash 
incident energy can be assessed holistically. 
 
Load point reliability analysis is the most important and innovative study of the research, after all how 
can electrical issues encountered during load flow, short circuit or protection grading be expressed in 
a term or manner which reflects the key metrics of the data centre industry. Given the Uptime Institute 
provides design availability the operational issues with electrical equipment can also be assessed in a 
similar manner, allowing the data centre owner to fully understand the operational performance 
against the proposed design. This approach is a first, as far as the author is aware no current available 





Often data centre owners will invest tens of millions of pounds to increase the redundancy of 
equipment or improve the ‘Design Reliability’ without having an actual operational assessment or 
impact assessment matrix to support such an investment. A drive for a five 9’s (99.999% Availability) 
system will cost multi-millions of pounds and possibly provide no better Operational Availability (Ao) 
than what can be achieved from undertaking electrical network studies on a lower costing system. 
 
The key benefit of a Load Point Reliability (LPR) study is it allows a fault to be assessed in terms of 
increased downtime in average annual hours per year or load point failure rates.  Results from this 
study highlights just how severe operational issues can be in terms of possible increased outages 
rather than considering design values alone. Such design availability values form part of manufacture 
tests in engineering laboratories, not considering site connections as an actual data centre electrical 
network, the two scenarios are some ways apart. For this research programme, all critical loads were 
assessed for i) Load point average failure rate ii) Average annual outage duration iii) Annual 
unavailability. 
7.1 Contribution 
The below descriptions detail the findings of each simulation and a subsequent summary section to 
outline the research work in a holistic context i.e. How data centres can benefit from applying these 
investigations to their Electrical Networks with a section discussing the formation of a new 
‘Generalised Approach for improving Data Centre Operational Availability’.  
7.1.1 Flowchart for A Generalised Approach 
The Generalised Approach Flowchart consists of the complied results from this research programme 
and can be applied to any other data centre electrical network to improve its Operational Availability 
(Ao). In summary, the flowchart is a six stage, twenty-step detailed process for the simulation of data 
centre electrical networks, providing an in-depth explanation of how each simulation must be carried 
out, which international standards are applicable, and what criteria each simulation results must meet. 
This research programme has proven this approach is an improvement to the current Uptime Tier 
Classification and predicted downtime can be improved by as much as 50 hrs/yr., at each of the 
system critical load points. A brief explanation for each of the goals associated with the flowchart 
stages is as below.  
 
Stages 1: Consisting of an audit of the original system and electrical network design. Investigation 
into the operational literature, design philosophy and possible operational scenarios for the system. 
Also, outlining the details for modelling each of the critical equipment in singular format and how to 




of the singular model components into a complete electrical network i.e., one which represents the 
exact live system, which is then subject to further investigations. 
 
Stages 2:  Building a complete ‘Base Model’ is detailed in this section i.e., the construction of all the 
single model components to represent the actual live system. Providing guidance on the necessary 
ETAP simulation parameters and what international standards should be applied to the model 
simulations.  
 
Stages 3: Benchmarking the original system, this is a particularly important step. This stage details 
what is required to obtain the load point reliability data for each critical load point in the system, and 
how these values should be recorded. This data is subsequently cross referenced after improvements 
have been made to the base model i.e., providing a tangible before and after reliability metric.   
 
Stages 4: This is one of the larger flowchart stages and provides details for each of the power system 
simulations required for the data centre electrical network. Including which operational scenarios need 
to be investigated, which International Standards are applicable and what results need to be 
documented.  
 
Stages 5: Consists of an analysis of results against a ‘best practice set of parameters’, provides 
guidance as to where system improvements can be achieved before re-evaluation of complete network 
reliability performance. This stage will require an update to any base model with a new and improved 
set of operational configurations of equipment. The set of ’best practice guides’ were constructed 
from the discoveries of this research and listed in Appendix I. 
 
Stages 6: Re-evaluation of load point reliability, this is applicable to the new and improved network 
configuration following completion of the previous stages. Results can be compared to stage 3 i.e.; the 
electrical system improvements can be expressed in terms of how changes have positively impacted 
system Operational Availability (Ao).   
 
Combined these stages produce a robust flowchart which will continue to support the improvement of 
data centre Operational Availability (Ao) through application of optimising electrical networks, with 
this knowledge continuing to support the field and advancement of the current Uptime Tier 
Classification approach.  Operational scenarios investigated in the electrical network model 
simulations provided results which indicated annual downtimes were 40 times greater than those 
listed in the Uptime Institute’s Tier Classification table. Hence, the optimal way to provide high 
reliability in an electrical infrastructure is to investigate the operational configurations and equipment, 




reliability was far worse than the expectations listed in the Uptime tables, despite following the 
associated design criteria - thus questioning the practical value or limitation of its use.  
 
Such data centre electrical network investigations are to be carried out in significant detail and via the 
application of power system modelling software, such as ETAP. The author believes this approach 
was a first and proved to be more effective for highlighting operational issues, also leading to a 
significantly simplified electrical network and possible reduction in both operational and construction 
costs. ETAP allowed simulation of scenarios to be undertaken that are just not possible or viable to 
undertake on a ‘live’ data centre system, yet these simulations often underpin an understanding of the 
electrical network during normal operation, fault scenarios or major equipment issues. All of which 
are key to improving reliability and resiliency.  
 
Whilst the six areas of data centre electrical networks indicated by current research provided a 
substantiated starting point, it was established these six areas were somewhat randomised with little 
information detailing the links between each one of the six topics. An example is the electrical power 
system studies, which must be carried out in a sequential approach i.e., load flow, short circuit, 
protection device grading, arc flash, reliability assessment. This sequence of modelling is of 
paramount importance since each proceeding study has the potential to effect subsequent results. 
These findings are now proposed in a ‘Generalised Approach Flowchart’ which can be utilised to 
improve operational reliability of any data centre. 
 
During this research programme substantial issues were recorded in each simulation type, either in 
terms of potential effects on Ao or as non-compliance with current industry standards. The reliability 
study is most useful to understand the severity of electrical network issues. For example, failure of a 
protection device can be re-simulated in reliability mode, verifying the significance in the network in 
terms of increased outage times or MTTR. This was a novel approach and not investigated by current 
available research. Reliability data can also be expressed as a metric for success and understood by 
the data centre owners, which proves to be useful in a practical application. The stages and steps 
required to achieve this have also been included in a new generalised approach flowchart which is the 
author’s contribution to a continuation of improvements and knowledge to this field.  
 
Research investigations discovered issues that challenged the conventional methods of specifying data 
centre electrical systems, by utilising Uptime Tier philosophies and inherent design availabilities. In 
fact, the system designs with a higher Tier rating often led to significant operational issues due to the 
range and complexity of equipment and how these had been operationally configured. One could 
argue the more complex a design the more operational issues may occur, in terms of negatively 




Approach Flowchart in Chapter 6.3 of this report improves on the current approach and adds value to 
the data centre owners as simulation of their electrical networks by this approach will improve 
Operational Availability (Ao). The flowchart is inclusive of all operational factors, data, standards, 
and theoretical formula required to achieve such success. Key aspects investigated with the RBS 
buildings through application of new generalised approach flowchart: 
 
i. A Tier 4 system led to network peak fault currents that were in excessive of the installed 
switchgear rating. Therefore, a fault on the electrical system would extensively damage 
equipment beyond repair – effecting resiliency (MTTR). This is not considered in the Uptime 
Institutes guidance on data centre design. 
 
ii. Over 30 % of the operational scenarios modelled led to a negative result, in terms of a non-
compliance to either international standards or manufactures guidelines. These scenarios 
when modelled in reliability mode of the software which significantly increased the potential 
hrs/yr. downtime. Limited research is provided on the importance of operational 
investigations which supports this work being a first to approach.  
 
iii. Rotary UPS model simulations led to peak fault currents above the connected equipment 
ratings. This has a significant effect on critical power strings within the building’s 
infrastructure. No specific guidance is available on how to effectively model the transient 
contributions, this research provided an accurate and first solution with details on how to 
obtain these values which are critical for data centre rotary UPS systems. 
 
iv. Protection device grading and co-ordination displayed there is a significant issue given over 
30% of HV protection devices installed on site, whether this be a transformer, generator, grid 
feeder or interconnector were not set correctly and had the potential under fault to cause 
significant network outages. The LV devices were not as significant as the HV since only 
16% had been set incorrectly, although these can still cause issues it appears the complexity 
of HV networks are a more prominent issue, with respect to protection settings and providing 
optimal configurations.  
 
v. This research programme has allowed the author to provide a new ‘Generalised Approach for 
improving Data Centre Operational Reliability’. Which continues to improve the predicted 
outage times by as much as 50hrs/yr., at each critical system load point. This is a significant 
achievement in comparison to the utilisation of Uptimes Classification table which suggests a 
predicted outage time of just 1.6 hrs/yr. (Tier 3), which is just not the case when investigated 




practical application and or improvement of the operational system, which is the most 
important factor for the data centre owners.  
7.1.2 Load flow 
Issues encountered during load flow studies for the LV distribution switchgear, both red & yellow 
power strings encountered simulation alarms for low busbar voltage outside of the ANSI C84 optimal 
limits. This was the case for any busbar loads above 50% of nominal design value. Such low voltage 
limits at the intake switchgear, for a given power string, leads to a reduction in voltage drop 
allowances in the downstream network and is not a best design option. This issue encountered was 
due to LV cabling (BS5467 XLPE) utilised on the secondary side of the distribution transformer, 
given the remaining power strings in the electrical network utilised a busbar construction which 
provided an improved resistance to voltage drop and ensured limits were within ANSI C84, at any 
connected load value.  
 
Simulations undertaken for all available transformers tap settings (-5% to +5%), which found only 
two of the available five settings provided a busbar voltage within ANSI C84 limits, at connected 
loads above 50% of nominal design. The operational cost of the power transformers, with respect to 
energy consumption, can vary by £300k per annum - between the extreme settings of a transformers 
tap. A 2N system also requires adjustment of the transformer tap to ensure optimal busbar voltage. If a 
transformer is then dis-connected, for maintenance etc, the busbar voltage is too low and leads to 
simulation alarms. Thus, the N+1 type supply configuration lends to the most appropriate solution for 
load flow and busbar voltage. 
 
In summary, load flow studies highlighted the requirement for changes to sixteen power transformers 
tap settings and two from six of the main power strings did not have an equipment designs which 
could comply to the ANSI C84 limits, for any load above 50% of the associated design capacity.  
7.1.3 Short Circuit Analysis 
Over 35 operational scenarios were simulated with ETAP for both the HV & LV electrical networks, 
this included both operational configurations for grid feeders and standby generator supplies. The 
associated key challenges are: 
 
i. Constant power loads within the network increased associated busbar fault currents by 
14.28KA in comparison to constant impedance types, thus must be factored at the design 
stages to ensure switchgear ratings are adequate.  
ii. Given the varied options of standby power supplies and grid connections fault currents within 




challenge in terms of protection device settings and clearing network faults in a coordinated 
manner.  
iii. Network distribution transformers were solidly grounded which led to L-G currents in-line 
with L-L-L faults, not as the typical IEC60909 guidance of 0.85 P.u of L-G values. Also 
connecting distribution transformers in a 2N paralleled method to the main busbar led to fault 
currents more than the site’s switchgear ratings.  
iv. Transient contribution of the rotary UPS increased peak busbar fault current (𝐼𝑝) by 25KA, 
which led to a value above the switchgear rating. The UPS also have mains pathways 1&2, 
pathway 2 contributes to an input busbar fault i.e., the fault contribution is bi-directional and 
must be considered in the studies. Typical model blocks in ETAP software do not allow for 
the transient effects, hence a custom-built model block consisting of a synchronous motor 
with negative power factor provided a first and an accurate representation required to confirm 
adequacy of switchgear rating.  
 
In summary, the above points discovered each led to a comprised electrical network given the original 
equipment were not designed or operational configured to mitigate these issues. Findings were in-line 
with current research in terms of the potential effect to Operational Availability (Ao). The more 
specific challenges being the HV network fault current variations and transient effect from rotary 
UPS, both of which are discussed further in the protection device grading and arc flash sections 
below. 
7.1.4 Protection Device Grading 
Protection device grading issues encountered for this electrical network were arguable the most severe 
of all the network studies investigated (i.e., load flow, short circuit, protection grading and arc flash 
etc), in terms of magnitude and quantities. The Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) following operation of 
a protective device can be significant, up to 50 hours, thus optimal protection settings must be 
obtained. Likewise, if high Operational Availability (Ao) is a priority goal for data centres, all 
network faults must be removed with minimal impact. The findings highlighted over twenty-six 
simulation issues which are: 
 
I. Distribution transformer protection relay pick up currents were set more than 200% of the 
transformer current rating, which is not in-line with the IEC standards or manufacturers 
recommendations. It was also discovered in TCC’s high pick-up values were present - above 
the transformers frequent damage point. The transformer L-G settings were also found as low 






II. Each main LV intake switchgear was connected to two primary transformers, in an N+1 
configuration. Whilst the transformer characteristics were identical settings from protection 
unit to unit varied significantly. This approach did not provide optimal settings for grading 
and co-ordination.  
 
III. Time delay (Td) settings on distribution transformers, in several cases, were found more than 
two seconds which led to failed HV & LV co-ordination, tripping relay indication and further 
complication with clearing arc flash incident energy. During a network fault this would 
provide substantial issues to the network with increased service outages and MTTR.   
 
IV. The UPS output Air Circuit Breaker (ACB) protection settings were more than 200% of the 
nominal current ratings, therefore not compliant to the manufactures recommendations and 
may significantly damage the machine under overload conditions.  
 
V. A significant number of the Air Circuit Breakers (ACB) low voltage protection devices had no 
Short Time (ST) settings applied which led to significant arc fault current clearance issues, 
problematic for site engineering maintenance and specifying safety equipment. Also, such arc 
currents during an actual fault would damage the switchgear beyond economical repair, 
leading to significant outage of critical services. 
 
VI. High voltage ring-main circuit breakers failed protection co-ordination for several possible 
faults, settings investigated during a site fault disconnected many distribution transformers 
not relating to the actual fault. Definite Time (DT) settings on VCB A and VCB B created 
significant issues for the GEC busbar. 
 
VII. Ground Fault (GF) settings on the main GEC busbar were more than the actual L-G currents 
present in the network, rendering the setting completely ineffective. This also led to issues 
with the main site feeders and grid incomers during an L-G fault on the DNO network.  
 
VIII. Grading margins between circuit feeders and standby generators were found less than 100ms. 
It was also noted the five generators had a range of different settings although units are 
identical. Issues encountered with generator protection settings: 
 
i) EF setting 50N/51N is below the 15% Io sum, as outlined by IEC standards.  
ii) EF IDMT settings not in-line with IEC, 10% of neutral earth resistor (NER). 
iii) No protection settings for generator phase imbalance as recommended by IEC 




iv) Under frequency and over frequency not in-line with G59 guidelines.  
v) Under voltage and over voltage settings varied between generator protection units, 
despite being identical units. 
 
IX. SOLKAR pilot differential protection scheme on the HV ring main interconnectors achieved 
less than 25ms time grading margin against upstream/downstream devices.  
 
X. UPS input circuit breakers had no L-G protection settings thus relied on overcurrent values, 
which causes co-ordination issues for a fault between the UPS input and main transformer 
incomer circuit breakers.  
 
XI. UPS power strings, in bypass mode achieved no L-G discrimination between outgoing Power 
Distribution Units (PDU’s) and the main incoming bypass circuit breaker. Thus, a fault will 
disconnect the UPS outputs busbar rather than a single PDU.  
 
In summary, from 1136 HV protection settings investigated a recommended 339 are to be changed. 
Likewise, for the LV out of 337 protection settings 54 changes are required. This equates to 18% of 
the investigated HV systems and 3% of the LV, therefore it could be argued the HV system is more of 
a significant issue, in comparison to the LV system in this data centre investigation.  
7.1.5 Arc Flash 
Arc flash studies included all the data centres electrical networks HV & LV switchgear under the 
following three operational scenarios: 
 
i. Electrical network supplied by two DNO supplies in parallel.  
ii. Electrical network supplied by a single DNO feeder. 
iii. Electrical network supplied by standby generators.  
 
IEEE 1584 & National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) standards were applied to all arc flash 
simulation models, given the UK have no specific legislation available at present. The following 
quantities were established at every system busbar or Switchgear. 
 
i. Total Incident Energy (Ie) of the arc fault. 
ii. Recommended safe arc flash boundary distance whilst carrying out service activities, for 
safety of maintenance personnel etc. 
iii. Required PPE ratings for a Safe System of Work (SSOW). 




It is important to note the NFPA recommend use of PPE at levels up to and including 40 cal/cm2, with 
specific guidance for values more than this to be reduced with other measures rather than PPE. The 
electrical network studied in this research programme had significant issues with arc flash given 33 
from 69 scenarios tested led to values above the NFPA recommendations. A significant problem given 
the site switchgear relies on maintenance activities to support 100% uptime of critical services.  Its 
paramount maintenance work can be safely undertaken – at present this cannot be true for 30% of the 
installed switchgear. Also, such significant arc fault values and clearing times following a fault would 
lead to significant equipment outage and extended MTTR due to extensive plasma and damages from 
the arc currents.  
 
It was discovered for this electrical network it was possible to reduce arc faults for all system busbar 
with exception to eight LV protection devices. The IDMT curves on both HV & LV protection lends 
to improved settings in terms of arc flash reduction when compared with the nominal LT/ST/INST of 
a typical LV Air Circuit Breakers (ACB’s). This is shown in the results Chapter 5 where IDMT 
achieve level C and ACB’s level F. 
7.1.6 Load Point Reliability 
To recap the main purpose of load point reliability studies is to discover additional downtime of 
critical services due to the issues found during the electrical system or protection device grading 
analysis. This analysis of load point reliability provides a value of downtime expressed as hrs/yr. and 
can be a utilised as a metric or measurement for success i.e., the less this value the more a data centre 
electrical network is available for its required operations. 
 
For example, take a protection issue and simulate this in load point reliability before and after a 
technical solution is established, the two values can be compared with the goal to reduce the 
downtime metric (hrs/yr.). This is a great way to provide a transferable terminology to express 
technical operational issues in an electrical network for the data centre owners.  
 
This research programme was a first to discover and express that protection grading issues can 
increase the data centre annual downtime by as much as 45 hrs/yr. (for a single protection grading 
issue), with total simulated for this network equating to over 4000 hrs/yr. This is a significant figure 
when compared with the Uptime Institute Tier Classification table, which outlines only minutes of 
predicted outage between Tier design options. Therefore, its critical an Operational Assessment (Ao) 
is undertaken. An example of one ETAP scenario in this project is DBA1 where the reliability figure 
for a healthy N+1 network is 1.279 hrs/yr. and then 50 hrs/yr. following protection trip due to grading 
mis-coordination. Thus, in this case a protection issue has the potential to increase downtime by 44.84 




critical spares, and trained engineering operatives – all further supporting the requirement for 
operational assessment if the data centre owners want to improve reliability of their electrical 
network. 
 
Obviously, these conclusions are drawn from this project, but the importance is that this final 
approach can be utilised by any other data centre building, which is detailed in the generalised 
approach for improving operational availability of data centres section. 
7.2 Challenges  
The data centre industry is largely driven by information technology businesses with most industry 
standards and working groups targeting the advancement of cloud computing, edge computing and 
supporting the drive for an Internet of Things (IoT). Technology industry leaders have evidenced new 
technology over the last decade has led to a vast growth in demand for data centre buildings. As such 
these mission critical data centre buildings aim to provide an effective environment for technology 
equipment and are often significant in scale, requiring a vast range of complex equipment which a 
high-power demand and operational cost. In real terms the investment and operational cost of 
engineering equipment can often appear to be a small portion of the overall cost of ownership of the 
data centre, and the technology business partners have therefore often demanded high reliability and 
resilient infrastructures for their operations.  This has led to an approach where the ‘gold standard’ is a 
drive to achieve an Uptime Tier 4 data centre, as outlined by Uptime Institute a Tier 4 standard 
requires a range of complex equipment and system redundancy to achieve Inherent Availability (Ai) 
design figures. This is likely to cost the data centre owners tens of millions of pounds to achieve, in 
both capital investments and subsequent operational cost. 
 
Whilst it is true, in general terms, electrical equipment with high design reliability statistics are the 
most desirable in the mission critical environments, operational scenarios or more specifically 
Operational Availability (Ao) is considerably overlooked. Compared with the more established areas 
of electrical engineering there is limited research available that provides reports and data on such data 
centre operational assessments. From the author’s searches and reviews it appears  Eaton, ABB, 
Schneider Electric and Microsoft are most of the technical engineering companies that are completing 
elements of published research on this topic, these publications have too found from facility audits 
that the high inherent availability designs may not practically achieve the goals of the data centre 
building. Eaton’s research highlighted a generalised six areas of electrical engineering which were 
found to be a common issue in the data centre environments, in terms of negatively effecting 





This research programme has continued to build on these areas, with specific investigation of an 
actual data centre building, utilising advanced ETAP simulation software and being first to challenge 
the Uptime Tier designs and providing a substantiated, structured, and detailed assessment of why 
operational scenarios should be of greater concern. Also, this research continues to drive these six 
areas of the electrical systems, in depth of technical research and expressing availability metrics 
which can be understood by the system owners. Ultimately, the findings have produced a 
‘Generalised Approach for improving Data Centre Operational Reliability’, which is proven to better 
the current approach and can be utilised by any other Data Centre system. The flowchart can also be 
utilised in tandem with the Uptime Institutes Tier Classification table, as evidence in this research 
programme.  
7.3 Significance & Limitations 
The author believes this research programme is a first to utilise ETAP for improving Operational 
Availability (Ao), resiliency and redundancy of electrical infrastructures in data centres, via the 
application of power system modelling and simulation. At present the approach utilised for data centre 
environments is to specify Tier ratings on design availability figures (Inherent Availability Ai), which 
has been proven to be ineffective when practically configuring the electrical network for optimal 
performance or reducing the cost of ownership and complexity of designs. The author’s research 
findings have allowed the construction of a ‘Generalised Approach for improving Data Centre 
Operational Reliability’ which can significantly improve the predicted Operational Availability (Ao) 
of these infrastructures and can be utilised by any other data centre wanting to simulate its electrical 
network and improve the critical load point Operational Availability (Ai) within the complete system.  
 
List of contributions  
 
i. The research programme findings provided a new ‘Generalised Approach for improving Data 
Centre Operational Reliability’ which can be utilised by any other data centre building, for 
simulation of their electrical networks and achieving tangible improvements to Operational 
Availability (Ao). Up to 50 hrs/yr. reduction of downtime can be achieved with this approach.  
 
ii. Evidenced that operational assessments of data centre electrical networks are critical to assess 
the potential downtime of the system, which provided a significantly improved approach in 
comparison to utilising the current inherent availability metrics provided by the Uptime 






iii. Outlined the importance and value of a holistic approach when investigating the electrical 
network, i.e., given each preceding model simulation can affect subsequent results. To obtain 
an optimal configuration all aspects of the system should be investigated, which is not 
detailed in the current approach. These stages have been extensively detailed in the new 
flowchart i.e. A Generalised Approach for improving Data Centre Operational Availability 
(Ai), where checkpoints list several conditions for installed equipment, these conditions will 
lead to improved system availability.  
 
iv. Evidenced arrangements for high voltage protection devices and arc flash mitigation at the 
low voltage switchgear can have the most significant potential to increase outage times during 
network faults. This was not previously available in the current research work or Uptime 
Institutes Tier Classification approach.  
 
v. Highlighted many of the data centre guidelines are becoming legacy, for instance the CBEMA 
power quality guide, which is still utilised as a current approach in industry, despite growth of 
IT equipment and associated changes since its construction in 2000. Therefore, the author has 
recommended future works for CBEMA power quality investigations.  
 
vi. This research also led to the publication of two IEEE papers via the Industry Application 
Society (IAS) who have also indicated a requirement for further research in the field, and 
recently formed a new Data Centre Working Group (DCWG) i.e., this work is timely, topical, 
and beneficial to the data centre engineering community. The IET are also planning to release 
a first edition  Data Centre Power system guide in 2021. 
 
Given this research programme was a first to utilise ETAP for data centre electrical network studies, 
the author believes there is no such similar research to support or cross reference the findings. The 
research was carried out via funding support from the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and as such 
investigations were based on their critical buildings. It could be argued this itself is a limitation and 
the programme could be built upon, i.e., via investigation of other critical buildings outside of the RBS 
portfolio – either data centres or other such critical facilities. Building types such as hospitals, air 
traffic control stations, and the ministry of defence buildings etc. These buildings may also have 
similar issues within their critical electrical infrastructures. At present the identified research is largely 
produced by Microsoft, Eaton, ABB, and Schneider Electric, who are also working within this area. 
Any subsequent research publications will continue to support progress in the field. Particularly the 




7.4 Future Work 
Analysis not covered in this research programme includes transient simulation. This could be 
investigated in ETAP or PSCAD simulations for standby generators and UPS, given both pieces of 
equipment have a potential to encounter transient stability issues due to the network load demands. 
Scenarios could include no-break and break transfer operations and connection or removal of system 
generators and UPS, under varying load scenarios i.e., in-line with system design criteria.  
 
Operation of the generator alternator must also adhere to the governor and exciter classifications in 
terms of the required network voltage and frequency tolerances. This would provide a valuable in-site 
into standby power system behaviour which is also pivotal to the uptime of a data centre. The Energy 
Networks Association (ENA) G59 guidance has also been revised in 2019 to the G99 which should 
also be investigated further. Likewise, the CBEMA curve outlining power quality standards was last 
revised in 2000, with such a significant growth and range of new equipment an assessment of these 
guidelines could provide valuable future improvement of knowledge.  
 
The author is currently collaborating with the IEEE Industrial Application Society Data Centre 
Working Group, to drive technical engagement and publications for the data centre environments. 
Also, holding the position of joint chair for the subcommittee reliability & uptime, which has a 
coherent goal to focus on the following four areas of data centre engineering. 
 
i. Power Quality. 
ii. Reliability & Uptime. 
iii. Power Sources.  
iv. Design & Maintenance.  
 
A longer-term drive is to create an IEEE Data Centre Engineering Chapter, working towards 
subsequent technical standards in the industry covering some of the potential operational gaps, as 
those areas approached and discussed in this thesis. The author believes this is a continuation to 
support the industry’s engineers to drive operational improvements with what are some of the most 
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I. ETAP single model simulations and theoretical calculations completed in-line with T. Davies 
Protection of Industrial Power Systems.  
II. Protection settings table relating to Chapter 5– Original ‘as installed’ site setting.  
III. Protection settings table relating to Chapter 6.1 – Optimising for grading co-ordination and 
Ao. 
IV. Protection settings table relating to Chapter 6.2 – Optimising for arc flash mitigation.  
V. List of optimal conditions for reach of the power systems studies, which were utilised to form 
the generalised approach flowchart for improving Operational Availability (Ao) of data centre 



























I Individual simulation models with theoretical calculations and cross reference to the 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) 
 
DNO Grid Source Feeder Model  
 
Data by DNO enquiry 
3-phase system 
Swing operation 
Vn = 11KVL-L rms 
 
Verification by calculation (as single component of no-load busbar L-L-L and L-G fault current rms): 
L-L-L 
 I  =
 
√   
= 𝟑𝟎𝟒𝟒. 𝟐𝟏𝐀 
Zf =  =  
.  
= 2.086Ω   (or 1.72 P.u on 100MVA base) 
 
L-G 
I   =
.  
√    
= 998.32A 
 
Simulation results for IEC 60909 L-L-L fault current (rms) 
If = 𝟑. 𝟎𝟒𝟒𝐊𝐀   
Z P.u = 1.7 
 
OEM CALC SIM 
3.04KA 3.044KA 3.044KA 
Accepatble model simulation tolerance  
 
Where; 
SC = Short Circuit, Vn = Nominal Voltage L-L rms, If = Simulation Fault Current rms, Zf = Fault Impedance, 
Isc = Symetrical short current current rms. 
GRID FEEDER  
 
Conversion to a P.u system on a  100MVA base is as 
follows: 
 
Zpu =    
Z%
100
















Short circuit current values (rms). 
L-L-L  = 58MVA L-L-L  𝐼 = 3040A 







Verification by calculation 
MVA (fault level) =  
2.5
0.0741
= 33.72 MVA 












 x (1770) = 𝟒𝟔. 𝟗𝟏𝐊𝐀  
 
Simulation result: 
IEC60909 peak current calulations  
I    = 35.01 x √2 
I    = 49.51KA 
With C-Factor correction for Voltage variation as IEC6090 1.05, for system less than 1001V rms. 
I   = 49.51/1.05 = 47.15 KA  
OEM CALC SIM 
46.13KA 46.91KA 47.15KA 
Accepatble model simulation tolerance  
Where; 
FLC = Full Load Current, Vp = Primary Voltage, Vs = Secondary Voltage, Ip = Current Primary rms , Is = 






IEC Liquid filled ONAN 65oC 
2.5MVA Dyn11 (-30o shift) 
Nominal Voltages = 11/0.433KV 
FLC = 131.2/3333A 
Z = 7.41% 
X/R = 6 
Tap = -5 (0.415KV) 
Grounding = TN-C-S, Solidly grounded 
Current Inrush = 8 𝐼  







SYNCHRONOUS GENERATOR  
 
Un = 11KV   
MVA = 1.8    %PF = 80 
6 poles 
Swing operation 
Grounding = Resistor 42.33Ω or 150A when Vn = 
6.351KV 
Sub Transient Impedance Xd’’ = 0.105 P.u 
Transient Impedance Xd’ = 0.2 P.u 
Synchronous Impedance Xd = 1.36 P.u 
Sub Transient Time Constant Tdo’’ = 0.03 s 
Transient Time Constant Tdo’ = 5.25 s 
Exciter type = Salient Pole 
Governor type = droop @ 5% 
Verification by calculation 
Note: I is the P.u value of 1 at rated MVA, given Cos(θ) is load PF, Assuming EMF = V. 
0.8PF Rating (36.87θ) | Cos (36.87θ) = 0.8 | Sin (36.87θ) = 0.6 
Equations: 
E = [ 1 + Xd I Sin(θ) + Xd I Cos(θ)  ] /  
E = [ 1 + Xd I Sin(θ) + Xd I Cos(θ)  ] /  
E = [ 1 + Xd I Sin(θ) + Xd I Cos(θ)  ] /  
Currents under open time constants, where full load current FLC = 118.1A: 
I =  
1.066
0.105 
= 10.15 x FLC = 𝟏𝟏𝟗𝟖. 𝟕𝟏𝟓𝐀 
I =  
1.131
0.2 
= 5.65 x FLC = 676.265A 
I =  
2.117
1.36
= 1.56 x FLC = 183.84 A 
During short circuit time constants equations: 
Td =  
Xd
Xd





I = 1198.72A         Td =  
0.105
0.2
x 0.03 = 0.016s 
I =   667.265A        Td =  
0.2
1.36
 x 5.25 = 0.772s 
Given the time required to decrease to a transient value is 0.03s the following becomes the characteristic curve: 
I =  5.65 x FLC = 676.265A 
I = 1.56 x FLC = 183.84 A 
Hence decay period is 676.265 – 183.84 = 483.42A 
When t = 0s current is 1198.715A 
When t = 0.1s  
E = [ (1 + 0.105 x 0.6) + (0.105 x 0.8)  ] /  = 1.066 
E = [ (1 + 0.2 x 0.6) + (0.2 x 0.8)  ] / = 1.131 
E = [ (1 +  1.36 x 0.6) + (1.36 x  0.8)  ] /  = 2.117 
 







𝑖 = 483.42 𝑒
.
. + 183.84 
𝑖 = 608.53𝐴 
Example decay for given time constant (t): 
𝑡 (𝑠) 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Infinity 
𝑖 (𝐴) 608 556.9 471.8 406 355 183.84 
 
Simulation result: 




Accepatble model simulation tolerance  
 
Where; 





























Rating = 625KVA, 0.5MW   PF = 0.8 
Input/Output Voltage Nominal = 0.415KV 
FLC = 1225A 
SC contribution = 1400% or 12173A 
Grounding = TN-C 
 
Synchronous M/G element 
Rating = 625KVA, 0.5MW   PF = -0.8 
Direct axis: 
Sub Transient Impedance Xd’’ = 0.077 P.u 
Transient Impedance Xd’ = 0.179 P.u 
Synchronous Impedance Xd = 1.039 P.u 
Sub Transient Time Constant Td’’ = 0.29 s 
Transient Time Constant Td’ = 2.06 s 
 
Note: @0.8PF Rating (36.87θ) | Cos (36.87θ) = 0.8 | 
Sin (36.87θ) = 0.6 
 
Verification by calculation 
E = [ 1 + Xd I Sin(θ) + Xd I Cos(θ)  ] .  
E = [ 1 + Xd I Sin(θ) + Xd I Cos(θ)  ] .  
E = [ 1 + Xd I Sin(θ) + Xd I Cos(θ)  ] .  
Currents under open time constants, where full load current FLC = 931.2A: 
I =  
1.048
0.077 
= 13.61 x FLC = 𝟏𝟐𝟔𝟕𝟑. 𝟔𝟒𝐀 
I =  
1.117
0.179
= 6.24 x FLC = 5810.69A 
I =  
1.824
1.039
= 1.76 x FLC = 1634.76A 









I = 12673.64A         Td =  
0.077
0.179
x 0.29 = 0.125s 
I =   5810.69A        Td =  
0.179
1.039
 x 2.06 = 0.35s 
Given the time required to decrease to a transient value is 0.29s the following becomes the characteristic 
curve: 
I =  6.24 x FLC = 5810.69A 
I = 1.76 x FLC = 1634.76 A 
Hence decay period is 5810.69 – 1634.76 = 4175.93A 
E = [ (1 + 0.077 x 0.6) + (0.077 x 0.8)  ] .  = 1.048 
E = [ (1 + 0.179 x 0.6) + (0.179 x 0.8)  ] . = 1.117 
E = [ (1 +  1.039x 0.6) + (1.039  x 0.8)  ] .  = 1.824 
 







When t = 0s current is 12673.64A 
When t = 0.1s  
𝑖 = 4175.93 𝑒
.
. + 1634.76 
𝑖 = 4772.85𝐴 
Example decay for given time constant (t): 
𝑡 (𝑠) 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.8 Infinity 
𝑖 (𝐴) 4472 3992 2996 2059 1634.76 
 
Simulation result: 
If = 12609A 
 
CALC OEM SIM 
12673.64A 12173A 12609A 
Accepatble model simulation tolerance  
 
Where; 































BS6622 11KV/50Hz XLPE 3C 240MM2 
PVC Thickness = 3.4mm Diameter = 17.84mm 
(both ±15%) 
 
Verification by calculation 
𝐿 = 0.46 log   𝜇𝐻/𝑚  
d= distance between conductors 
Re= conductor geometric mean radius  
L = Inductance (Henry) 
 
Where equivalent radius (Re): 




= 8.74𝑚𝑚  
Re = 0.78x8.74 = 6.81mm 
 
Utilising worse case for insulation as 3.4mm plus 15% to solve d. 
𝑑 = (1.15𝑥8.74)2 + 3.65 = 23.752𝑚𝑚 
 
Therefore: 
𝐿 = 0.46 log
.
.
 = 0.25 𝜇𝐻/𝑚  
Inductive reactance at 50 Hz 
𝑋𝐿 = 2𝜋𝐹𝐿 = 100𝜋. 0.25 = 78.53 𝜇Ω/𝑚 
 
Convert to P.u: 
Calculated X P. u =  
10MVA
11KV
  x 78.53   
μΩ
m
  = 0.0714 P. u  
 
Simulated X P. u =  
10MVA
11KV
  x 85.58   
μΩ
m
  = 0.077 P. u  
 
CALC SIM 
0.0714 P.u 0.077 P.u 













II Complete Protection Settings Table relating to Chapter 5.5, Load Point Reliability Assessments.  
 
HV Relay ID 
CT Ratio 
(A) 
Tap Setting (Pickup)  Time Dial  Instantaneous Setting 
Observations  
  Range (x CT rating) Setting Primary (A) Range (s) 
Setting 
(s) Range (x CT rating) Settings 
Primary 
(A) 
T10 LV IDMT 3500:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.5 5250 0.05-1 0.15         
T10 LV IDMT 3500:5 0.05 - 2.4   0.8 2800 0.05-1 0.2         
T9 LV IDMT 3500:5 0.05 - 2.4   0.35 1225 0.05-1 0.15         
T9 LV IDMT 3500:5 0.05 - 2.4   0.8 2800 0.05-1 0.2         
T3 LV IDMT 1600:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3         
T3 LV IDMT 1600:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3         
T4 LV IDMT 1600:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3         
T4 LV IDMT 1600:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3         
T8 LV IDMT 1600:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3       Pick up at 2400A, maximum BB FLC is 2000A 
T8 LV IDMT 1600:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3         
T7 LV IDMT 1600:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3       Pick up at 2400A, maximum BB FLC is 2000A 
T7 LV IDMT 1600:5 0.05 - 2.4  1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3         
T6 LV IDMT 3500:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.5 5425 0.05-1 0.3       Pick up at 5250A, maximum BB FLC is 4000A 
T6 LV IDMT 3500:5 0.05 - 2.4  1.5 5250 0.05-1 0.3         
T5 LV IDMT 3500:5 0.05 - 2.4  1.5 5250 0.05-1 0.3       Pick up at 5250A, maximum BB FLC is 4000A 
T5 LV IDMT 3500:5 0.05 - 2.4  1.5 5250 0.05-1 0.3         
T12 SEPAM 150:5 0.5 - 2.4  1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.5 - 24   12 1800 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device 
Pick up more than 200% of FLC capacity  
T12 SEPAM 150:5 0.01 - 1  0.2 30 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.01 - 15   3 450   
T14 SEPAM 150:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.5 - 24   12 1800 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device 
Pick up more than 200% of FLC capacity 
T14 SEPAM 150:5 0.01 - 1   0.2 30 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.01 - 15   3 450   
T16 SEPAM 150:5 0.5 - 2.4  1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.5 - 24   12 1800 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device 
Pick up more than 200% of FLC capacity 
T16 SEPAM 150:5 0.01 - 1   0.2 30 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.01 - 15   3 450   
T1 SEPAM 150:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.75 262.5 0.1-12.5 0.93 0.5 - 24   8 1200 
Faults exceed transformer damage point at current 
protection settings 












Tap Setting (Pickup) 
 




 Range (x CT rating) Setting Primary (A) Range (s) 
Setting 
(s) Range (x CT rating) Settings 
Primary 
(A) 
T1 SEPAM 150:5           0.01 - 15   0.02 3 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device, time delay of 
0.59s not required 
GF setting is too low at 3A, increasing chance of 
spurious trip on energisation 
T3 SEPAM 75:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.75 131.25 0.1-12.5 0.89 0.5 - 24   8 600 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device 
Pick up more than 200% of FLC capacity  
T3 SEPAM 75:5           0.01 - 15   0.02 1.5   
T5 SEPAM 150:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.75 262.5 0.1-12.5 0.59 0.5 - 24   8 1200 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device 
Pick up more than 200% of FLC capacity 
T5 SEPAM 150:5           0.01 - 15   0.02 3   
T7 SEPAM 75:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.75 131.25 0.1-12.5 0.74 0.5 - 24   8 600 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device 
Pick up more than 200% of FLC capacity 
T7 SEPAM 75:5           0.01 - 15   0.02 1.5 GF setting @ 1.5A is too low 
T9 SEPAM 150:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.25 187.5 0.1-12.5 0.74 0.5 - 24   9 1350 
Faults exceed transformer damage point at current 
protection settings 
Pick up more than 150% FLC capacity 
T9 SEPAM 150:5           0.01 - 15   0.02 3 GF setting is too low at 3A 
T2 SEPAM 150:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.75 262.5 0.1-12.5 0.59 0.5 - 24   8 1200 
Faults exceed transformer damage point at current 
protection settings 
Pick up more than 200% of FLC capacity 
T2 SEPAM 150:5           0.01 - 15   0.02 3 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device, time delay of 
0.59s not required 
GF setting is too low at 3A 
T4 SEPAM 75:5 0.5 - 2.4  1.75 131.25 0.1-12.5 0.74 0.5 - 24   8 600 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device 
Pick up more than 200% of FLC capacity 
T4 SEPAM 75:5           0.01 - 15   0.02 1.5   
T6 SEPAM 150:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.75 262.5 0.1-12.5 0.59 0.5 - 24  8 1200 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device 
Pick up more than 200% of FLC capacity 
T6 SEPAM 150:5           0.01 - 15   0.02 3   
T8 SEPAM 75:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.75 131.25 0.1-12.5 0.74 0.5 - 24   8 600 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device 









Tap Setting (Pickup) Time Dial  Instantaneous Setting 
Observations 
 Range (x CT rating) Setting Primary (A) Range (s) 
Setting 
(s) Range (x CT rating) Settings 
Primary 
(A) 
T8 SEPAM 75:5           0.01 - 15   0.020 1.5 GF setting @ 1.5A is too low 
T10 SEPAM 150:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.44 0.5 - 24   9 1350 
Exceeds transformer damage point 
Pick up more than 150% FLC capacity 
T10 SEPAM 150:5           0.01 - 15   0.02 3 GF setting is too low at 3A 
T15 SEPAM 150:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.5 - 24   12 1800 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device 
Pick up more than 200% of FLC capacity 
T15 SEPAM 150:5 0.01 - 1   0.2 30 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.01 - 15   3 450   
T13 SEPAM 150:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.5 - 24   12 1800 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device 
Pick up more than 200% of FLC capacity 
T13 SEPAM 150:5 0.01 - 1   0.2 30 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.01 - 15   3 450   
T11 SEPAM 150:5 0.5 - 2.4   1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.5 - 24   12 1800 
Failed co-ordination with LV side device 
Pick up more than 200% of FLC capacity 
T11 SEPAM 150:5 0.01 - 1   0.2 30 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.01 - 15   3 450   
A2 SEPAM 400:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.5 600 0.1-12.5 0.3         
A2 SEPAM 400:5 0.01 - 1  0.1 40 0.1-12.5 0.12       
GF setting does not co-ordinate with VCB 'C' thus GEC 
BB fault will lose all connected busbar loads, not 50% as 
achievable etc. 
Whilst in parallel with grid connection VCB A2 would 
operate prior to DNO incomer for supply side cable fault 
thus loose Energy centre BB loads. 
A SEPAM 400:5 0.05 - 24   1.75 700 0.05-300 0.3       DT settings does not grade with VCB A2/B2, or VCB C. 
A SEPAM 400:5 0.01 - 15   0.31 124 0.05-300 0.6         
B SEPAM 400:5 0.05 - 24   1.75 700 0.05-300 0.30       DT settings does not grade with VCB A2/B2, or VCB C. 
B SEPAM 400:5 0.01 - 15   0.31 124 0.05-300 0.6         
B2 SEPAM 400:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.5 600 0.1-12.5 0.3       
GF setting does not co-ordinate with VCB 'C' thus GEC 
BB fault will lose all connected busbar loads, not 50% as 
achievable etc. 
Whilst in parallel with grid connection VCB B2 would 
operate prior to DNO incomer for supply side cable fault 
thus loose Energy centre BB loads. 
B2 SEPAM 400:5 0.01 - 1   0.1 40 0.1-12.5 0.12       
GF setting does not co-ordinate with VCB 'C' thus GEC 



























      
Does not grade for O/C with DNO incomer. Trips at grid 










Tap Setting (Pickup) Time Dial  Instantaneous Setting 
Observations 
 Range (x CT rating) Setting Primary (A) Range (s) 
Setting 
(s) Range (x CT rating) Settings 
Primary 
(A) 
A1 SEPAM 400:5 0.01 - 1   0.3 120 0.1-12.5 2.55       
G/F protection does not grade with DNO incomer, takes 
longer than 3s for the relay to operate at the systems 
maximum L-G current. 
B1 SEPAM 400:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.75 700 0.1-12.5 2.16       
Does not grade for O/C with DNO incomer. Trips at grid 
fault level within 2.4s whereas DNO trips within 0.8s. 
B1 SEPAM 400:5 0.01 - 1   0.3 120 0.1-12.5 2.55       
G/F protection does not grade with DNO incomer, takes 
longer than 3s for the relay to operate at the systems 
maximum L-G current. 
WPD B 
MCCG52 400:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.75 700 0.05-1 0.25         
WPD B 
MCCG52 400:5 0.05 - 2.4   0.3 120 0.05-1 0.325         
WPD A 
MCCG52 400:5 0.05 - 2.4   1.75 700 0.05-1 0.25         
WPD A 
MCCG52 400:5 0.05 - 2.4   0.3 120 0.05-1 0.325         
VCB C 
SEPAM 600:5 0.5 - 2.4   1 600 0.1-12.5 0.59         
VCB C 
SEPAM 600:5 0.01 - 1   1 600 0.1-12.5 0.32       
L-G set at 600A, considerably more than the system fault 
current.  
G1 SEPAM 150:1 0.5 - 2.4   0.9 135 0.1-12.5 0.89       
O/C settings as ANSI 51 is <1.2 x FLC of generator 
capacity. 
Under/Over frequency setting not in-line with G59 
recommendations. 
G1 SEPAM 150:1 0.01 - 15   0.05 7.5 0.05-300 1       L-G setting as ANSI 50N is less than 'Io' stability sum. 
G2 SEPAM 150:1 0.5 - 2.4   0.9 135. 0.1-12.5 0.89       
O/C settings as ANSI 51 is < 1.2 x FLC of generator 
capacity. 
Under/Over frequency setting not in-line with G59 
recommendations. 
G2 SEPAM 150:1 0.01 - 15   0.05 7.5 0.05-300 1       L-G setting as ANSI 50N is < 'Io' stability sum. 
G3 SEPAM 150:1 0.5 - 2.4   0.9 135 0.1-12.5 0.89       
O/C settings as ANSI 51 is < 1.2 x FLC of generator 
capacity. 
Under/Over frequency setting not in-line with G59 
recommendations. 
G3 SEPAM 150:1 0.01 - 15   0.05 7.5 0.05-300 1       L-G setting as ANSI 50N is less than Io' stability sum. 
G4 SEPAM 150:1 0.05 - 2.4   1.86 279 0.1-12.5 0.16       
O/C Setting as ANSI 51 is approx. 208A or 200% of 
generator FLC capacity. 
Under/Over Voltages or frequency setting not in-line 









Tap Setting (Pickup) Time Dial  Instantaneous Setting 
Observations 
 Range (x CT rating) Setting Primary (A) Range (s) 
Setting 
(s) Range (x CT rating) Settings 
Primary 
(A) 
G4 SEPAM 150:1 0.01 - 1   0.45 67.5 0.1-12.5 0.44       
L-G setting has just 100ms grading margin when 
compared with upstream VCB A or VCB A2. 
L-G setting is 67.5A with a non-IEC curve (1.2 x 67.5 
=81A), IEC recommends 10% of NER thus 15A 
G5 SEPAM 150:1 0.05 - 2.4  1.87 280.5 0.1-12.5 0.16       
O/C Setting as ANSI 51 is approx. 208A or 200% of 
generator FLC capacity. 
Under/Over Voltages or frequency setting not in-line 
with G59 recommendations. 
G5 SEPAM 150:1 0.01 - 1   0.45 67.5 0.1-12.5 0.44       
L-G setting has just 100ms grading time when compared 
with VCB A or VCB A2. 
L-G setting is 67.5A with a non-IEC curve (1.2 x 67.5 








Function Long-Time  Short-Time / Ground 
Instantaneous / 
















A1 Terasaki AGR-L 2000 Phase                       
ACB 
T1 Terasaki AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5 10 40000 ST Band 0.1     
Pick up setting at 4000A, the 
transformer ampacity is 3333A 
ACB 
T2 Terasaki AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5 10 40000 ST Band 0.1     
Pick up setting at 4000A, the 
transformer ampacity is 3333A 
ACB 
T2 Terasaki AGR-L 4000 Ground         0.1 400 
Ground 
Band 0.1       
ACB 
T3 Merlin Gerin 
STR 
18M 2000 Phase                 2 4000   
ACB 
T15 Terasaki AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5         10 40000 
Pick up setting at 4000A, the 
transformer ampacity is 3333A 
ACB 
T16 Terasaki AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5         10 40000 
Pick up setting at 4000A, the 
transformer ampacity is 3333A 
ACB 
T11 Terasaki AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5         10 40000 
Pick up setting at 4000A, the 
transformer ampacity is 3333A 
ACB 
T12 Terasaki AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5         10 40000 
Pick up setting at 4000A, the 
































T14 Terasaki AGR-L 3200 Phase 1 3200 
LT 
Band 0.5         12 38400 
Pick up setting value is < FLC of 
the transformer. 
ACB 
T13 Terasaki AGR-L 3200 Phase 1 3200 
LT 
Band 0.5         12 38400 





Terasaki AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
No L-G setting present on the UPS 
input, therefore an opportunity 
exists to improve L-G grading 




O/P Terasaki AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
Pick up for O/C output setting is 
1600A whereas the UPS machine 




O/P Terasaki AGR-L 1600 Ground         1 1200 
Ground 




Terasaki AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
No L-G setting present on the UPS 
input, therefore an opportunity 
exists to improve L-G grading 




O/P Terasaki AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
Pick up for O/C UPS output setting 
is 1600A whereas the machine 




Terasaki AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
No L-G setting present on the UPS 
input, therefore an opportunity 
exists to improve L-G grading 




O/P Terasaki AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
Pick up for O/C output setting is 





Terasaki AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
No L-G setting present on the UPS 
input, therefore an opportunity 
exists to improve L-G grading 




O/P Terasaki AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
Pick up for O/C output setting is 


































Terasaki AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
No L-G setting present on the UPS 
input, therefore an opportunity 
exists to improve L-G grading 




O/P Terasaki AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
Pick up for O/C output setting is 
1600A whereas the machine rating 
is 900A. 
 







LG fault current 
(KA) Base KV 
Observations  
LV Fuse T9 Bussmann GG 0.55 kV 800 
47.37 50.632  
0.411 
Fuses are not required; settings can be achieved on the IDMT 
incoming relay to maintain effective grading and inter-trip 
indications. 
PDU A2 FUSE Bussmann DD 0.415 kV 160 
97.413 104.242  
0.411 
PDU fuses do not grade with transformer incomer whilst in 
UPS bypass mode. 
PDU A21 FUSE Bussmann DD 0.415 kV 160 
97.413 104.242  
0.411 
PDU fuses do not grade with transformer incomer whilst in 
UPS bypass mode. 













III Complete LV & HV Protection Settings Table relating to Chapter 6.1, Improving AO with protection device grading 








Tap (Pickup)  Time Dial / Mult. Instantaneous Inst. Delay 
Range Setting Primary Range Setting Range Settings Primary Range Setting 
T10 LV 
IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 5250 0.05-1 0.15           
T10 LV 
IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.15 4025 0.05-1 0.1 
1 - 31  x51 
Pickup 9 36225     
T10 LV 
IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.8 2800 0.05-1 0.2           
T10 LV 
IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.7 2450 0.05-1 0.2           
T9 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.35 1225 0.05-1 0.15           
T9 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.35 1225 0.05-1 0.5 
1 - 31  x51 
Pickup 30 36750     
T9 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.8 2800 0.05-1 0.2           
T9 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.6 2100 0.05-1 0.2           
T3 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3           
T3 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.95 1520 0.05-1 0.25 
1 - 31  x51 
Pickup 10 15200     
T3 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3           
T3 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.25 2000 0.05-1 0.25 
1 - 31  x51 
Pickup 8 16000     
T4 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 2400.000 0.05-1 0.3           
T4 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.95 1520 0.05-1 0.2 
1 - 31  x51 
Pickup 10 15200     
T4 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3           
T4 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.25 2000 0.05-1 0.25 
1 - 31  x51 
Pickup 8 16000     
T8 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3           
T8 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.95 1520 0.05-1 0.25 
1 - 31  x51 
Pickup 10 15200     
T8 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3           
T8 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.25 2000 0.05-1 0.25 
1 - 31  x51 











Tap (Pickup)  Time Dial / Mult. Instantaneous Inst. Delay 
Range Setting Primary Range Setting Range Settings Primary Range Setting 
T7 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3           
T7 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.95 1520 0.05-1 0.25 
1 - 31  x51 
Pickup 10 15200     
T7 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3           
T7 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.25 2000 0.05-1 0.25 
1 - 31  x51 
Pickup  16000     
T6 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.55 5425 0.05-1 0.3           
T6 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.15 4025 0.05-1 0.3 
1 - 31  x51 
Pickup 8 32200     
T6 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 5250 0.05-1 0.3           
T6 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 2s 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.7 2450 0.05-1 0.2           
T5 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 5250 0.05-1 0.3           
T5 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.15 4025 0.05-1 0.3 
1 - 31  x51 
Pickup 8 32200     
T5 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 5250 0.05-1 0.3           
T5 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 2s 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.7 2450 0.05-1 0.2           
T12 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 225 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 12 1800     
T12 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Extremely Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1 165 
0.1-
12.5 0.3 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 12 1800 
0.05 - 
300 0.2 s 
T12 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.2 30 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 3 450     
T12 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.2 30 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 3 450     
T14 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 225 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 12 1800     
T14 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Extremely Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1 165 
0.1-
12.5 0.3 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 12 1800 
0.05 - 
300 0.2 s 
T14 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.2 30 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 3 450     
T14 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.2 30 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 3 450     
T16 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 225 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 12 1800     
 








IEC - Extremely Inverse  
 












0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 
 
12  1800 
0.05 - 











Tap (Pickup)  Time Dial / Mult. Instantaneous Inst. Delay 
Range Setting Primary Range Setting Range Settings Primary Range Setting 
T16 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.2 30 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 3 450     
T16 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.2 30 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 3 450     
T1 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 262.5 
0.1-
12.5 0.93 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 8 1200     
T1 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase 
IEC - Extremely Inverse 
(TMS) 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1 165 
0.13-
15.47 0.4 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 18 2700 
0.05 - 
300 0.1 s 
T1 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.02 3     
T1 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.15 22.5 
0.05 - 
300 0.1 s 
T3 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 131.25 
0.1-
12.5 0.89 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 8 600     
T3 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Phase 
IEC - Extremely Inverse 
(TMS) 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1 82.5 
0.13-
15.47 0.4 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 18 1350 
0.05 - 
300 0.1 s 
T3 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.02 1.5     
T3 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.15 11.25 
0.05 - 
300 0.15 s 
T5 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 262.5 
0.1-
12.5 0.59 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 8 1200     
T5 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase 
IEC - Extremely Inverse 
(TMS) 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1 165 
0.13-
15.47 0.4 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 18 2700 
0.05 - 
300 0.1 s 
T5 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.02 3     
T5 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.15 22.5 
0.05 - 
300 0.15 s 
T7 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 131.25 
0.1-
12.5 0.74 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 8 600     
T7 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Phase 
IEC - Extremely Inverse 
(TMS) 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1 82.5 
0.13-
15.47 0.4 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 18 1350 
0.05 - 
300 0.1 s 
T7 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.02 1.5     
T7 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.15 11.25 
0.05 - 
300 0.15 s 
T9 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.25 187.5 
0.1-
12.5 0.74 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 9 1350     
T9 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Very Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1 150 
0.1-
12.5 0.4 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 9 1350 
0.05 - 
300 0.5 s 
T9 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.02 3     
T9 SEPAM  150:5  Overcurrent  Ground              
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 















Tap (Pickup)  Time Dial / Mult. Instantaneous Inst. Delay 
Range Setting Primary Range Setting Range Settings Primary Range Setting 
T2 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 262.5 
0.1-
12.5 0.59 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 8 1200     
T2 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase 
IEC - Extremely Inverse 
(TMS) 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1 165 
0.13-
15.47 0.4 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 18 2700 
0.05 - 
300 0.1 s 
T2 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.02 3     
T2 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.15 22.5 
0.05 - 
300 0.1 s 
T4 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 131.25 
0.1-
12.5 0.74 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 8 600     
T4 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Phase 
IEC - Extremely Inverse 
(TMS) 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1 82.5 
0.13-
15.47 0.4 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 18 1350 
0.05 - 
300 0.1 s 
T4 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.02 1.5     
T4 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.15 11.25 
0.05 - 
300 0.15 s 
T6 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.7 262.5 
0.1-
12.5 0.59 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 8 1200     
T6 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase 
IEC - Extremely Inverse 
(TMS) 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1 165 
0.13-
15.47 0.4 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 18 2700 
0.05 - 
300 0.1 s 
T6 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.02 3     
T6 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.15 22.5 
0.05 - 
300 0.15 s 
T8 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 131.25 
0.1-
12.5 0.74 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 8 600     
T8 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Phase 
IEC - Extremely Inverse 
(TMS) 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1 82.5 
0.13-
15.47 0.4 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 18 1350 
0.05 - 
300 0.1 s 
T8 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.02 1.5     
T8 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.15 11.25 
0.05 - 
300 0.15 s 
T10 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 225 
0.1-
12.5 0.44 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 9 1350     
T10 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Very Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1 150 
0.1-
12.5 0.3 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 12 1800 
0.05 - 
300 0.075 s 
T10 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.02 3     
T10 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.2 30 
0.05 - 
300 0.1 s 
T15 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 225 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 12 1800     
T15 SEPAM  150:5  Overcurrent  Phase  IEC - Extremely Inverse  
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1  165  
 
0.1-
12.5 0.3  
0.5 - 24  xCT 















Tap (Pickup)  Time Dial / Mult. Instantaneous Inst. Delay 
Range Setting Primary Range Setting Range Settings Primary Range Setting 
T15 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.2 30 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 3 450     
T15 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.2 30 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 3 450     
T13 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 225 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 12 1800     
T13 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Extremely Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1 165 
0.1-
12.5 0.3 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 12 1800 
0.05 - 
300 0.2 s 
T13 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.2 30 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 3 450     
T13 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.2 30 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 3 450     
T11 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 225 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 12 1800     
T11 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Extremely Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.1 165 
0.1-
12.5 0.3 
0.5 - 24  xCT 
Sec 12 1800 
0.05 - 
300 0.2 s 
T11 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.2 30 
0.1-
12.5 0.12 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 3 450     
A2 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 600 
0.1-
12.5 0.3           
A2 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.3 520 
0.1-
12.5 0.25 
0.05 - 24  xCT 
Sec 9 3600 
0.05 - 
300 0.25 s 
A2 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.1 40 
0.1-
12.5 0.12           
A2 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground IEC - Very Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.2 80 
0.1-
12.5 0.4           
A SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase                       
A SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.31 124 
0.05-
300 0.6           
A SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground                       
B SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Definite Time 
0.05 - 24  xCT 
Sec 1.75 700 
0.05-
300 0.3           
B SEPAM 0:0 Overcurrent Phase                       
B SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.31 124 
0.05-
300 0.6           
B SEPAM 0:0 Overcurrent Ground                       
B2 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.5 600 
0.1-
12.5 0.3           
B2 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Very Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.3 520 
0.1-
12.5 0.25 
0.05 - 24  xCT 
Sec 9 3600 
0.05 - 
300 0.25 s 
B2 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.1 40 
0.1-
12.5 0.12           
B2 SEPAM  400:5  Overcurrent  Ground  IEC - Very Inverse  
0.01 - 1  xCT 
















Tap (Pickup)  Time Dial / Mult. Instantaneous Inst. Delay 
Range Setting Primary Range Setting Range Settings Primary Range Setting 
A1 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 700 
0.1-
12.5 2.165           
A1 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 700 
0.1-
12.5 0.6 
0.05 - 24  xCT 
Sec 11 4400 
0.05 - 
300 0.4 s 
A1 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.3 120 
0.1-
12.5 2.55           
A1 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground IEC - Very Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.25 100 
0.1-
12.5 0.4           
B1 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 700 
0.1-
12.5 2.16           
B1 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 700 
0.1-
12.5 0.6 
0.05 - 24  xCT 
Sec 11 4400 
0.05 - 
300 0.4 s 
B1 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.3 120 
0.1-
12.5 2.55           
B1 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground IEC - Very Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.25 100 
0.1-
12.5 0.4           
WPD B 
MCCG52 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 700 0.05-1 0.25           
WPD B 
MCCG52 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 700 0.05-1 0.35           
WPD B 
MCCG52 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.3 120 0.05-1 0.325           
WPD B 
MCCG52 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.3 120 0.05-1 0.325           
WPD A 
MCCG52 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 700 0.05-1 0.25           
WPD A 
MCCG52 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.75 700 0.05-1 0.35           
WPD A 
MCCG52 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.3 120 0.05-1 0.325           
WPD A 
MCCG52 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.3 120 0.05-1 0.325           
VCB C 
SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1 600 
0.1-
12.5 0.59           
VCB C 
SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Very Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.9 540 
0.1-
12.5 0.15           
VCB C 
SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 1 600 
0.1-
12.5 0.32           
VCB C 
SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Ground IEC - Very Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.15 90 
0.1-
12.5 0.24           
G1 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.9 135 
0.1-
12.5 0.89           
G1 SEPAM  150:1  Overcurrent  Phase  
IEC - Standard Inverse 
  
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
















Tap (Pickup)  Time Dial / Mult. Instantaneous Inst. Delay 
Range Setting Primary Range Setting Range Settings Primary Range Setting 
G1 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.05 7.5 
0.05-
300 1           
G1 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.1 15 
0.05-
300 1           
G2 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.9 135 
0.1-
12.5 0.89           
G2 SEPAM 0:0 Overcurrent Phase                       
G2 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.05 7.5 
0.05-
300 1           
G2 SEPAM 0:0 Overcurrent Ground                       
G2 diff 150:1 Overcurrent Phase                       
G2 diff 150:1 Overcurrent Ground                       
G3 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.9 135 
0.1-
12.5 0.89           
G3 SEPAM 0:0 Overcurrent Phase                       
G3 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.05 7.5 
0.05-
300 1           
G3 SEPAM 0:0 Overcurrent Ground                       
G4 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.86 279 
0.1-
12.5 0.16           
G4 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1 150 
0.1-
12.5 0.89           
G4 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.45 67.5 
0.1-
12.5 0.44           
G4 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.1 15 
0.05-
300 1           
G4 diff 150:1 Overcurrent Ground                       
G5 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1.87 280.5 
0.1-
12.5 0.16           
G5 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1 150 
0.1-
12.5 0.89           
G5 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.45 67.5 
0.1-
12.5 0.44           
G5 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 
0.01 - 15  xCT 
Sec 0.1 15 
0.05-
300 1           
G5 diff 150:1 Overcurrent Phase                       
T9 REF 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase             
10 - 40  xCT 
Sec 10 350 
0.01 - 
0.01 0.01 s 
WPD B 
directional 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.5 200 
0.1-
12.5 0.1           
WPD B 
directional 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.4 160 
0.1-
12.5 0.1           
WPD A 
directional 
  400:5  Overcurrent  Phase  Standard Inverse  
0.05 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec  0.5  200  
0.1-











Tap (Pickup)  Time Dial / Mult. Instantaneous Inst. Delay 
Range Setting Primary Range Setting Range Settings Primary Range Setting 
WPD A 
directional 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.4 160 
0.1-
12.5 0.1           
VCB E 
SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1 600 
0.1-
12.5 0.59           
VCB E 
SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Very Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.8 480 
0.1-
12.5 0.4           
VCB E 
SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 1 600 
0.1-
12.5 0.32           
VCB E 
SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Ground IEC - Very Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.17 102 
0.1-
12.5 0.6           
VCB D 
SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 1 600 
0.1-
12.5 0.59           
VCB D 
SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Very Inverse 
0.5 - 2.4  xCT 
Sec 0.8 480 
0.1-
12.5 0.4           
VCB D 
SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 1 600 
0.1-
12.5 0.32           
VCB D 
SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Ground IEC - Very Inverse 
0.01 - 1  xCT 
Sec 0.17 102 
0.1-
12.5 0.6           
 
Where, Orange coloured cells highlight the proposed protection changes, in comparison to the original scheme (Changes required for the HV scheme 339 of a 















Low Voltage System Settings  
LVCB 
ID 
Manufacturer Model Amps Model Function 





















B/C A1 Terasaki AR440S 4000 
AGR-
L Phase                           
ACB 








Pickup 10 40000 
ST 
Band 0.1       
ACB 




Pickup 0.9 3600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 56000 
ACB 








Pickup 10 40000 
ST 
Band 0.1       
ACB 




Pickup 0.9 3600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 56000 
ACB 
T2 Terasaki AR440S 4000 
AGR-
L Ground           
Ground 
Pickup 0.1 400 
Ground 
Band 0.1       
ACB 
T2 Terasaki AR440S 4000 
AGR-
L Ground                           
ACB 
T3 Merlin Gerin M20 H1 2000 
STR 
18M Phase                     
Inst. 
Pickup 2 4000 
B/C C1 Merlin Gerin M40 H1 4000 
STR 
18M Phase                           
B/C G1 Merlin Gerin M40 H1 4000 
STR 
18M Phase                           
ACB 




Pickup 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 10 40000 
ACB 




Pickup 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 10 40000 
ACB 




Pickup 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 10 40000 
ACB 




Pickup 0.9 3600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 10 40000 
ACB 




Pickup 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 10 40000 
ACB 




Pickup 0.9 3600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 10 40000 
ACB 




Pickup 1 3200 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 12 38400 
ACB 




Pickup 1 3200 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 12 38400 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 






Manufacturer Model Amps Model Function 



























Pickup 0.85 1360 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 10 16000 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 0.85 1360 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 6 9600 
ACB 
UPS 
A1 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 
AGR-
L Ground           
Ground 
Pickup 1 1200 
Ground 
Band 0.1       
ACB 
UPS 
A1 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 
AGR-
L Ground           
Ground 
Pickup 1 1200 
Ground 
Band 1       




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 0.9 1440 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 10 16000 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 0.8 1280 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 6 9600 
ACB 
UPS 
A2 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 
AGR-
L Ground                           
ACB 
UPS 
A2 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 
AGR-
L Ground           
Ground 
Pickup 1 1200 
Ground 
Band 1       
ACB 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 0.9 1440 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 






Manufacturer Model Amps Model Function 



























Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 0.8 1280 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 6 9600 
ACB 
UPS 
A3 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 
AGR-
L Ground                           
ACB 
UPS 
A3 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 
AGR-
L Ground           
Ground 
Pickup 1 1200 
Ground 
Band 1       
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 0.9 1440 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 10 16000 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 0.8 1280 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 6 9600 
ACB 
UPS 
A4 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 
AGR-
L Ground                           
ACB 
UPS 
A4 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 
AGR-
L Ground           
Ground 
Pickup 1 1200 
Ground 
Band 1       
ACB 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
ACB 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 0.9 1440 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 10 16000 
ACB 
UPS 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 






Manufacturer Model Amps Model Function 



























Pickup 0.8 1280 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 6 9600 
ACB 
UPS 
A5 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 
AGR-
L Ground                           
ACB 
UPS 
A5 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 
AGR-
L Ground           
Ground 
Pickup 1 1200 
Ground 
Band 1       
ACB 




Pickup 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 22400 
A1 
Bypass 












Pickup 10 40000 
A1 
Bypass 




Pickup 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5           
Inst. 
Pickup 14 56000 
DB A/2 
B/C Terasaki AR440S 4000 
AGR-
L Phase                           
A2 
Bypass 




Pickup 1 4000 
LT 
Band 5           
Inst. 
Pickup 4 16000 
A2 
Bypass 
ACB Terasaki AR440S 4000 
AGR-
L Phase                           
 
Where, Orange coloured cells highlight the proposed protection changes, in comparison to the original scheme etc. (Changes required for the LV scheme 54 









IV Protection Settings for Arc Flash Mitigation Table relating to Chapter 6.2  
Low Voltage System Settings  
LVCB ID Make Model Amps Model Sensor/Frame Function 












Label Band Pickup 
Trip 
(Amps) 
ACB T1 Terasaki AR440S 4000 AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5 10 40000 ST Band 0.1     
ACB T2 Terasaki AR440S 4000 AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5 10 40000 ST Band 0.1     
ACB T2 Terasaki AR440S 4000 AGR-L 4000 Ground         0.1 400 
Ground 
Band 0.1     
ACB T3 
Merlin 
Gerin M20 H1 2000 
STR 
18M 2000 Phase                 2 4000 
ACB T15 Terasaki AR440SB 4000 AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5         10 40000 
ACB T16 Terasaki AR440SB 4000 AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5         10 40000 
ACB T11 Terasaki AR440SB 4000 AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5         10 40000 
ACB T12 Terasaki AR440SB 4000 AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 0.5         10 40000 
ACB T14 Terasaki AR332H 3200 AGR-L 3200 Phase 1 3200 
LT 
Band 0.5         12 38400 
ACB T13 Terasaki AR332H 3200 AGR-L 3200 Phase 1 3200 
LT 
Band 0.5         12 38400 
ACB UPS 
A1 I/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
ACB UPS 
A1 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
ACB UPS 
A1 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 AGR-L 1600 Ground         1 1200 
Ground 
Band 0.1     
ACB UPS 
A2 I/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
ACB UPS 
A2 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
ACB UPS 
A3 I/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 




LVCB ID Make Model Amps Model Sensor/Frame Function 
















A3 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
ACB UPS 
A4 I/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
ACB UPS 
A4 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
ACB UPS 
A5 I/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
ACB UPS 
A5 O/P Terasaki AR316H 1600 AGR-L 1600 Phase 1 1600 
LT 
Band 0.5         14 22400 
A1 Bypass 
ACB Terasaki AR440S 4000 AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 
Band 5 2 8000 ST Band 0.2 10 40000 
A2 Bypass 
ACB Terasaki AR440S 4000 AGR-L 4000 Phase 1 4000 
LT 














High Voltage System Settings  
Relay ID 
CT 
Ratio Device Function Trip Element Curve 
Tap (Pickup)  Time Dial / Mult. Instantaneous 
Range Setting Primary Range Setting Range Settings Primary 
T10 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 5250 0.05-1 0.15       
T10 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 0.8 2800 0.05-1 0.20       
T9 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 0.35 1225 0.05-1 0.15       
T9 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 0.8 2800 0.05-1 0.2       
T3 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3       
T3 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3       
T4 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3       
T4 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3       
T8 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3       
T8 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3       
T7 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3       
T7 LV IDMT 1600:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 2400 0.05-1 0.3       
T6 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.55 5425 0.05-1 0.3       
T6 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 5250 0.05-1 0.3       
T5 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 5250 0.05-1 0.3       
T5 LV IDMT 3500:5 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 5250 0.05-1 0.3       
T12 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 12 1800 
T12 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 0.2 30 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 3 450 
T14 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 12 1800 
T14 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 0.2 30 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 3 450 
T16 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5  225  0.1-12.5  0.12  0.5 - 24  xCT Sec  12  1800  
T16 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 0.2 30 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 3 450 
T1 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.75 262.5 0.1-12.5 0.93 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 8 1200 
T1 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.02 3 
T3 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.75 131.25 0.1-12.5 0.89 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 8 600 
T3 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Ground             0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.02 1.5 
T5 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.75 262.5 0.1-12.5 0.59 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 8 1200 
T5 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.02 3 
T7 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.75 131.25 0.1-12.5 0.74 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 8 600 
T7 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Ground             0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.02 1.5 
T9 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.25 187.5 0.1-12.5 0.74 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 9 1350 
T9 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.02 3 
T2 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.75 262.5 0.1-12.5 0.59 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 8 1200 
T2 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.02 3 
T4 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.75 131.25 0.1-12.5 0.74 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 8 600 
T4 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Ground             0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.02 1.5 
T6 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.75 262.5 0.1-12.5 0.59 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 8 1200 
T6 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.02 3 
T8 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.75 131.25 0.1-12.5 0.74 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 8 600 
T8 SEPAM 75:5 Overcurrent Ground             0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.02 1.5 
T10 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.44 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 9 1350 
T10 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground             0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.02 3 
T15 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 12 1800 






Ratio Device Function Trip Element Curve 
Tap (Pickup)  Time Dial / Mult. Instantaneous 
Range Setting Primary Range Setting Range Settings Primary 
T13 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 12 1800 
T13 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 0.2 30 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 3 450 
T11 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 225 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.5 - 24  xCT Sec 12 1800 
T11 SEPAM 150:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 0.2 30 0.1-12.5 0.12 0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 3 450 
A2 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 600 0.1-12.5 0.3       
A2 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 0.1 40 0.1-12.5 0.12       
A SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.31 124 0.05-300 0.6       
B SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Definite Time 0.05 - 24  xCT Sec 1.75 700 0.05-300 0.3       
B SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.31 124 0.05-300 0.6       
B2 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Very Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.5 600 0.1-12.5 0.3       
B2 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Extremely Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 0.1 40 0.1-12.5 0.12       
A1 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.75 700 0.1-12.5 2.165       
A1 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 0.30 120 0.1-12.5 2.55       
B1 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.75 700 0.1-12.5 2.16       
B1 SEPAM 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 0.3 120 0.1-12.5 2.55       
WPD B MCCG52 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.75 700 0.05-1 0.25       
WPD B MCCG52 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 0.3 120 0.05-1 0.325       
WPD A MCCG52 400:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.75 700 0.05-1 0.25       
WPD A MCCG52 400:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 0.3 120 0.05-1 0.325       
VCB C SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1 600 0.1-12.5 0.59       
VCB C SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 1 600 0.1-12.5 0.32       
G1 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 0.9 135 0.1-12.5 0.89       
G1 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.05 7.5 0.05-300 1       
G2 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Phase IEC - Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 0.9 135 0.1-12.5 0.89       
G2 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.05 7.5 0.05-300 1       
G3 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 0.9 135 0.1-12.5 0.89       
G3 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Definite Time 0.01 - 15  xCT Sec 0.05 7.5 0.05-300 1       
G4 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.86 279 0.1-12.5 0.16       
G4 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 0.45 67.5 0.1-12.5 0.44       
G5 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Phase Extremely Inverse 0.05 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1.87 280.5 0.1-12.5 0.16       
G5 SEPAM 150:1 Overcurrent Ground Very Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 0.45 67.5 0.1-12.5 0.44       
VCB E SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1 600 0.1-12.5 0.59       
VCB E SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Ground Standard Inverse 0.01 - 1  xCT Sec 1 600 0.1-12.5 0.32       
VCB D SEPAM 600:5 Overcurrent Phase Standard Inverse 0.5 - 2.4  xCT Sec 1 600 0.1-12.5 0.59       





V Parameters for Establishing Optimal Network Load Flow Relating to Chapter 5 
Simulation Approach  
Load flow optimal conditions for a Tier 3 data centre system  
Condition 1 Switchgear busbar 
Voltage Security Indices (Vsi) must 
comply with: 
 







Vi = Simulated busbar voltage 
Vsp = Specified busbar voltage 
(Nominal 415V) 
Vlim = Voltage deviation  
 
Condition 2 Cost parameters 
of an optimal distribution 
transformers arrangement 
must comply with: 
 
TX Ecost ≤ 0.5428 
 
Where; 
TX Ecost is the total annual 
energy cost for a 
distribution transformer, 




Condition 3 Generator vector 
stability curves should not be 
exceeded during: 
 
Pn < Pd < Pd x 1.1 
 
Where; 
Pn is the nominal site load power 
(MW) 
Pd is the system power design 
capabilities (MW) 





























VI Parameters for Establishing Optimal Network Short Circuit Analysis Relating to Chapter 5 Simulation Approach  
Short circuit analysis optimal conditions for a Tier 3 data centre system 
Load demand and 
profiles: 
All simulations must be 
inclusive of actual site 
power metering data from 
devices in accordance to 
IEC62053 
 
Where accuracy is within 
tolerances: 
 
Voltage (V) and Current 
(A) ± 0.01% 
Frequency (Hz)  ± 0.005 
Hz 
Power (KW) ± 0.075% 
Power Factor (PF) ± 
0.02% (from 0.5 lag to 0.5 
lead). 
 
Specify the actual KVA & 
PF in simulations with 
details for constant KVA or 
constant Z type loads to be 
expressed as a percentage 
of nominal load. 
 
For constant KVA loads 
LRC values must conform 
with: 
 
LRC ≥ 6 x In 
 
Where; 
LRC = lock rotor current 





ratings must not 
exceed: 
 
In ≤ 0.95 x Ib 
 
Where; 
In = Nominal 
connected busbar 
load currents (A) 
including any Tier 
3 redundant 
capability.  
Ib = Switchgear 
continuous 
current rating (A) 




Static path contribution 
for model components 
must include: 
 
Kac = 1200 – 1400%  
 
Where; 
Kac is the short circuit 
expressed as percentage 
of nominal UPS current 
rating. 
 
Internal bypass switch 
must be closed for all 
short circuit simulations. 
 
A Synchronous motor 
(model block) is to be 
utilised for representation 
of the rotary UPS sub 
transient components, 
where transient data is 
sourced from the OEM: 
 




OEM is the original 
equipment 
manufacturers 
Xd’’ = sub transient 
impedance  
Xd’ = transient 
impedance  




must not exceed 
IEC60034: 
 
2.18 x FLC < 10s 
 
Where; 
FLC = Nominal full 
load current rating 













Xd’ = direct axis 
transient 
reactance 






Model components must 
satisfy: 
 
Imag < In x 8 
Tmag < 6 cycles 
 
Where; 
Imag = transformer magnetising 
current (A) 
Tmag = time in seconds for 
transformer inrush to clear. 
 
Faults simulated on the 






Zs = total upstream system 
impedance 
Zt = transformer impedance 
 
Short circuit current analysis 
must include both frequent and 
infrequent values as IEEE C57. 
 
(𝐼 𝑡 = 𝐾) < 𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶57.109 
 
Where; 
I = Symmetrical fault current, 
expressed as times rated 
current. 
K = constant determined at 




Model as fixed (Z) passive 
analysis. Simulations must 
include cable data for positive, 
negative and zero sequence 
resistance and reactance. 
Construction and insulation 
type, along with configuration 
i.e., trefoil, flat or random lay. 
 
IEC603664 operating factors 
must be applied as; 
 
Cg Ca Cs Ct 
 
Where factors; 
Cg = grouping with other 
cables.  
Ca = ambient temperature 
exposed to cabling. 
Ct= Thermal insulation (where 
cable penetrates) 
Cs = derating for semi enclosed 
fuse types BS3036. In x 0.725. 




Thermal damage curves as 
IEC603644 are to be plotted in 
the TCC for compliance with 
𝐼 𝑡.  
 
Where; 





current values at 
each busbar:  L-
L-L, L-G, L-L, L-
L-G. 
 
L-L-L < IEEE 
Std. C37.21  
 
Where; 






L-L-L & L-G 
IEEE Std. C37.21  
values are then to 
be utilised in 







VII Parameters for Establishing Optimal Electrical Protection Relay Settings Relating to Chapter 5 Simulation Approach  
Protection device settings optimal conditions for a Tier 3 data centre system 
Generators: 
Curve type = IEC SI   
Phase Overcurrent 50/51: 1.2 
x In 
Earth Fault 50N/51N: 10% of 
NER rating 
Machine Differential 87M: 
5 to 10% In (stator) 
20% In (frame faults) 
Reverse Active Power 32P:  
5 to 20% Pn 




Td = 3  
Undervoltage 27: 
0.75 to 0.85 x Un  
Td = 3  
Over voltage 59: 
1.1 x Un  
Td = 5  
 
For O/C & E/F settings: 
 
Td > 200ms  
 
Between generator outputs 




In = nominal current rating 
Pn = nominal power rating 
NER = neutral earth resistor  
Td = time delay in seconds.  
O/C = relay overcurrent 
setting 
E/F = relay earth fault setting 
UPS: 
LT pick-up ≥ 1.5 x In 
Td > 200ms  
 
Relevant between UPS input & upstream devices, 
i.e., Td = 0, between UPS input and outputs.  
 
Where; 
LT = Relay long time 
In = UPS nominal current rating (A) 
Td = Time delay (S) 
 
I1 > 1.5 x I2  
Td1 > Td2 + 200ms  
 
For bypass protection against downstream loads. 
 
Where; 
I1 = Bypass relay current setting  
I2 = Downstream PDU relay current setting 
Td1 = Time delay on bypass protection  
Td2 = Time delay on downstream PDU  
 
UPS Voltage and frequency operational settings 
must comply with: 
 
81l/81h/27/59 < G59  
 
Where; 
G59 is the Energy Networks Associations short-
term requirements for parallel power system 
connections.  
 
UPS input INST protection must not exceed: 
 
Inst ≤  (In x 10) 
Where; 
In = nominal current rating (A) 
Inst = instantaneous current setting (A) 
Transformer (HV): 
LT pick-up > 1.25 x In & < 1.5 x In  
 
Where; 
In = Continuous rating of the transformer 
LT = Relay long-time pick-up setting (A). 
 
Ig = 0.3 x In 
 
Where; 
Ig = Ground fault setting (A) 
In = Transformer continuous rating (A) 
 
Td1 > Td2 + 200ms  
 
Where; 
Td1 = Time delay of upstream protection 
device. 
Td2 = time delay of transformer device. 
 
Thermal ratings must achieve IEEE C57.109 
compliance: 
 
(𝐼 𝑡 = 𝐾) < 𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐶57.109 
 
Where; 
I = Symmetrical fault current in times rated 
current. 
K = Constant determined at maximum I when 
t=2. 
t = seconds 
 
 
Note: There is no requirement or benefit to grade 
HV & LV protections, either side of a Dyn11 
vector group transformer.  
HV Main feeder: 
Ig < DNO + Td 200ms  
 
Td (DNO dp) > 200ms + 
Td (PNO dp) 
 
Where; 
Ig = Ground current 
setting (A) 
Td = Time delay (s) 
DNO Dp = DNO 
differential protection 
setting.  




G59 compliance settings: 
U/V & O/V  ± 6% Un, Td = 
0.5 




U/V = Under voltage  
O/V = Over voltage 
U/F = Under frequency 
O/F = Over frequency 
Un = Phase to earth 
Voltage. 
Td = Time delay (s) 
 
Note: Protection system 
must include an operational 
relay to denote signalling 
for LV inter-trip received, 
or HV inter-trip send. 
 
 
LV Main feeder: 
INST > 12 x In & < 
14 x In  
 
Where; 
In = Continuous 
current setting (A). 
INST = 
Instantaneous 
current setting (A). 
 




In = Continuous 
rating of the 
switchgear (A). 
LT = Long-time 
relay setting. 
 
Vk > 2 x Vs 
 
Where; 
Vk = Setting voltage 
of Restricted Earth 
Fault relay. 
Vs = Voltage present 
at the Restricted 
Earth Fault Relay, 
during an earth fault. 
 
Note: Protection 
system must include 
an operational relay to 
denote signalling for 






VIII Parameters for Establishing Optimal Arc Flash Mitigation Relating to Chapter 5 
Simulation Approach  
Arc flash optimal conditions for a Tier 3 data centre system 
For each of the installed switchgears within the data centre electrical network, the following three conditions must be 
obtained. 
 
E < 30 cal/cm2 
FCT < 35 cycles 




RSO > 30m distance from switchgear. 
 
Where; 
E = Incident Energy (J/cm2) 
FCT = Fault Clearing Time (s) 
INST = Instantaneous current setting of incoming switchgear protection relays (KA) 
RSO = Remote Switching Operations i.e., from an HMI controller or mobile lanyard 
 
 
 
